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Abstract 
The destruction of global financial markets and the collapse of the Greek and Irish 
economies in 2010 caused a ripple effect that spread across the Eurozone and 
presented the EU with an unprecedented crisis. The level of economic devastation 
led many to question the integrity of the single currency and the direction of the 
European project as a whole. This thesis has examined three rounds of debate during 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis between 2010 and 2014, in order to ascertain the effect of 
this period on three competing ‘visions’ for the future of Europe. It has found that 
efforts to reform economic governance in the EU in the wake of the crisis have for 
the most part led to an entrenchment of the consolidation orthodoxy sponsored by 
Germany and its allies in northern Europe. However, a political turning point in 
mid-2012 led to a reprieve for the European Left and the subsequent advancement of 
the Social European vision advocating greater solidarity in the place of fiscal 
austerity. While the consolidation coalition’s commitment to economic stability and 
oversight has for the most part been maintained, the shifting balance of power in 
European politics, and an increasing frustration with the failures of austerity, have 
provided momentum for a major revision to the status quo. This thesis has found 
that while the Eurosceptic rise in the 2014 elections has raised serious questions for 
the EU, it has highlighted the unwavering commitment towards further integration 
among the dominant political actors in Europe, and will most likely set the 
Continent further along the path towards an ever closer union.   
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Introduction 
“Germany is our fatherland; Europe is our future”1 
- Helmut Kohl 
The idea of a united Europe was something only the great philosophers dreamed of, 
an ambition of which statesmen did not dare to speak until the devastating effects of 
the Second World War changed Europe’s future for good. A “series of grand 
bargains”2 set the continent on the path of evolving integration throughout the 
second half of the 20th century, until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification 
of Germany cleared the way for the most extensive reversion of European economic 
treaties in history through the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a 
European Union.3 This grand project, spurred on by the founding fathers of 
integration - Delors, Mitterrand and Kohl – expected much of an ever-expanding 
collection of nation states, many of which had had felt a severe human toll from their 
conflicting interests over past decades and centuries. While the Maastricht Treaty 
represented the greatest step forward in integration yet, much like the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 it demanded more, and called for the creation of “an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe.”4  
The potential implications of an ever closer union, beyond the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the single currency established in the 1990s, became the 
central focus for debate in Europe over the next two decades. Delors called for the 
realisation of a “true Federation”5, Kohl likewise dreamed of a “United States of 
Europe”. Margaret Thatcher fiercely warned of dominance from Brussels and the 
                                                             
1 Gray, T. and Wilke, S. (1996), German Unification and its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful 
Revolution, University of Washington Press, USA, page 107. 
2 Moravcsik, A. (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
Cornell University Press, NY, USA, page 1.  
3 Van Oudenaren, J. (2004), “The European Union: From Community to Constitution”, in Europe 
Today: National Politics, European Integration and European Security (ed. Tiersky, R.) Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, MD, USA, page 40.  
4 European Central Bank (1992) “The Maastricht Treaty: Treaty on European Union”, available: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf  
5 Archer, C. (2008), The European Union, Routledge, Oxfordshire, UK, page 27.  
Introduction  2 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
consequences of central power.6 Many of the disputes were based around the extent 
to which the European institutions and sovereign member states would influence 
economic policy-making. Disagreements over the issue materialised into three broad 
competing ‘visions’ for European integration: the move towards an ever closer union 
based on greater political unification and the consolidation of the EMU; the creation 
of a federalist ‘Social Europe’ based on full political and economic integration; and 
the Eurosceptic rejection of ever closer union calling for the repatriation of powers 
from Brussels to national parliaments.  
The nature of the debate took a turn when the collapse of global financial markets 
and the disintegration of economies on the continent’s periphery triggered the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2010. The devastating effects on the European 
economy caused policy-makers to reassess the idea of the EU and the competing 
visions of integration came under greater scrutiny than ever before. Many felt this 
was a time for a fundamental change; some saw the crisis as an opportunity to push 
their ideas for reform. The very foundations upon which the Union were based had 
been called into question while some observers believed it was only a matter of time 
before the single currency collapsed. Political leaders knew they needed to react; the 
question was how they would go about it. Jacques Delors had emphasised the need 
for Europeans to overcome national interests and individualism in the search for a 
common ‘soul’. The events of the next four years in response to the crisis would do 
much to uncover the underlying nature of the soul of Europe.  
This thesis analyses how the response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis has affected the 
strength of the three competing visions for Europe. It does so by focusing primarily 
on economic integration and by critically evaluating the political developments 
within three phases of the crisis between 2010 and 2014. Discovering the political 
soul of Europe is a crucial aspect in understanding the direction of the Union. 
Evaluating the strength of the competing visions will shed some light on Europe’s 
future: will the Community exist simply as a collection of entirely sovereign nation 
                                                             
6 BBC News (April 8th, 2013), “In quotes: Margaret Thatcher”, available: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10377842  
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states? Will we see the development of a transfer union under ‘Social Europe’? Or 
will the EU even survive?  
Chapter 1 sets the scene for the current narrative of economic reform by providing 
the background to both the Eurozone crisis7 and the historical development of the 
three visions in the 20th century. It then examines the changing levels of support for 
the federalist and Eurosceptic ideals since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
early 1990s, and outlines the various political parties, member states, and other 
interests that have fallen in behind each of the three visions. It is concluded that 
despite the support in some quarters for a more collective approach to economic 
policy, and the low but ever-present levels of Euroscepticism, it was the German-led 
vision for a liberal economic ‘stability union’ with the most significant support and 
influence behind it prior to the crisis.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the Fiscal compact, the most significant development in 
economic governance reform in Europe since the Stability and Growth Pact. Here it 
is shown how both Eurosceptics and Social Europeans failed to turn the tables 
against the German-led consolidation coalition which successfully sought to base 
economic governance reform around fiscal responsibility and tighter budgetary 
surveillance. Implications for the European treaties are discussed, with particular 
attention paid to the UK’s decision to veto the agreement. The failure of the 
European Left is described as coming down to both concerns over the need to react 
and a lack of material power.  
The following chapter looks at how a shift in the political climate in May 2012 
altered the setting for debate as European leaders continued to strive for a solution 
to the crisis. A number of factors, including the election of Francois Hollande to the 
French presidency – and the corresponding end to the ‘Merkozy’ pact – as well as 
the deteriorating economic situation in the Eurozone, led to an increased uncertainty 
over the ability of austerity measures to solve Europe’s problems. It is argued that 
the Two-Pack legislation for the most part followed the status quo direction set by 
prior consolidation-heavy reforms. However, the Left’s ability to delay an agreement 
                                                             
7
 The terms ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis’ and ‘Eurozone Crisis’ are used interchangeably throughout this thesis 
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while keeping the highly-controversial issue of Eurobonds in play acted as a major 
contributor to a turning tide against the austerity orthodoxy during 2012 and 2013.  
Finally, Chapter 4 turns away from economic governance reform to look at the 
European elections of May 2014, where a strong rise in Eurosceptic sentiment caused 
a major stir across the continent. The cause for the surge in anti-EU votes is analysed 
and, while justifications including increased concerns over identity and a decline in 
trust of EU institutions are undoubtedly at play, explanations that downplay the role 
of economics are found to be unconvincing. The strong showing from Eurosceptic 
parties, particularly in the UK, France and Denmark, has provided an opportunity 
for those supporting a vision of ‘less Europe’ to capitalise on. However, it is argued 
that the most significant effect of the Eurosceptic rise could be the formation of an 
unlikely alliance of pro-integration forces. The paradoxical strengthening of the 
political establishment in Europe is likely to be of greatest benefit for the European 
Left, as the pressure to make discernable change away from the status quo in the 
Eurozone continues to mount.  
Each of the visions for Europe is found to have enjoyed periods of support within 
the three phases of debate analysed in this thesis. Despite grave predictions and 
initial fears over the ability of the EU to stay intact, the commitment in the European 
political establishment towards an ever closer union has strengthened. This 
development has come to the detriment of the Eurosceptic vision, which has 
benefitted from a revival based on the success of nationalist and protest parties in 
the 2014 elections. While advocates of less Europe will seek to exploit uncertainty 
surrounding the implications of the Eurosceptic wave, it is more likely that the 
incoherent coalition opposing further integration will be crowded out by a much 
grander alliance between the centre-left and centre-right of European politics. With 
advocates of the two dominant visions agreeing on the need for a more ambitious 
EU in the wake of the crisis, the remaining question tackled in this thesis has been 
over the nature of economic reform. The ordoliberal orthodoxy so ardently 
supported by Germany and its allies has been the dominant economic ideology at 
play in the Eurozone, with stricter fiscal rules enforced and budgetary oversight 
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enhanced in Brussels. However, an electoral turning point in 2012 provided the Left 
with a reprieve that would turn the tables against the consolidation coalition in 
European economic debate. While the effects of the changing political landscape 
following the 2014 elections are yet to be determined at the time of writing, this 
thesis argues that ever-building public frustration with the austerity-centric status 
quo in the EU will allow the Social European vision to prosper from the political 
establishment’s new unlikely alliance. Europe is on course for another ‘grand 
bargain’ whereby Germany must choose between its commitment to its historic 
economic edifice and its dream of a European future.   
1. The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Three Visions for Europe 
“The long drawn-out scream that can be heard reverberating around the dealing floors of the 
world, is the cry of the global economy plunging headlong over the edge of the precipice and 
into the abyss below.”1 
This was the brutal assessment of the global financial services giant UBS on October 
6th, 2008, three weeks after the collapse of the American investment bank Lehman 
Brothers had confirmed that the bursting US housing bubble, crumbling global 
credit conditions and international bank bailouts were not merely points along the 
timeline of an extended economic blip, but key events that would combine to cause 
the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on September 15th was the largest in US history and 
provided a “tectonic eruption that blew a gigantic hole in the world economy”.2 
The Global Financial Crisis would pull apart the European economy in a manner 
which few could have imagined. Moreover, it would lead citizens and policy-makers 
on the Continent alike to question the nature of an integration project which began 
over half a century beforehand. This chapter is broken into two distinct sections. 
First it will briefly discuss how the GFC led towards a crisis of devastating 
proportion that Europe could very much call its own, before outlining two 
explanations for the economic situation the Eurozone finds itself in today. The 
second section of this chapter sets up the three competing ‘visions’ for Europe 
dominating the political scene today. Two rival ‘federalist’ visions for Europe based 
on warring economic and political ideals are introduced as the dominant views in 
the debate since the formation of the EMU. Thereafter, the anti-integrationist vision 
is examined by explaining the development of Euroscepticism in the member states 
in the period leading up to the crisis.  
 
                                                             
1 Paul Donovan, UBS (2008) “Recession”. There is no alternative, available: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&v=_27gGoplAQA&hl=en-GB, (Accessed: May 20th, 2013) 
2 McNally, D. (2011), Global Slump – The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance, Spectre 
Publishing, Oakland, page 13. 
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1.1 Road to the crisis: How the great experiment failed 
The European economy had begun its decline a few months prior to the precipice of 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in America. Euro area unemployment had risen 0.5 
per cent between April and October in 2008 and a 1.1 per cent reduction in the 
growth rate between the first and second quarter in 2008 led to a contracting 
Eurozone economy for the first time in the history of the common currency.3 On the 
national level, things were even worse. By the end of the third fiscal quarter 
Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain had all officially entered 
recession – most of these countries for the first time in over a decade – and the rest of 
the euro area would be soon to follow.  
1.1.i The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The Irish economy had dipped into recession during the early stages of the credit 
crunch, prior to any real concern of a global economic meltdown. This followed the 
greatest period of economic prosperity in the history of the Republic. From 1995 to 
2008, the economy dubbed the Celtic Tiger had cast a magic spell on the emerald 
Isle. The nation saw over a decade of unprecedented growth, soaring employment 
and a poverty rate that dropped to below 6 per cent.4 By the start of the new 
millennium, the Bank of Ireland believed the nation to be the second richest in the 
world.5 While the majority of Irish economic officials and commentators had 
predicted the prolonged boom would end with a ‘soft landing’6, the outcome was to 
be nothing less than a full-scale crash.    
By the time Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, the Irish economy had 
already contracted for five of the past six quarters, over 50,000 more people had 
become unemployed and investors had stopped borrowing.7 Despite the negative 
trends, the Irish Government continued to insist that there was no disaster on the 
                                                             
3 “Euro Area GDP Growth”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/gdp-growth 
(Accessed: May 20th, 2013). 
4 Lewis, M. (2011), Boomerang: The Biggest Bust, Penguin Books, London, page 87. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid, page 90.  
7 “Ireland Unemployed Persons”, available: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/unemployed-persons  (Accessed: May 25th, 2013).  
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horizon and that the banks were in much greater condition than their American 
counterparts. This optimism proved to be unfounded. By January 2009, Anglo-Irish 
Bank and its losses of €34 billion had been nationalised and 10 months later, the 
Government created the National Asset Management Agency to buy €80 billion 
worth of bad bank assets.8 This happened amid an ever-shrinking economy, with an 
unemployment rate that had risen to over 12 per cent and a debt ratio close to three 
times greater than it had been at the end of the boom.  
The Irish economy would soon be in need of external salvation, but not before 
Greece had ensured that rampant corruption and a false economy would cause it to 
become the main source of Eurozone concern. When George Papandreou came to 
power in October 2009, he found that the culture of tax evasion, bribery, dishonesty 
and excess had contributed to a dangerously poor economic situation, far worse than 
what had been reported.9After an IMF investigation into the state of the country’s 
finances had been completed, it was revealed the deficit/GDP ratio was five times 
larger than what had been previously declared.10  
Greek government officials agreed that they would be forced to make large-scale 
cuts to the public sector in order to address the crisis but were held back by an ever-
growing scale of stagnation and indebtedness. By April 2010, Greece was labouring 
under a budget deficit of 13.6 per cent of GDP and a debt/GDP ratio of 115 per 
cent.11 Unable to grow its way out of the situation, the only solution for saving the 
Greek economy and the Eurozone from the flow-on effects of its collapse would be a 
bailout. On May 2nd, Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF agreed to a €110b 
rescue plan for Greece, the largest bailout in history. Papandreou was forced to 
announce a heavy round of austerity measures in order for the country to meet its 
obligations to the EU. The cuts, directed almost entirely at the public sector, were 
                                                             
8 Ibid, page 117.  
9 Ibid, page 64.  
10 Ibid.  
11 “Greece – economic indicators”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/indicators 
(Accessed: May 28th, 2013).  
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meant to save a staggering €30b by 2012.12 Public opposition to the austerity 
measures had been steadily building, and on May 5th, the anger among the masses 
marching on the streets of Athens reached its zenith, where three were killed and 
many more injured in a series of violent protests.13 
Fears of European contagion that had surrounded the bailout negotiations and had 
frightened investors into submission would soon prove to be well founded. As the 
euro continued to falter throughout 2010, concerns that other member states would 
require bailouts intensified. After a period in which Irish debt had reached nearly 90 
per cent of GDP and the country’s unemployment rate had exceeded 14 per cent, the 
EU and IMF agreed to an €85 billion bailout for the country in late November; €35 
billion of this would go towards propping up the failed banks.14 The remaining 
funds were designed to assist the government’s budgetary needs and reduce the 
pain forced upon the electorate by the desperate state of the economy. Despite this, 
the Irish government passed a budget including the toughest spending cuts and tax 
hikes in the nation’s history to counter what Finance Minister Brian Lenihan 
described as its worst ever crisis.15 Six months later Portugal became the next 
Eurozone member to receive a bailout, with an emergency loan package reaching 
€78 billion.16A decision by finance ministers in February 2011 to create the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM)17, a €500 billion permanent bailout fund to replace the 
                                                             
12 EurActiv (May 3rd, 2010), “Euro zone seals €110bn rescue plan for Greece”, available: 
http://www.euractiv.com/euro/euro-zone-seals-110-bn-rescue-plan-for-greece-news-493605  
13 “Greek Bailout: Athens burns – and crisis strikes at the heart of the EU”, available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/05/greek-bailout-economic-crisis-deaths (Accessed: 
May 29th, 2013).  
14 Lisa O’Carroll (November 28th, 2010), “Ireland bailout: full Irish government statement”, available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/ireland-business-blog-with-lisa-
ocarroll/2010/nov/28/ireland-bailout-full-government-statement  
15 Joe Brenan and Dara Doyle (December 9th, 2010), “Irish Lawmakers Back Budget to Combat ‘Worst’ 
Crisis”, available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/irish-lawmakers-back-budget-as-
lenihan-battles-country-s-worst-crisis-.html  
16 BBC News (May 17th, 2011), “Portugal’s €78bn euro bail-out is formally approved”, available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13408497  
17 BBC News (February 14th, 2011), “Eurozone agrees bailout fund of 500bn euros”, available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12460527  
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more temporary EFSF, had not inspired much confidence that the light at the end of 
the tunnel was approaching.18  
Discussion about the worsening economies in Spain and Italy, and the notion that 
the developing Sovereign Debt Crisis could spread beyond the periphery, kept an 
ominous cloud over the continent. As it became clear that Greece would require a 
second large bailout, European politicians – particularly in Germany and the UK – 
began to voice the notion that a Greek exit from the euro would cause no more harm 
for Europe and Greece than the status quo. In July 2011, the forecasting agency 
CBER19 claimed a ‘Grexit’ was inevitable and argued a complete breakup of the euro 
was almost certain within five years.20 The warnings of global economic peril at the 
outset of the GFC now found fresh impetus as the world looked on in horror at the 
European economy. With the common currency in crisis and the great experiment of 
European integration under increasing scrutiny it was difficult not to wonder how 
the union had failed so dramatically and why those in power had not seen this 
coming.  
1.1.ii Integration and the Maastricht Treaty 
Many believe the Eurozone’s woes can be traced back to the foundation of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe in the early 1990s. While the Treaty of Rome 
led to the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the 
Treaty was not explicit on macro-economic and monetary integration in Europe. It 
was predominantly aimed at creating the conditions for a common European Market 
and safeguarding economies within the community by ensuring equilibrium in 
Balance of Payments, confidence in currencies and a stable level of prices and 
                                                             
18 The ESM and EFSF have acted as the mechanisms through which the bailouts to Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus have been provided. The ESM operates as a transfer-facility-of-sorts whereby 
loans have been given to ‘crisis countries’ on the basis that they implement austerity measures to 
restore public finances. It is funded through a progressive system that calls on wealthier Eurozone 
member states to make the largest contributions. 
Source: “ESM Shareholders”, available: 
http://esm.europa.eu/about/governance/shareholders/index.htm (Accessed: July 28th, 2014). 
19 Centre for Business and Economics Research 
20 “The Euro: Greece is a sideshow”, available: http://www.cebr.com/reports/the-euro-greece-is-a-
sideshow-2/ (Accessed: 29th May 2013).  
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employment.21A decision in 1985 to complete the internal market by removing all 
physical, technical and fiscal barriers by the end of 1992 led to the signing of the 
Single European Act in 1986 and subsequently, the first concrete proposals for EMU 
in 1989.22According to Willem Molle, the rationale behind monetary union was to 
smooth trade, thus contributing to the efficient allocation of resources.23 However 
the creation of the European Union at Maastricht in 1993 was about much more than 
engineering stable conditions for multi-national cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty 
was seen as a point along the continuum of European integration since the end of the 
Second World War, and - due to the commitment to EMU - the most significant 
point yet. The creation of a single currency and a monetary union were two of a 
series of measures constructed to bring people across the continent together under 
the common goal of European citizenship.  
The Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on the European Union) was signed on 
February 7th 1992 and came into effect in November 1993.24 The single currency 
would take over from the first day of 1999, with only Denmark, the UK and Sweden 
among the 14 states exempt from adopting the euro as the national currency. The 
opt-outs were one of the reasons why the Maastricht Treaty so quickly came under 
fire following its implementation. The two aforementioned countries, in addition to 
Sweden, Ireland and Poland refused to adopt certain parts of the Treaty, a factor 
which - in combination with significant issues passing the Treaty through national 
parliaments in Germany, the UK, Denmark and France - would cause debate over 
the supposed ‘democratic deficit’ in the newly formed Union.25 Others criticised 
Maastricht for reflecting not so much the universally desired ends of the European 
Community but the state of thinking within the dominant Franco-German engine in 
the early 1990s.26  The monetary union in itself has been almost universally derided 
by critics as either ill-conceived or ill-formed: a result of European bureaucratic 
                                                             
21 Molle, W. (1997), The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy, Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, page 404.   
22 Christiansen et al (2012) “Understanding and assessing the Maastricht Treaty” in: Journal of 
European Integration, vol 34, no. 7, Routledge, London, page 686.  
23 Molle, W. (1997), The Economics of European Integration, page 396.  
24 Christiansen et al (2012) “Understanding and assessing the Maastricht Treaty”, page 687 
25 Ibid, page 690.  
26 Ibid, page 687. 
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overreaching or a weak substitute for the full political and economic union required 
for effective integration.  
The Eurozone crisis has led to much debate over the logic of creating a monetary 
union in the absence of the accompanying political infrastructure and enforcement 
mechanisms.27Andre Sapir states that the Maastricht Treaty made no provisions for 
any genuine transferral of competence from the member states as well as including 
“no significant EU budget, no integrated financial supervision, no strong political 
counterpart to the central bank nor any provision for crisis resolution.”28 Caporaso 
and Kim agree that the most notable flaw in the Treaty was the creation of a 
common currency without provisions for an economic governance structure and 
sound banking regulations.29 Dyson questions the logic of this omission, arguing 
that the desire to keep fiscal and financial authority is actually incompatible with the 
objectives of having capital mobility and financial stability at the same time.30    
This recurring argument describes the asymmetry best encapsulated by former chief 
economic advisor to Ronald Reagan, Martin Feldstein, who heavily criticised the 
provisions for monetary union in the Maastricht Treaty. Feldstein’s main criticism 
was that the real rationale for EMU was political and not economic, despite the fact 
that there were considerable gaps and omissions on the political side of the Treaty.31 
He warned that member states with vastly divergent economies would be tempted 
to leave the union should the shift to a single currency leave them in bad shape and 
the political arrangements of the union leave them unimpressed.32He also warned 
that the distributional effects of the single currency could be catastrophic, saying the 
                                                             
27 Ibid, page 693.  
28 Caporaso, J.A. and Kim, M. (2012), “The Maastricht Treaty at Twenty: A Greco-European 
Tragedy?” In: Christiansen, T. and Duke, S. (eds.) Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, no. 7, 
Routledge, London, page 771.  
29 Ibid, page 775.  
30 Dyson, K. (2012), “Maastricht Plus: Managing the Logic of Inherent Imperfections”, in: 
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31 Feldstein, M. (1997) “EMU and International Conflict”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, no. 6, Council on 
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most likely outcome of the EMU “would be the growth of substantial transfers from 
the EU to countries that experience cyclical increases in unemployment”.33 
For others, it wasn’t just the lack of fiscal and financial provisions where the treaty 
had failed.  Some criticised the EEC for creating a monetary union with a single 
currency that was in itself unnecessary. John Gillingham argues that the economic 
rationale for adopting a monetary union in Europe was “anything but compelling”.34 
Like Feldstein, he claimed the “one size fits all” monetary policy would not be able 
to accommodate regional economic variations and that it would lead to a less 
efficient operation of the internal market.35 Moreover, Gillingham argued that 
Europe was not in a strong position to adopt a monetary union as none of the four 
pre-requisites – homogenous economies, flexible domestic wages and prices, labour 
mobility and responsive fiscal transfers - for an optimum currency area (OCA) were 
met.36 This view was shared by many other commentators, including The Economist, 
which called the Maastricht Treaty a “bungled design (that) ignored copious 
literature… and came up with three proposals that have nothing to do with 
optimum currency areas”.37 
The European Commission and the Council had been frustrated over the lack of 
agreement over fiscal harmonisation to come out of Maastricht. Under pressure to 
enforce more budgetary oversight from Germany38, the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) was adopted in 1998 and 1999 prior to the implementation of the single 
currency. The two most significant and well-known provisions in the agreement 
were the limiting of member states’ budget deficits to 3 per cent of GDP and the 
restriction of debt levels to a maximum of 60 per cent of a country’s GDP.39 Whilst it 
was hoped the SGP would reign in profligate spending and excessive borrowing and 
                                                             
33 Ibid, page 66.  
34 Gillingham, J. (2003) European Integration 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? Cambridge 
University Press, NY, page 269.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, page 274.  
38 Feldstein, M. (1997) “EMU and International Conflict”, page 66.  
39 Morris, R. et al (2006), “The Reform and Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, 
Occasional Paper Series no. 47, ECB, page 12, available: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp47.pdf  
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ultimately facilitate the stability of the EMU, the pact has failed in both its 
‘preventative’ and ‘dissuasive’ aims and much like the monetary union, has been 
roundly criticised, primarily for its perceived excessively tight collar and an inherent 
bias towards price flexibility. 40  
Twenty years on from Maastricht, the evaluations of the Treaty as a whole have been 
mixed, with many conclusions on the monetary union nothing short of damning. 
Martin Feldstein has gained acclaim for essentially forecasting the Eurozone crisis 
over a decade before it took place. He has reiterated that the economic failure of the 
Treaty was “quite predictable” and that we’re now seeing the results of an ill-
advised attempt to put a dozen (now 18) very different economies into a single 
currency with a single exchange rate.41 
While it is easy to accuse commentators of revisionist history, it is clear that since the 
formation of the EU, there have been considerable concerns over the long-term 
compatibility of the EMU. American author Michael Lewis claims that it was 
obvious to a lot of people at the time of Maastricht that these countries did not 
belong together.42 Francois Mitterrand, French Prime Minister at the time, is said to 
have admitted in private that he knew the monetary union would lead to 
imbalances.43 Perhaps this is an indication of the risks which he and other European 
leaders were willing to take to achieve their ultimate goal. The Maastricht Treaty 
called explicitly for the evolution of a future political union.44The goal was a 
European citizenship, a shared identity and a common future for all of Europe.45  
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Dyson, K. (2012), “Maastricht Plus: Managing the Logic of Inherent Imperfections”, page 800.  
41 “Martin Feldstein on the future of the euro”, available: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vsqd_gOHmy8 (Accessed: May 29th, 2013).  
42 Lewis, M. (2011), Boomerang: The Biggest Bust, Penguin Books, London, page 168.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Feldstein, M. (1997) “EMU and International Conflict”, page 60.  
45 Christiansen et al (2012) “Understanding and assessing the Maastricht Treaty”, page 696.  
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1.1.iii Crisis countries: The scourge of Europe 
While the provisions of the SGP have been derided by many as unrealistic and the 
Maastricht Treaty heavily criticised for introducing an incomplete EMU, some 
believe the imbalances highlighted by the crisis were less the result of these factors 
than the outcome of poor political and economic management on the part of several 
member state governments. Whatever the existing economic discrepancies within 
the EU, proponents of this theory have argued that the now struggling PIIGS 
countries – chief among them Greece – have long been guilty of serious fiscal 
profligacy and the sort of political ineptitude that has prevented governments from 
enacting the necessary structural economic reforms to survive in the common 
market.46  
Marsh suggests that some of these member states missed the boat in the years 
leading up to the crisis whereby – fairly or unfairly – the inability for governments to 
devalue under the single currency led to the necessary requirement of more 
stringent reform. He argues that, “the Euro has exposed shortcomings in economic 
policy among member countries that… need to be corrected by painful longer-term 
adjustments, through lower wage rises, increased working hours and job losses in 
uncompetitive businesses and sectors”.47 
Other academics and commentators have been less accommodating of the mistakes 
of peripheral member state governments, claiming those in charge of economic 
policy in the lead up to the crisis have only themselves to blame for the devastating 
outcomes of the Eurozone crisis. In regard to Europe’s prime economic outcast in 
Greece, Featherstone points to the “endemic weaknesses of the state”48 including “a 
political culture marked by clientelism, rent-seeking and corruption”, alongside a 
                                                             
46 Phillips, L. (2010) “Working the night-shift in the German austerity sweatshop - A primer on the 
crisis: Eurozone crash vs. United States of Europe”, available: 
http://euobserver.com/economic/31449  
47 Marsh, D. (2011), The Euro: The Battle for the New Global Currency, Yale University Press, Connecticut, 
page 4.  
48 Featherstone, K. (2011), “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed 
Regime” in Journal of Common Market Studies – Volume 49, issue 2, UACES, page 196.  
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record of low reform capacity and consistently high levels of public debt.49 Lewis has 
highlighted the manipulation of economic data, tax fraud and insidious political 
corruption prevalent in Greece prior to the crisis as contributions towards “a society 
that has endured something like total moral collapse”.50 
It is not only Greece that has invited the displeasure of more economically sound 
member states within the EU. Weidmann and Panetta are among those who have 
also placed the blame for the crisis at the feet of states such as Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. According to Bundesbank head Jens Weidmann, the governments of these 
countries failed to implement the necessary levels of consolidation and structural 
economic reform required to make the single currency work.51 Due to their inability 
to renounce welfare state objectives and adopt more realistic fiscal policy 
prerogatives, the excessive public debt held in Europe’s periphery has not only 
affected the individual member states but the Eurozone economy as a whole.52 
Panetta agrees that the crisis was far from inevitable under the design of Maastricht, 
believing it was caused by “fiscal profligacy, weakness of the banking system and 
low competitiveness and productivity”.53  
Critics of the ‘profligate periphery’ have also lambasted a lack of action against 
misbehaving states at the institutional level in Europe. They note that with the SGP 
provisions in place, some countries falsified their accounts to satisfy the convergence 
criteria54 and subsequently failed to consistently observe the rules while the 
European Council remained unwilling to enforce them.55 While few argue the design 
of the monetary union in Europe was perfect, and critics of the Maastricht Treaty are 
louder and more numerous than ever before, a stubborn group continue to insist 
that the rules were there for all to see at the outset, and that the dismal failure of a 
                                                             
49 Ibid, page 198. 
50 Lewis, M. (2011), Boomerang: The Biggest Bust, Penguin Books, London, page 65. 
51 Jens Weidmann (March 28th, 2012), “Rebalancing Europe”, speech at Chatham House, London, 
available: http://www.bis.org/review/r120329a.pdf  
52 Ibid.  
53 Panetta, F. (2011), “Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default”, in: Allen, F. et al, 
European Commission Policy Report (of same title as chapter heading), page 11, available: 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ssh/docs/sovereign_en.pdf  
54Ibid.   
55 Ibid, 694.  
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few to follow these rules contributed greatly to the collapse of the Eurozone 
economy.  
After the initial shock of the Sovereign Debt Crisis and the desperation of nations 
trying to repair their broken economies, much of the debate in the Eurozone has 
turned to the question of ‘who pays?’ Peripheral economies, now trying to grow 
their way out of a crisis have become frustrated with Germany as they feel Angela 
Merkel’s demands have placed them in an ‘austerity straightjacket.’56 Many feel as 
though Germany has benefitted more from the Euro than any other nation and 
Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Italy have argued that German exports flooding into their 
countries has increased its prosperity at the expense of others.57 On the other hand, 
the German electorate has grown weary of the ‘crisis countries’ and is frustrated by 
the on-going bailouts offered by the ESM, for which Germany is the primary 
contributor.58 Lewis argued in 2011 that while the Eurozone was “conceived as a tool 
for integrating Germany with Europe, and preventing the Germans from 
dominating others, the euro had now become the opposite”.59  
In the context of the foundations of the monetary union it is crucial to note, however, 
that Germany was not dragged into EMU kicking and screaming. Whether they 
joined because they knew they would dominate economically and hold power over 
the ECB, or it was a decision made out of trust or a desire to exorcise a horrendous 
and divisive past, Germany wanted a union as much as other states needed it. This 
leads onto the central basis for the analysis in this thesis: the three visions for the 
future of Europe. 
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/04/23/f-pauls-berlin-germanophobia.html (Accessed: 
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1.2 An ever closer union? The three visions 
The strong rhetoric and significant transfer of powers involved in the formation of 
the Maastricht Treaty had moved Europe further towards becoming a truly 
federalist supranational community60, and at the same time intensified the debate in 
around the evocative decades-old decree of an ever closer union. The Treaty of Rome 
had, in 1957, expressed a determination to move Europe towards this end.61 36 years 
later, Europe had become more integrated than ever under the Maastricht Treaty, 
with the creation of a common European citizenship, as well as monetary and 
political unions aimed at eventually encompassing the entirety of the continent.62 
In the midst of the Sovereign Debt crisis, there have been three main European 
visions competing over the implications of an ‘ever closer union’ on economic 
integration, a battle that will undeniably shape the political soul of Europe for 
decades to come. In this section, I will explain these visions by discussing first their 
foundations, before examining the relative strength of support they each carried as 
the Eurozone crisis landed on the continent’s doorstep.63 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 While there is an ongoing debate over the extent to which the EU is a true ‘federalism’, this thesis 
takes the well-held view that the Union is at least a “species of federalism” – as McKay argues – and 
will not delve heavily into this particular discussion. 
Source: McKay, D. (1999), Federalism and European Union: A Political Economy Perspective, Oxford 
University Press, UK, page 22.  
61 European Economic Community (March 25th, 1957), The Treaty of Rome, page 2, available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf  
62 McKay, D. (1999), Federalism and European Union: A Political Economy Perspective, page 19.  
63 A much earlier representation of contrasting approaches towards European integration as a set of 
‘visions’ was presented by Leon Lindberg in 1963. Lindberg’s classifications differ from those in this 
thesis as he focussed only on pro-EU aims and did not seek to explain a ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic view on 
integration (though such an ideology was less popular during the years of ‘permissive consensus’ [see 
below] in which he was writing). He provides four broad visions - Integration as political unification, 
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political parties and interests under the relevant groupings.  
For more detail on Lindberg’s visions see: Lindberg, Leon N. (1963), “The Political Dynamics of 
European Economic Integration”, in: Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (ed) (2006) Debates on European 
Integration, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, page 131.  
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1.2.i Germany’s Europe: A coalition for consolidation 
The two dominant visions of the EU are federalist in nature.64 Both view the creation 
of the EMU under Maastricht as a major step towards deeper integration and 
eventual political unity.65 Supporters of both visions are active in promoting an ever 
closer union, though their plans for an ideal political and economic union in Europe 
contrast considerably.  
Germany’s influence in Europe is unmatched by any other member state, nor any 
other single political actor. The continent’s most populous nation has been 
instrumental in the formation of the European Union: as Moravcsik argues, the most 
significant steps taken towards the creation of a European ‘community’ and political 
union have been engineered through a series of grand bargains between France and 
Germany.66 As such, the German vision for Europe has gained prominence, and 
acted as a particularly difficult obstacle for those with opposing agendas. Germany’s 
Europe is best described as a centre-right, economically liberal ‘coalition for 
consolidation’. The most dominant historical explanations offered to explain the 
German position towards an ever closer union come under two main themes: the 
nation’s desire to discover a peaceful and prosperous Europe in the wake of 
reunification, and the creation of European monetary stability based on its deeply 
embedded ‘ordoliberal’ economic principles.  
Germany has been an enthusiastic supporter of European integration from the very 
beginning of the project.67 After World War II, integration provided an unlikely 
vehicle for international recognition. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
reunification of Germany in 1990, foreign observers’ concerns that a unified 
                                                             
64 While both of the established pro-European visions are described here as federalist, there are 
different degrees of integration supported by each. Due to its commitment to political and economic 
unification, the Social European vision could be reasonably described as more closely reflecting the 
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65 Umbach, G. and Wessels, W. (2008), “The Changing European Context of Economic and Monetary 
Union: ‘Deepening’, ‘Widening’, and Stability”, in The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Power and 
Convergence (ed. Dyson, K.), Oxford University Press, UK, page 54. 
66 Moravcsik, A. (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
page 4.  
67 Walsh, H. A. (2004), “Unified Germany: The Desire for Stability and the Need for Change”, in 
Europe Today, (ed. Tiersky, R.), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, MD, page 235. 
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Germany might be less committed to Europe were proved to have been 
unfounded.68 Instead, the desire to further this recognition simply served to increase. 
According to Klaus Goetz, multilateralism - and the belief in the great value of the 
European political project – had become part of the German political elites’ “genetic 
code”.69 
This genetic code has greatly influenced the German approach towards economic 
integration and the creation of the single currency. The decision to embrace the euro, 
requiring Germany to give up the deutsche mark, was a deeply unpopular decision, 
in many respects due to the currency’s association with the Wirtschaftswunder 
(economic miracle) of the post-war period.70 However, German public opinion was 
pulled away from the anxiety created by the deutsche mark’s demise through a 
recognition of the symbolic importance the euro had acquired in the process of 
European economic and political unification.71 A passive but growing domestic 
consensus has since formed to support the fundamental ‘rightness’ of the euro as a 
political project72, due in part to its impact on post-war peace and prosperity.73   
The ordoliberal dominance of German economic policy since the 1950s has had 
perhaps the biggest impact on the stability-based vision of Europe shared by 
Germany and its allies. Ordoliberalism – the German form of a ‘social free market’ or 
government-guided capitalist economy - became the dominant economic orthodoxy 
in West Germany under the influence of Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard after 
World War II. 74 Drawing on the historical lessons of Weimar hyperinflation (post 
WWI) and of Nazi tyranny, ordoliberalism called for a limited but strong state that 
would deliver both economic stability and open, competitive markets.75 This 
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70 Dyson, K (2008), “Germany: A Crisis of Leadership in the Euro Area”, in: Dyson, K. (ed) The Euro at 
10: Europeanization, Power and Convergence, page 160. 
71 Ibid, 161. 
72 Ibid, page 133. 
73 Ibid, page 161.  
74 David Henderson (2008), “German Economic Miracle”, available: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GermanEconomicMiracle.html  
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approach to economic management found favour amongst the people and became 
intrinsically associated with the strong growth and low rates of inflation and 
unemployment that characterised the Wirtschaftswunder between the late 1940s and 
early 1970s.76 
Ordoliberal economic orthodoxy has continued to influence both German domestic 
policy and the approach of successive governments towards Europe. The German 
influence over the creation of the monetary union can be described as an ‘uploading’ 
or ‘binding in’ of its policy preferences and institutional arrangements.77 Rules-based 
fiscal policy coordination in the Euro Area was secured in large part due to the 
activism of the Bundesbank in its preparations for the euro, especially through the 
‘Germanic’ design of the ECB and its monetary policy.78 A reframing of the EMU in 
ordoliberal discourse thus took place. This was mostly allowed due to the 
dependence of the euro area’s reputation on the performance of the German 
economy: the “centre of gravity” for Europe.79 A tacit sponsoring of ordoliberalism – 
or at least a lack of opposition against this economic orthodoxy – on the part of 
centre-left and left-wing German political parties, combined with the inability of 
French and southern European economic models to resonate to the same extent, also 
left Europe without a legitimate alternative to the prevailing design of the EMU.80  
As Chancellor from 2005, Angela Merkel gave top priority to fiscal consolidation in 
Europe. Germany had lost a certain amount of prestige on the Continent due to its 
economic woes and flaunting of the fiscal rules in the SGP it was so instrumental in 
creating.81 Merkel sought to restore Germany’s reputation while using Europe as a 
chance to display her governing competence to the German electorate.82 The 
consolidation drive was not simply about pandering to a receptive German audience 
however. The Chancellor had found many friends in her pursuit of stability and 
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competitiveness in Europe during, particularly, her first term as leader. Merkel’s 
vision was supported by the European Commission under both President Romano 
Prodi, and his successor José Manuel Barroso.83 Furthermore the consolidation 
coalition prior to the crisis encompassed northern European countries such as 
Finland and Belgium, as well as gaining the support of Luxembourg’s Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Junker, one of the prime architects of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Alongside various centre-right politicians and leaders around Europe, the German-
led alliance, to a significant extent, earned the backing of the largest political group 
in the European Parliament - the centre-right EPP-ED group - between 2004 and 
2009.   
However, the most crucial support for the German vision was found through the 
powerful alliance with France. While long-time French president Jacque Chirac had 
been criticised for his inability to maintain the Franco-German motor on European 
integration through his relationships with chancellors Kohl and Schroeder84, he 
enjoyed a strong bond with Angela Merkel in his final few years in charge, 
describing Germany’s economic leadership as a “magnificent example.”85 The 
election of conservative Nicolas Sarkozy to the French Presidency in May 2007 
resulted in a close relationship between the economically like-minded leaders and 
the Merkozy pact thereafter served to entrench the stability-based approach towards 
an ever closer union as the dominant vision in Europe. 
1.2.ii The European Left: Finding Social Europe 
The second of the dominant visions for the European Union, and the rival school of 
thought to the German-led consolidation coalition, is the ambition for a federal 
‘United States of Europe’ marked by a fiscal and re-distributive transfer union. 
While Germany and its allies could be described as promoters of more conservative 
movements towards further economic integration – following their success in 
                                                             
83 Romano Prodi (February 15th, 2000), “Shaping the New Europe”, speech to the European 
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embedding centre-right, liberal economic principles into the monetary union and 
Maastricht convergence criteria - the coalition’s opponents seek an alternate view of 
‘more Europe’, based on a more radical approach to economic and social policy. The 
pro-integration forces on the European Left – described interchangeably in this 
thesis as Social Europeans and as simply the European Left - are seeking a 
restoration of the European Social Model and the creation of a redistributive ‘welfare 
state of welfare states’ in order to overcome imbalances within the union. 86 These 
two inter-related themes provide the background for the Social European vision of 
Europe. 
The European Social Model is based on the recognition that social justice can, and 
should, contribute to economic efficiency and progress.87 The foundation of the 
Social Model can be traced to a “coevolution” between social democracy and 
European integration that, since the 1950s in some parts of Europe, sought to combat 
both Euroscepticism and the perceived ‘capitalist club’ dominance over European 
integration.88 However, unlike with the German ordoliberal foundations of the 
stability-based vision for Europe, there was a certain lack of consistency in attitudes 
towards integration among left-wing European parties, many of which remained in 
opposition for the majority of the post-war period due to the dominance of Christian 
Democratic parties over European politics.89 Some scholars such as Andre Sapir 
argue that there is no one European Social Model, but a number of variants across 
regions of Europe.90 
Nevertheless, the move towards an ever closer union with the Treaty of Rome and 
creation of the common market heightened the enthusiasm towards solidarity on the 
                                                             
86 Discussion or analysis of eurosceptic individuals, member states, political parties and groups of 
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European Left. Further to this, the post-war period – characterised by the mostly 
Keynesian ‘mixed’ economic policy approach91 prescribing high levels of public 
investment and social protection - brought about a prolonged boom period in 
Europe, effective redistribution and a convergence of economic performance among 
states unlike anywhere else in the world.92  
While Maastricht continued the evolution towards political unification on the 
continent, the creation of an EMU so heavily influenced by liberal economic 
principles and a stability pact characterised by fiscal rules and sanctions, threatened 
member states’ protection of the Social Model. The Left’s efforts to retain such a 
model at the European level were scuppered by a lack of action on the institutional 
front: whereas economic and monetary rules had been set in stone, directives for 
social protection were mentioned, but not mandated, in the post-Maastricht 
treaties.93 The relative dismissal of social values contrasted with what many on the 
Left felt to be in the essence of being ‘European’.94 Social Europeans often argue that 
the generosity of the social model is what makes Europe different from any other 
region of the world. It is Europe’s “attitude towards social solidarity” that creates a 
distinct identity from Asia and America.95 
The European Left’s commitment to protecting the Social Model leads onto the other 
primary and inter-related motivation behind their vision for Europe: namely its 
desire to create an egalitarian European welfare state through the foundation of a 
redistributive fiscal union. Those who share this vision see strong welfare states as 
“non-negotiable European realities” that define the people of the Union.96 However, 
the success of the right in dismantling welfare states through the free-market 
                                                             
91 J. Bradford Delong (1997), “Post-WWII Western European Exceptionalism: The Economic 
Dimension”, University of California at Berkely, available: http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/econ_articles/ucla/ucla_marshall2.html  
92 Ibid. 
93 Taylor-Gooby, P and Larsen, Trine P. (2004), “New Risks at the EU Level; A Spillover from Open 
Market Policies?” In: Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed) New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European 
Welfare State, Oxford University Press, UK, page 181.  
94 Reid, T.R. (2004), The United States of Europe, Penguin, NY, page 150. 
95 Ibid, page 151. 
96 Ibid, page 150. 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Three Visions for Europe 25 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s, and the inability of the left to 
counteract this,97 have led Social Europeans to look towards Europe as their true 
solution to the welfare state.  
Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin articulated the Social European vision 
by arguing for a Europe that “refuses to divorce economic prosperity from social 
progress”98 and for the acknowledgement of a European ‘art de vivre’ whereby a 
range of societal rights and freedoms are protected by the common whole.99 
However, the Left in Europe feels as though the rights of citizens under the welfare 
state have been eroded under the EMU. The Maastricht criteria, it says, has forced 
countries to introduce policies designed to control public expenditure, particularly in 
the social field.100 Social Europeans claim the market-centric approach to economic 
integration has resulted in, and will continue to cause, more inequality among 
member states and European peoples.101  
Moreover - while member states’ abilities to react to social pressures have been 
constrained by an EMU based on strict fiscal rules - traditional welfare state taxation, 
spending and redistribution have remained largely outside the EU’s domain.102 
Social Europeans - who believe the extensive disparities in welfare among European 
regions becomes less and less acceptable as member states become more integrated - 
are turning to Europe to defend their social commitments by altering the emphasis 
on stability and competitiveness. They believe a European “federation of nation 
states” with a much greater level of fiscal policy coordination and a co-ordination of 
taxes and benefits through collective agreements or an EU transfer body is the best 
way to restore and enhance the social model which is so crucial to their European 
vision.103  
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Social Europeans today are made up predominantly by social democratic, centre-left 
or left-wing political forces including politicians in member state governments, 
MEPs and many in union movements across the continent. The 21st century has 
brought with it a stronger consensus among social democratic parties as to the 
desirability of European integration, and the need for a federal, ‘social’ Europe.104 
Prior to the crisis, supporters of this vision acted as the main counterweight to the 
institutional strength behind the German-led consolidation coalition. However, 
while there were a number of advocates for this vision at the beginning of the 21st 
century among the 11 centre-left EU leaders, by 2008 only three prime ministers 
could be considered social democratic.105 Additionally, the left bloc in the power-
strapped European Parliament was inferior to the centre-right and liberal political 
groups sponsoring the ordoliberal economic orthodoxy of the EMU. 
The European vision for social and economic solidarity had traditionally been an 
idea which had to a certain extent separated the southern states of Europe from the 
north.106 Despite the fact that there were only governments of the left in power in 
Spain and Portugal among the southern European member states prior to the GFC, 
the common Mediterranean approach to the welfare state and to economic 
integration in Europe meant that attitudes towards solidarity and the Social 
European vision were always largely positive in the region.107 
1.2.iii The Eurosceptic vision: ‘No’ to more Europe 
The expansion of European integration has, at each stage since the Community was 
formed, brought with it an outspoken opposition. The level, strength and 
cohesiveness of the Eurosceptic movement across the continent has fluctuated 
greatly since the 1950s, with the manifestation of certain ‘sticking points’, as well as 
the gradual enlargement of the Union after Maastricht playing a big part in the 
timing of anti-European fervour. While Euroscepticism has often been based on a 
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combination of socio-cultural, political and identity-related factors108, the foundation 
of the EMU served to shift the debate towards concerns over economic integration, 
where a vision for Europe based on the member states’ retention of fiscal and 
monetary sovereignty was enhanced.  
Although much of the literature surrounding Euroscepticism focuses on the post-
Maastricht period, its historical foundations lie in earlier stages of integration.109 The 
early period of anti-European sentiment was predominantly elite-driven and mostly 
nation-specific.110 Between the 1950s and 1990s, a ‘permissive consensus’ over 
integration based mostly on positive feelings over national economic performance111 
shielded the influence of Eurosceptic minorities in a number of member countries. 
Opposition to integration swelled for the Social Democrats in Germany alongside 
the Gaullists in France in the 1950s; the Greek nationalists under Prime Minister 
Andreas Papandreou in the 1980s; and significantly in the UK under a Labour 
government seeking renegotiation in the mid-‘70s, as well as under Margaret 
Thatcher’s conservatives in the late 1980s.112  
It has been argued that Euroscepticism prior to Maastricht was not particularly 
consequential, due to the fact that the European project at the time more closely 
resembled an international organisation than any form of political union.113 
However it influenced the integration process as sceptics such as Charles De Gaulle 
were able to keep the transferral of powers to Europe in check, through early French 
dominance over the Community.114 While many modern Eurosceptics will find 
common ground with the Gaullists over the commitment to nation states, the term 
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‘Eurosceptic’ itself was born in Britain in the mid-1980s.115 This came during a period 
in which increased anxiety over the European project was fuelled by fears over the 
move towards a political and economic union, as well as Thatcher’s nationalist 
rhetoric.116 
The Iron Lady’s interventions have played a big part in the nature of Euroscepticism 
in Britain today. However, it is true that the anti-integration phenomenon is not 
based on one ideology, political motive or historical understanding alone: rather, 
different individuals and groups within and between nations, political parties and 
protest movements under the Eurosceptic banner, hold a range of ideals for what 
‘Europe’ should look like and to what extent a community should exist.  117 This 
thesis touches on the development of a ‘Eurosceptic vision’ that seeks retrenchment 
from the powers given to Brussels coinciding with further involvement of national 
parliaments in European-wide decision-making. While some actors who support this 
vision would go as far to threaten a potential withdrawal from the EU, others are 
primarily focused on preventing the move towards an ever closer union.  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty allowed Eurosceptics to argue that the project 
had gone too far. They found a lot of support for this argument as the embedded 
nature of Euroscepticism in the integration process was revealed during the 1990s.118 
The openly demonstrated desire on behalf of the political elites to transfer national 
competencies to the European level - in areas traditionally considered to belong to 
the realm of national politics such as foreign policy, citizenship and currency – had a 
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significant impact over popular opinion on integration.119 The negative referendum 
outcome in Denmark and the razor-thin ‘yes’ to Maastricht in France were followed 
by a series of EU opt-outs of social and economic integration for Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark and Sweden.120  
It had become clear post-Maastricht that the public differentiated between political 
and economic integration and, to an increasing degree, did not favour the latter.121 
Furthermore, Eurosceptics began to deride the EU for its ‘democratic deficit’ as they 
rallied against moves to take power away from national parliaments.122The most 
common academic explanations for Euroscepticism include fears of losing national 
identity, a lack of trust in political institutions (extending to Europe) and as a 
“touchstone of dissent.”123 However, the surge of Euroscepticism following the 
formation of the EMU casts doubts over justifications that downplay the role of 
economic rationale in anti-integration sentiment. The best analysis comes from 
McLaren, who concludes that two distinct paths to Euroscepticism - cultural threat 
and economic loss - are joined by the feeling of institutional distrust.124 She notes 
that levels of trust in both national and supranational institutions tend to go 
together, but that citizens’ greater knowledge of their national governments leads to 
a ‘better the devil you know’ attitude, to the clear detriment of the EU.125 
Euroscepticism fluctuated well above pre-Maastricht levels throughout the first 
decade of the 21st century as ‘no’ votes in treaty referendums in France, the 
Netherlands and Ireland (twice) served to intensify the debate over the desired 
nature of Europe. However, it is important not to overstate the level of distaste for 
integration across the continent, while recognising the relative isolation of 
Euroscepticism to certain regions. The average proportion of European citizens 
against EU membership (between member states) reached a high of close to 18 per 
                                                             
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid, page 160. 
121 Serrichio, F. et al (2013), “Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis”, page 53.  
122 Vasilopoulou, S. (2013), “Continuity and change in the study of Euroscepticim: Plus ca change”, 
page 159. 
123 Serrichio, F. et al (2013), “Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis”, page 54.  
124 Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2007), “Sources of Euroscepticism”, in Acta Politics, Volume 42, Palgrave 
Macmillan, page 123.  
125 Ibid, page 124. 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Three Visions for Europe 30 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
cent in 2007, and was 14 per cent in 2007 prior to the GFC.126 In the same year 58 per 
cent of those surveyed said membership in the EU was a good thing. While this 
represents a sizeable gap in pro and anti-EU sentiment across the Union, the picture 
has been much less clear cut in countries with traditionally high levels of 
Euroscepticism. Over 20 per cent opposed membership in the UK, Sweden, Finland 
and Austria in 2007, and in Britain it was only slightly below the proportion of 
respondents that supported it.127  
Prior to the Eurozone crisis those supporting the Eurosceptic vision and seeking to 
block the move towards an ever closer union could see an opportunity to exploit 
wavering public sentiment towards the EU and its institutions. The most powerful 
voice against the EUs move towards an ever closer union since Maastricht has 
predictably been Britain. Tony Blair’s opportunistic efforts to push his country 
towards adopting the euro came up against stern opposition in the form of an 
unreceptive Treasury, doubtful Chancellor of the Exchequer in Gordon Brown,128 
and an even-less-negotiable state of public opinion. While the Labour government 
was in office, attitudes towards the single currency had remained predominantly 
negative coinciding with a whole scale lack of interest in the EU.129 Policies towards 
the EU subsequently became ever more negative with Brown replacing Blair in 2007 
as Labour leader and PM.  
But it wasn’t only the UK drifting further towards a vision demanding less Europe. 
Seen predominantly as a ‘British disease’ during the expansion process of the 
1990s130, levels of scepticism over the project of an ever closer union had firmed up 
in a number of other places prior to the beginning of the crisis. Views on the euro 
and further integration in Sweden were similar (if not slightly less severe), while 
governments in the Czech Republic, Finland and Denmark supported the vision to 
                                                             
126 Serrichio, F. et al (2013), “Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis”, page 57.  
127 Ibid, page 58.  
128 Buller, J. and Gamble, A. (2008), “Britain: The Political Economy of Retrenchment”, in: Dyson, K. 
(ed) The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Power and Convergence, page 265.  
129 European Commission (2003), Eurobarometer 60: Public Opinion In the European Union, page 36. 
130 Torreblanca, J. and Leonard, M. (2013), “The Continent-Wide Rise Of Euroscepticism”, European 
Council on Foreign Relations Policy Memo, London, UK, page 1, available: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_continent_wide_rise_of_euroscepticism207  
The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Three Visions for Europe 31 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
block an ever closer union while protecting national parliamentary sovereignty in a 
range of areas including fiscal, and sometimes monetary, policy.131 Despite this, 
there is little doubt that prior to the onset of the EU’s first genuine economic crisis, 
the Eurosceptic vision was losing out to its competitors. The balance of power in 
European politics was in the hands of the Merkozy pact and the federalist base in 
Brussels. While Eurosceptic political parties existed in Germany and certainly in 
France, they were typically extremists who garnered low levels of support in 
national elections and thus had little influence over the nature of policies towards 
European integration (with the erstwhile exception of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National 
Front in France).132 This was also the case in many other European member states.   
1.2.iv Where to with the crisis?  
This second section of this chapter has explained the makings of three competing 
visions for Europe, as well as outlining their levels of support and relative strength 
prior to the start of the Eurozone crisis. The remainder of this thesis will seek to 
evaluate how major events in European governance and politics impacted on these 
competing approaches towards integration.  
There are a number of assumptions that were made in European economic discourse 
about the likely impact of such a devastating crash. This chapter has already 
discussed the competing explanations for both the eventuation of the crisis and the 
creation of heavy economic imbalances within the Union. According to the 
conclusions summarised above either the naïve and incomplete design of the EMU, 
or the profligate fiscal behaviour of Europe’s peripheral states were to blame for the 
state the Eurozone found itself in come 2010. But how would these explanations and 
the on-going effects of the economic devastation affect the success of the three 
overarching visions for the future of Europe?  
As the severity of the crisis hit home in Europe, and the possibility of a Greek default 
remained on the table, the chance of a euro breakup was being talked up. This 
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represented the dream for ‘hard Eurosceptics’ searching for a return to entirely 
national dominion over all economic and social policy.133Some commentators and 
academics believed breakup was a real possibility. As early as October 2008, Martin 
Feldstein listed a range of reasons a country might want to leave the EMU, in the 
wake of the effects of the GFC. He felt it was a genuine possibility that an 
economically strong country’s desire for tighter monetary policy or the fear of moves 
towards a redistributive taxation union could lead governments to believe they were 
better off outside the single currency.134 He also noted the possibility of weaker 
countries seeking exit, due to institutional constraints preventing Keynesian 
stimulus policies or the possibility of self-interested politicians exploiting anti-euro 
attitudes to move away from the EMU.135 In early 2010, prominent economist Paul 
Krugman claimed that Greece’s economic situation could become so bad were it to 
default that the rationale for staying within the single currency may simply 
dissipate.136 
However, the idea of a breakup of the euro, labelled “absurd” by ECB president 
Jean-Claude Trichet137 and “unlikely” and “overhyped” by the European 
Parliament138, was not a particularly popular idea in the minds of most academics 
and economists in 2010. It was, for the most part, a concept pushed by Eurosceptic 
forces in the media – such as in Britain’s Daily Telegraph139 and the tabloids - seeking 
to counter the numerous calls for economic governance reform as a means to solve 
the crisis. While some dismissed claims that more Europe was needed to save the 
ailing Eurozone economy and prevent such a crisis from happening again, the 
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prevailing feeling was that status quo Europe was the loser as something surely had 
to change.  
The last six months of 2011 involved a constant stream of negative news for the 
European economy. Following a second Greek bailout, fears that Spain and Italy 
would be the next in line to receive assistance would not go away as the Italian 
Parliament passed an austerity budget set to save €50 billion by 2013.140 Throughout 
September and October, anxiety in Europe over the debt crisis heightened 
considerably. British Foreign Secretary William Hague labelled the Euro a “burning 
building with no exits” at a time when it seemed events were spiralling out of 
control.141 In order to put the fire out, policy-makers in Europe set upon improving 
the effectiveness of the EU and its institutions. The debate over the right vision for 
Europe in the midst of the crisis had just begun: was this the end for the federal, 
German-led liberal economic dominance over the Union? Or did the crisis provide 
the chance for the consolidation-coalition to re-emphasise the need for a more 
disciplined and stable political union? Some believed a radical change in economic 
governance was the only way forward. It was social and economic “federalism or 
bust” for Europe.142 The political debates, disagreements, compromises and collapses 
over a three-year period of reform would reveal much about the ‘soul of Europe’ 
moving into the future.  
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2. The Fiscal Compact: Shaping the ‘Austerity Union’ 
When European leaders met on December the 8th, 2011 in Brussels for the latest 
episode in a long series of intergovernmental summits on the future of the Eurozone, 
most were late to arrive. The journey to Brussels had been made via Marseille, where 
Merkel, Sarkozy et al stopped off at the 20th annual congress of the European 
People’s Party, to placate the fears of centre-right politicians over a potential 
breakup of the Eurozone.1 They were also looking to draw attention away from 
externally expressed concerns: the US Government’s demand that Europe get its act 
together and the threat of Standard & Poor’s to not only downgrade the EU’s credit 
rating, but to do likewise for 15 of 17 Eurozone countries.2 Plans to strengthen fiscal 
surveillance and increase sanctions over profligate state spending were bound to be 
met well by the conservative audience in Marseille but earlier reports that a deal 
would not be close until Christmas served to increase the anxiety level of European 
parliamentarians. Merkel and Sarkozy upped the stakes by arguing that this was 
indeed a ‘do or die’ summit. On the other hand, Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso sought to bring a sense of calm to proceedings, “I believe this is possible… 
leadership is about making what is possible indispensable,” he said.3 
This chapter will discuss the most major piece of economic governance reform since 
the start of the Sovereign Debt Crisis: the Fiscal Compact. It will first examine the 
contention surrounding moves to enforce the pact within EU treaties and the failure 
of Britain to gain its own concessions in the agreement. It will note that the veto 
issued by David Cameron did not represent an overall victory for the Eurosceptic 
vision and likewise a loss for federalism, rather it predictably isolated the UK from 
Europe with little to show for it. Secondly, the chapter will chart the evolution of the 
European ‘debt-brake’, before evaluating how the European Left was thwarted in its 
scattered attempts to defeat a treaty which showed the strong influence held by the 
German-led consolidation coalition over the direction of economic reform. 
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2.1 To treaty or not to treaty: All for one and one for all? 
The 27 leaders’ meeting at the European Council HQ on this Thursday evening was 
preceded by a smaller meeting between Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
and the big three - Cameron, Sarkozy and Merkel - whose competing demands 
looked to be one of the main obstacles to a significant agreement being reached in 
Brussels.4 The French and Germans disagreed over whether a treaty change was 
necessary in order to form a legitimate pact, with Merkel steadfastly refusing to 
accept that any other option would be sufficient.5 Britain’s primary concern was the 
preservation of the city of London as the European hub for financial services and 
Cameron was willing to do just about anything to protect his nations’ interests in 
negotiations. 
The French had been reticent over treaty change as they foresaw a series of 
difficulties in implementing such a reform. They worried about the expected 
involvement of European parliamentarians and the likelihood of referenda in several 
member states, which could cause significant difficulty.6 By the time negotiations got 
underway in Brussels, Sarkozy’s government had decided to bow to their German 
allies on the necessity of a treaty. They were, however, unconcerned about the 
possibility of a treaty that did not include all 27 members – a preference for which 
Germany had advocated stridently – with some observers arguing such an approach 
was a means of alienating Britain from proceedings.7 The relationship with the UK 
government was at a low point, as French officials decried the hypocrisy of David 
Cameron seeking special protection for London while singing the praises of the 
single market.8  
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The French had actually long felt that a treaty among the 17 Eurozone countries 
alone might be the best course of action. Nicolas Sarkozy revealed his desire for a 
‘two-speed’ Europe a month prior to the December Summit by arguing that true 
reform in the wider 27-member EU was not really possible and that, “in the end, 
clearly, there will be two European gears: one gear towards more integration in the 
euro zone and a gear that is more confederal in the European Union”.9 Despite 
favouring the two-speed approach, Sarkozy clearly had less time for the views of 
those outside the Eurozone. He shouted down the plea of Danish Prime Minister 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt to enforce treaty changes at the level of 27 during the 
summit, saying, “You're an out, a small out, and you're new. We don't want to hear 
from you”.10 
Angela Merkel and Germany, on the other hand, believed the best way to achieve 
legitimate and legally binding economic governance reform in the EU was to have a 
full treaty change at the level of 27. She had been pushing a revision to the Lisbon 
treaty whereby national governments ceded more of their fiscal sovereignty to EU 
institutions, or at least would provide Brussels with more supervisory powers over 
member states’ economies:11 “If we are talking about more Europe, more 
commitment and more ability for Europe to act, then we need to make sure that the 
conditions and pre-conditions are set out in the Treaties,” the German leader 
argued.12  
Meanwhile, David Cameron had reportedly indicated to his MPs prior to the 
conference that he expected Britain to gain major concessions in the negotiations 
over a new fiscal agreement. Whether he was kidding himself, bluffing other 
European leaders or simply presenting an air of confidence to placate Eurosceptic 
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colleagues, by the time an agreement was reached there was no doubting the union 
had found itself a new black sheep and the Eurosceptic vision had taken a hit. 
2.1.i The British Veto  
The optimism shown by Barroso and others leading up to the summit was 
vindicated in the early hours of Friday morning, the 9th of December. European 
leaders were happy to leave Brussels with a roadmap for fiscal reform but the 
outcome came with a major setback. British Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced that he could not accept the terms of the agreement, thus issuing a veto 
which would prevent a united 27-member state pact and a thorough, legitimate 
alteration to the Lisbon Treaty.13  
David Cameron had been fighting a European war at home against the increasingly 
Eurosceptic Conservative party rank-and-file, which urged their leader to oppose the 
terms offered at the summit unless special protection for the City of London could be 
obtained. The UK’s demands did not go down well in Brussels. Cameron had sought 
considerable safeguards for London’s financial services to be written into the treaty, 
including a demand that any transfer of power from a national regulator to an EU 
regulator would be subject to a veto, that the European Banking Authority remain in 
London and that the Treaty should block the ECB from ruling that all euro-
denominated transactions take place within the Eurozone.14 The UK was essentially 
seeking a ‘double-lock’ mechanism over financial regulation, whereby London’s 
prominence in this sector would be specifically recognised in the Treaty change and 
the Government would have the chance to refer any proposals it considered 
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discriminatory to the European Council where it could block legislation with a 
veto.15  
The UK’s demands were partially based on the usual British Eurosceptic fear of 
ceding legislative control to Brussels. They were more concerned, however, that the 
Treaty changes would benefit the struggling Eurozone countries far more than those 
outside of the common currency. Close to 50 proposals to regulate the financial 
sector were in the offing16, including the broadly popular financial transactions tax 
(FTT), with Cameron and his cabinet allies suspecting an attempt from the Eurozone 
countries to pounce on Britain’s competitive advantage in the sector. In the lead up 
to the summit, the importance of financial services to the UK’s economy was 
highlighted by an open letter from 30 MPs and Lords to The Telegraph arguing that 
an EU-wide FTT would “inflict enormous damage on Britain’s economic interests” 
and that the Government needed to take “strong action” to overcome the “present 
drift (threatening) both British jobs and Exchequer revenues”.17 There were 
widespread concerns in Westminster that the importance of the financial sector to 
the UK economy was being underplayed on the Continent. While some reports 
suggested that financial services made up only a small part of the economy, to the 
extent that it was perhaps not worth issuing a veto over, others claimed that the 
industry accounted for 10 per cent of Britain’s GDP and generated over £50 billion in 
annual tax receipts while making up 36 per cent of the EU’s wholesale financial 
industry.18 
The primary elements of the proposed changes had little impact on Cameron’s 
decision to veto, as it was well known in Europe prior to the summit that the UK had 
no intention of ceding control over its economic governance and being bound by the 
fiscal provisions in the treaty. The obligations contained within the agreement were 
                                                             
15 Booth, S. et al (2011) Continental Shift: Safeguarding the UK’s financial trade in a changing Europe, Open 
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principally designed to coordinate and regulate fiscal policy within the Eurozone 
and contracting parties outside of the single currency would not be required to 
adhere to the provisions unless they declared an intention to be bound by them.19 
Many believed Cameron had issued an unnecessary veto to cover for his inability to 
gain concessions.20 The Government was also lambasted for alienating itself from 
Europe and deserting their allies in such a time of need. Liberal Democrat politicians 
Lord Oakeshott and MEP Chris David derided David Cameron’s move as “very 
dangerous”, arguing he had “kicked (the European leaders) in the teeth” and cut 
Britain off from its “main trading partners… main allies (and) main friends.”21 The 
Tories were unlikely to have been surprised by the level of criticism coming their 
way following the veto, however. There had been some reports prior to the summit 
that Cameron and his team had been hoping for some sympathy in their stance from 
the likes of Poland, Romania, Sweden and the Netherlands, all of whom were 
considered wary of a fragmented union resulting from the talks in Brussels.22  
Furthermore, it was felt that given Cameron’s stature as one of the ‘big three’ in the 
room, he may have been capable of using whatever goodwill he had to engineer the 
inclusion of a moderate measure to protect Britain’s financial services.23  
As it turned out, David Cameron and his government had limited goodwill going in 
to the summit. While many European leaders had fallen in behind Chancellor 
Merkel’s demand that a Treaty be agreed among all 27 member states, the 
suggestion that the UK might veto without the inclusion of British-specific 
provisions caused frustration and dismay among the stakeholders. Polish Prime 
Minister Donald Tusk criticised those countries that were willing to put their 
national interest ahead of the needs of the union, saying it was a “devilish attitude… 
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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/87/87we18.htm 
20 Ibid.  
21 BBC (December 9th, 2011), “BBC Newsnight”, available: 
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22 Open Europe (December 8th, 2011), “What could Cameron hope for”, available: 
http://www.openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.nz/2011/12/what-could-cameron-hope-for.html 
23 Ibid.  
The Fiscal Compact  40 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
(that could) lead to the ruin of the European community.”24 President-elect of the 
European Parliament Martin Shultz warned that any deal that involved horse-
trading to meet country-specific demands could risk a larger fragmentation than the 
union was already exposed to. He suggested the leaders should perhaps think about 
“a 26-1 solution.”25 
In the days following the December 9th agreement, the UK’s demands were 
publically dismissed out of hand. French President Nicolas Sarkozy claimed David 
Cameron’s proposal was “unacceptable” as “a good part of the worries of the world 
comes from the deregulation of financial services”.26 José Manuel Barroso said the 
protocol Cameron asked for “presented a risk to the integrity of the internal market” 
and thus made compromise impossible.27 He also implicitly criticised the British 
approach to the summit by stating his pleasure that “most member states made it 
clear that they do not want to circumvent the community method and the European 
institutions.”28 While the Cameron veto was predictably praised by a number of 
business leaders in London, the reaction from the Continent was one of 
disappointment in the inability to reach a 27-member agreement, and dissatisfaction 
with the UK over its self-interested demands.  
The Prime Minister had hoped to use the threat of a veto to secure safeguards for the 
City of London but the momentum towards a fiscal pact due to the continued poor 
economic performance in the euro area and the billing of the negotiations as ‘the 
summit to save the Eurozone’, meant it was always unlikely leaders would look 
upon the UK’s demand for protection with enough sympathy to compromise over 
core elements of the agreement. Cameron’s tactics likely did more to hurt than help 
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advocates of less Europe. Instead of forming an alliance with sympathetic states over 
the extended reach of Brussels, the British demands came across as a self-interested 
stunt. 
2.2 A line in the sand: European Schuldenbremse 
The task set down at the Euro Summit of October 26, 2011 - to build a stronger 
economic union – was a target laid down before European leaders, on this occasion 
without a clear proposal or direction. While there were seemingly no formal papers 
making the rounds across the continent in the latter months of 2011, a German-
inspired budgetary-crackdown for the euro members was the main idea in question. 
Such an idea took very much the same approach as that endorsed by leaders through 
the signing of the Six-Pack. The first reform to economic governance of note – set to 
officially come into force in December 2011 – introduced six ‘legislative acts’ aimed 
primarily at ensuring a stricter implementation of the SGP.29 This would be achieved 
by making it harder for Eurozone countries to ignore warnings from the 
Commission; by fining misbehaving governments for the release of fraudulent 
statistics; by requiring that member states’ budgets converge towards country-
specific medium-term objectives; and by applying the Excessive Deficit Procedure to 
debt above 60 per cent of GDP.  
While there were a few notable holdups30, the new legislation passed with strong 
approval from the vast majority of political actors in Brussels – and from the 
member states – as leaders desperately sought to stop the Eurozone economy from 
bleeding out. Moreover, the process re-emphasised the extent to which power in the 
EU lay with Germany and its allies supporting the consolidation-centric vision for 
Europe. Despite this success, few European policy-makers believed the Six-pack 
rules could by themselves restore the state of the Union. Instead, they were seen as 
just a ‘first step’ in the process of reform. While Angela Merkel urged the adoption 
of stronger powers for the EU to act against fiscal profligates, Guy Verhofstadt – 
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leader of the liberal European Parliament group ALDE - argued the agreement 
should make up only part of a future “comprehensive framework for economic 
governance and growth”.31 
Mid-way through 2009, before the Sovereign Debt Crisis had even begun in earnest, 
German legislators passed a bill that would require the country to run a fiscal deficit 
of no more than 0.35 per cent of GDP, with deficits becoming completely illegal from 
the year 2020.32 A year later, with economic conditions consistently worsening and 
public debt blowing out to previously unimaginable levels, the Germans would ask 
their European brothers and sisters to follow suit. Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble’s suggestion predictably received a mixed reaction across the Continent, 
but was quickly backed by the Austrian Government and more importantly found 
favour with Nicolas Sarkozy.33 This was truly a sign of the times – an 
acknowledgement of the need for desperate measures – as a constitutional balanced 
budget provision, known as Schuldenbremse in Germany, would have almost 
certainly sent European leaders up the walls if it were proposed a mere 12 months 
earlier.   
Merkel and Sarkozy had previously joined forces over the idea of a European 
Schuldenbremse prior to negotiating the March 2011 agreement for the Euro Plus Pact: 
a watered down set-back for the Franco-German crackdown on fiscal profligacy, 
with the ‘debt-brake’ taken off the table. Both leaders stayed true to the principle 
however, and returned with another proposal for constitutionally mandated 
balanced budgets five months later. After talks in Paris on August 17th, Merkel and 
Sarkozy expressed their desire to strengthen the euro by introducing the debt-brake, 
asking all 17 countries of the single currency to “adopt the golden rule in writing in 
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their Constitutions, the rule that national budget laws are aimed at achieving a 
balanced budget. “34 
While the idea copped criticism from certain quarters of the European media, it 
emerged that both Italy and Spain would support the mechanism, with the 
Berlusconi government already having announced a national policy to add a similar 
amendment to its constitution, and with Spain agreeing upon the necessity for such 
a move for the sake of the Eurozone.35 The support from the two largest southern 
European countries, not often seen as natural allies to the Franco-German alliance, 
was crucial following earlier pronouncements of support from the likes of Poland 
and Austria.36 By the time the ‘Summit to end all summits’ came around on the 8th of 
December, Schuldenbremse had sustained momentum, and Council President 
Herman Van Rompuy had put the proposal on the table. The support from all ends 
of Europe over such a stringent budgetary measure underlined the extent to which 
the ordoliberal orthodoxy had remained in the ascendancy through the early crisis 
years. Countries with high levels of debt such as Italy and Spain felt it was futile to 
go up against the powerful austerity-inspired Franco-German engine under the 
control of the Merkozy pact.  
A report from Van Rompuy, leaked to the media prior to the summit, set down two 
possible avenues to move towards a “new fiscal compact”.37 The debt-brake 
amendment could be added via a “substantial revision” of Protocol No. 12 of the 
TFEU - the excessive deficit procedure - by way of an “obligation for euro area 
Member States to reach and maintain a balanced budget over the economic cycle”.38 
                                                             
34 Open Europe (August 17th, 2011), “The day after the night before”, available: 
http://www.openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.nz/2011/08/day-after-night-before.html 
35 Andrew Watt (August 26th, 2011), “Inane in Spain: debate on terms of debt brake begins”, available: 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/08/inane-in-spain-debate-on-terms-of-debt-brake-begins/ 
36 Leigh Phillips (February 23rd, 2011), “Poland backs Franco-German pact, but wants in on talks”, 
available: http://euobserver.com/economic/31861 (Poland) and, Daniel Schäfer and Ben Hall (May 
16th, 2010), “Berlin calls for Eurozone budget laws”, available: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ff35db4-6117-11df-9bf0-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ShRBzjot 
(Austria).  
37 Van Rompuy, H. (6 December, 2011) Towards a Stronger Economic Union – Interim Report, Brussels, 
page 2, available: http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2011/12/INTERIM-REPORT-FINAL-6-12-
.pdf   
38 Ibid, page 3.  
The Fiscal Compact  44 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The amended Protocol would “also include the obligation for euro area Member 
States to include such a rule in their national legal systems, preferably at 
constitutional or equivalent level”.39 Van Rompuy felt the way to enforce this was 
through the Court of Justice having “jurisdiction to control the transposition of this 
rule at a national level” and that the rule be complemented by automatic correction 
mechanisms (automatic increases in revenues and reductions in expenditure to aid 
states to meet the provision).40 The firm backing of a European Schuldenbremse from 
Van Rompuy followed on from José Manuel Barroso’s open support for the Franco-
German plan in August41, leaving no doubt to the weight of institutional support 
behind this fundamental fiscal crackdown.  
On December 9th, following the lengthy negotiations, the 17 Euro Area heads of state 
and Council President Herman Van Rompuy released statements decreeing the 
success of the Summit in producing “a move towards a stronger economic union”.42 
The agreement on the debt-brake required that “general government budgets shall 
be balanced or in surplus” and that this rule would be “deemed respected if… the 
annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5 per cent of nominal GDP”.43 The 
obligations for states to introduce the rule into their national constitutions – verified 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – and to enable automatic correction 
mechanisms were also written into the text.44 While the stable 0.5 per cent deficit 
requirement was more lenient than in the German Schuldenbremse, it was barely so, 
and it certainly did not appear a let-off for Eurozone members considering almost all 
states were running budget deficits at a considerably higher level than 0.5% of 
GDP.45  Due to the expressed ‘veto’ from the UK and the resulting “absence of 
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unanimity among the EU Member States”, the text noted that the fiscal compact 
would be brought in via an intergovernmental agreement to be signed in March.46  
There was a slightly surprising momentum for the balanced budget provision, 
giving the impression that the new fiscal rule would go through seamlessly and 
without too much protest. Despite the controversy of such a strict imposition on 
states, the feeling was that the economic situation in Europe was so dire that drastic 
action had to be taken. However, the failure of the pact to prevent national referenda 
and a shift in political sentiment in France with the election of Francois Hollande as 
President, meant the ratification of the Fiscal Compact would require much more 
than a mere tying up of loose ends.  
2.3 Blocking the pact: Sovereign democracy and the European left 
Herman Van Rompuy had confidently predicted the Fiscal Compact would receive 
near unanimous support when it came to signing the agreement into law. “26 
leaders are in favour of this effort,” he said after the December agreement. “They 
recognise the euro is a common good.”47 The former Belgian Prime Minister was 
however, a little too quick to assume such an unbridled success. Immediately after 
the December Summit it had become clear that several countries felt they would 
need to consult their national parliaments prior to signing the Treaty.48 While this 
would be a formality for most, the fact that many of the non-Euro area countries had 
not quite jumped into the agreement with the gusto of the leading players inside the 
Eurozone raised further concerns for the pact’s legitimacy, against the backdrop of 
whispers over the creation of a multi-speed Europe.  
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In the days and weeks following the December summit, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Sweden and Denmark were all cautiously holding fire on supporting the treaty, with 
many of those countries expressing fears that the new powers given to Brussels to 
police national budgets would be binding to signatories outside of the Eurozone.49 
The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic criticised the vague nature of the deal and 
said: “It would be politically short-sighted to come out with strong statements that 
we should sign this piece of paper.”50 Doubts over Sweden and Denmark would 
prove unwarranted as their parliaments approved the adoption of the Fiscal 
compact fairly comfortably.51 The Czech Republic though, initially refused to join the 
pact, as the government feared a loss of fiscal sovereignty and was unable to secure 
the concession of a seat at the newly created bi-annual Eurozone summits.52 
The real threats to Europe’s ‘stability union’53 were however in the Eurozone, in 
Ireland and increasingly in France. In the days after the December agreement, it 
quickly became clear that the Irish public would demand a referendum on the Fiscal 
Compact and that the Government would find it difficult not to oblige them. The 
two main opposition parties – Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin – demanded Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister) Enda Kelly put the new treaty to a popular vote, a move which 
some felt would almost certainly lead to an Irish rejection of the pact.54 In late 
February, days before the Fiscal Compact was to be signed by 25 countries including 
Ireland, Kelly announced that a referendum would indeed be held before the treaty 
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was ratified in the Republic.55 The decision came as a surprise in certain quarters as 
it was assumed the government was doing everything it could to argue against the 
legal necessity of ratification via a popular vote. However the Attorney General had 
decided that ‘on balance’ the calls for a referendum were legitimate, despite the 
intergovernmental nature of the treaty.56 The initial reaction across the Continent 
was one of quiet disappointment as treaty protagonists had felt that the pact was 
designed in order to avoid such a referendum from taking place.57 Leftist Republican 
and leader of the opposition Gerry Adams confidently predicted the treaty would be 
defeated and the government embarrassed but the vote was set to be close.58 A 
January poll suggested the treaty would narrowly pass with 40 Per cent of those 
questioned saying they would vote 'yes'. Another 36 per cent opposed the treaty, 
while a quarter of voters were undecided.59 
On May 31st, the referendum passed as 60 per cent voted to ratify the Fiscal 
Compact.60 For once, the ‘no’ campaign in Ireland had failed the first time around. 
The collective sigh of relief from Brussels and Berlin could almost be heard across 
the Continent, not least due to the fact that there would be no need for any offering 
of concessions to Ireland on this occasion. While a third abstaining nation would 
have been far from ideal, and put more pressure on Europe’s power-brokers over the 
pact’s legitimacy, there had been a consensus growing that a ‘no’ vote in Ireland 
would do the Republic more harm than it did to the EU.61 However, while many of 
the objections cited throughout the referendum process in Ireland were not over 
details of the Fiscal Compact itself, the calls from anti-treaty campaigners to 
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renegotiate the terms of the agreement reflected a growing surge of displeasure with 
the deal among the political left in Europe. 
After the final details of the Fiscal Compact were set down in January, the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) had summoned a meeting of Union leaders 
from across Europe in Brussels to protest the terms of the agreement.62 In a 
declaration released on January 25th the ETUC fiercely criticised the treaty for its 
“more of the same” approach which led Europe down the path of austerity and 
budgetary discipline “giving absolute priority to rigid economic rules at a time when 
most economies are still weak and unemployment intolerably high”.63 The Union 
leaders demanded a wide-ranging European treaty on economic governance include 
a stronger mandate for the ECB as a lender of last resort, an EU-wide financial 
transaction tax, a partial pooling of debt through Eurobonds, a wage safeguard 
clause, a social progress protocol and significant protocols to safeguard growth.64 
Furthermore they condemned Germany and its allies for imposing “wrong and 
socially harmful” initiatives on other European countries.65  
The Irish ‘no’ campaign opposed the treaty along similar lines. As the Irish had 
initially vetoed the treaties of Nice and Lisbon, in 2001 and 2008 respectively, there 
was optimism on the Left for a repeat with the Fiscal Compact. The Socialist Party 
expressed the Social European view perfectly. “The European political, financial and 
business establishment want to enshrine in law across Europe the type of policy 
response to the crisis that we have already seen fail across Europe”, they said.66 They 
also  claimed that the need to meet a 0.5 per cent structural deficit target would 
mean an additional €6 billion in extra cuts to the Irish budget, only adding to the 
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austerity already imposed on the Irish people following the recession and an EU-
IMF sponsored bank bailout.67  
Treaty detractors were watching the Irish vote closely, as a no vote was set to 
inflame opposition to austerity across the continent, particularly in Greece, Italy and 
Spain. It was thought such a result could lead to referenda being held on the treaty 
in other countries.68 Of great importance to the ‘no’ campaign in Ireland were the 
political developments in France. Anti-austerity campaigners were imploring the 
Irish public to believe that a rejection of the treaty could lead to its re-negotiation, 
and the encouraging rhetoric coming from their socialist comrades in France acted as 
the prime selling point for this plea. The ploy certainly worked for many austerity-
sceptics. One Irish voter told the Guardian on referendum day that a no vote would 
give Hollande “more leverage to renegotiate the treaty's terms and broker a better 
outcome for peripheral EU states like Ireland”. She argued that it also would send “a 
crucial signal to Eurocrats across the continent that the Irish people are unwilling to 
accept the stultifying and unyielding austerity they are currently subject to”.69   
May the 6th, 2012 was a strong day for the European Left, hailed as the moment 
Greek and French voters rejected German-led austerity and the “fragile political 
consensus” in Europe was dealt a serious blow.70 The Greek elections had been 
catastrophic for PASOK and New Democracy, the country’s two-largest parties, both 
of which were pro the EU bailouts. Benefitting from their slide were smaller parties, 
particularly the fiercely anti-austerity Radical Left Coalition (SYRIZA) which gained 
a stunning 17 per cent of the vote.71 Meanwhile, France had deposed Nicolas 
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Sarkozy and elected Francois Hollande, the country’s first Socialist President in 16 
years. While the Greek vote was a considerable cause for concern for stability and 
consolidation in Europe, the definitive end to the Merkozy pact presented a more 
immediate worry for Brussels and Germany regarding the Fiscal Compact. With the 
agreement freshly signed in March but likely to be months away from ratification, 
the approach of Hollande to the treaty was seen as a key element of its success.  
During a campaign centred on opposition to the austerity measures forced upon the 
French people by Sarkozy and Merkel, Hollande had vowed to renegotiate the Fiscal 
Compact should he be elected as President.72 The Socialist candidate had expressed 
vehement opposition to the agreement in December 2011, arguing that its 
consolidation-centric approach to the debt crisis would drag Europe’s fragile 
economy back into a prolonged recession.73 A French-led effort to radically reform 
the Fiscal compact was exactly what Merkel, Van Rompuy and company did not 
need as they waited for 12 Eurozone states to push the treaty through their 
respective ratification processes before the new fiscal rules would officially come 
into play. For the first time since the onset of the crisis, Merkel as the leader of the 
largest and most powerful European nation did not have a strong ally in the leader 
of the second largest and second most powerful European nation. The potential for a 
serious disruption to the status quo could explain why the German Chancellor 
openly supported Nicholas Sarkozy during the French presidential election 
campaign, an extremely rare intervention from a head of state into another nation’s 
electoral politics.74  
While Social Europeans were looking to pull together an anti-austerity coalition 
from across the continent to unite against the Fiscal Compact, they had also found a 
few unlikely friends. Investment fund managers with their eyes fixed on the 
European bond markets were concerned after the December 2011 agreement, citing a 
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lack of foresight in the treaty, “There’s no vision for what the Eurozone is going to 
look like in three years’ time,” said Mohamed El-Erian of Pacific Investment 
Management in an interview with the BBC.75 Paul McNamara – investment director 
at asset management group GAM – articulated a response to the December summit 
that social democrats would have been proud of, arguing that, “we need a fiscal 
union to accommodate a monetary union, but what we’ve got looks much more like 
an austerity union.”76 
An ‘austerity union’ was the type of reform that would turn the hand of economic 
agencies which had previously been so committed to prudence and stability. 
Standard & Poor’s denounced the EU’s approach to the crisis, claiming that the 
agreement did not supply enough resources for the region to overcome its economic 
woes and argued that, “reform based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks 
becoming self-defeating”.77 Moreover, while the IMF and OECD had praised the 
European approach to the crisis throughout 2011, concerns began to be expressed 
once the full details of the pact had emerged, and as the Eurozone economy 
continued to stutter midway through 2012. Both organisations noted the importance 
of matching debt reduction with pro-growth strategies. The IMF called for much 
greater fiscal integration and expressed concerns for the struggling peripheral 
European economies, suggesting a more “supportive financial and growth-friendly 
environment”.78 The OECD warned the prevailing approach risked causing a 
“vicious circle, involving high and rising sovereign indebtedness… excessive fiscal 
consolidation and lower growth”.79 These statements may not have been the rallying 
call for a rejection of the pact its opponents were looking for, but they certainly 
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signalled a sentiment shifting gradually away from the existing “pre-occupation 
with deficits and debt”.80 
2.4 A ratified Fiscal Compact: Why the Left failed 
When Finland’s ratification of the Fiscal Compact became official on the first day of 
2013, the pact gained its 12th member and entered into European law. From the first 
real draft proposed by Herman Van Rompuy in early December 2011 to the signing 
of the intergovernmental treaty in March 2012, the Fiscal Compact had been rushed 
through at an atypically impressive rate for the EU. This reflected the desperation 
from Berlin, Paris and Brussels in the latter months of 2011 - against the backdrop of 
a seriously ailing economy in the region – to save the Eurozone from its almost 
unimaginably high indebtedness, its (rumoured) possible breakup and perhaps most 
importantly, the scorn of the financial markets. While the path of consolidation led 
by Merkel certainly provided positive benefits for her domestic popularity81, 
electoral politics came into play with the progression of the Fiscal compact in more 
ways than one. With French Presidential frontrunner Francois Hollande expressing 
his distaste for the pact in its early days, Berlin and Brussels would have sensed the 
best way to avoid a true political scrap over the signing of the agreement was to get 
it done prior to the French election, as Nicolas Sarkozy was still on hand as a 
prominent driver of the reform. The momentum towards the treaty’s ratification was 
delayed only through the middle months of 2012: minor problems passing the pact 
through legislation in Finland and Poland, the hiccup of a referendum in Ireland and 
sustained protests from French socialists came months after the agreement had been 
signed by 25 member states, putting the Left firmly on the back foot in an effort to 
re-write the treaty.   
There were four main factors in the European Left’s failure to block the Fiscal 
Compact’s implementation: efficiency and practicality, states’ fears that rejecting the 
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pact would do more harm for them than good, the feeling that the revised rules 
would change very little in practice, and the numerical and institutional power 
behind Germany’s ordoliberal orthodoxy.  
2.4.i A starting point to ease fears 
The doomsday scenarios were laid down with the December 2011 meeting labelled 
the “summit to save the Eurozone”.82 The need to ease global fears about the future 
of the EU was abundantly apparent, including to those states frustrated by German 
dominance over legislative change and to those states forced to impose harsh 
austerity policies on their people in order to receive loans from European bailout 
funds and stay inside the single currency.  
The statement released by Eurozone leaders following the December summit made 
this necessity clear, asserting that “the stability and integrity of the Economic and 
Monetary Union and of the European Union as a whole require the swift and 
vigorous implementation of… moves towards a genuine ‘fiscal stability union’”.83 
The agreement in December was in large part an effort to convince international 
allies and the financial markets that the Eurozone was very much getting its act 
together.84 
From the December agreement, there was an attempt by advocates of further fiscal 
tightening to allay the fears of the pact’s sceptics by selling the agreement as a first 
step of many: a base to work from for the Eurozone. In order to achieve at least a 
Eurozone-wide agreement over the Fiscal compact, Berlin and Brussels had to 
consider somewhat of a carrot and stick approach in the negotiations. While the stick 
was further budgetary belt tightening, the carrot was the promise of more 
integration in the future, enhanced cooperation and shared responsibility. The pact 
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was seen as a step on the road to fiscal union85, and while this may have contributed 
to the Eurosceptic-prone Czech Republic’s decision not to sign the agreement,86 
governments frustrated by the feeling of a ‘German solution’ to the crisis were 
reassured by the possibility of more fundamental structural change for the 
Eurozone.  
Van Rompuy’s draft noted the prospect of tax coordination, financial integration and 
perhaps even debt mutualisation. He outlined the trade-off by arguing that “longer 
term reforms… must be combined with immediate action [bolded in-text] to 
forcefully address current market tensions.”87 José Manuel Barroso summed up the 
expectation of continued moves towards the ever closer union stating that, “It is 
indeed very important that Member States agreed on a fiscal compact, but let me say 
that this is not enough… our citizens expect from us: a Europe of responsibility, yes 
but also a Europe of solidarity; a Europe of stability, yes, but also a Europe of growth 
and employment.”88 
2.4.ii The danger of saying no 
Perhaps the most significant reason the Fiscal compact was ratified amid the protest 
and proclamations of re-negotiation was the uncertainty a rejection of the pact was 
set to create for any state that did not join. The crucial question in the Irish 
referendum was whether the fear of the potential repercussions of a ‘no’ vote would 
trump the anger felt by the public at the constant wave of austerity since the crisis 
had begun.89 In France, Francois Hollande’s fear was that alienating his country’s 
closest and most powerful ally in the EU might do more harm than the good of 
standing by his word on re-negotiation and placating the angry left-wing of the 
French Socialist Party.  
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In both cases, fear did reign over anger. For Ireland, the Fiscal Compact was almost 
entirely an economic animal. Frustrated by the bulk of the €85 billion bailout being 
directed towards the nation’s failing banks, voters wanted to know whether the 
agreement would enforce more-of-the-same austerity or, on the other hand, whether 
rejecting it would lead the country back into a deep recession. The ‘yes’ 
campaigners, including both coalition parties in government and the main 
opposition party Fianna Fail, argued that being outside of the Fiscal compact would 
actually mean more austerity for Ireland as the government would be forced into 
borrowing further, at extraordinarily high rates,90 and cutting expenditure in order 
to raise money to protect the economy against future crises.91 This would be the by-
product of the provision within the treaty excluding non-signatories from claiming 
funds under the ESM bailout facility. The ‘no’ campaigners argued that claims of a 
possible economic meltdown following a rejection of the pact were grossly 
overstated.92  
The Irish voted in favour of joining the treaty as the ‘yes’ side had been able to 
convince the voters of the economic perils of being excluded. While the certainty of 
being disqualified from the ESM – which also influenced the decisions of other 
bailout recipients and peripheral states such as Portugal, Italy and Spain to join the 
Fiscal compact – played a role, the prospect of being cut out of the single currency 
altogether was certainly a factor. While a provision to remove a country from the 
Eurozone was not included in the treaty, many argued it would be politically 
untenable for a nation to stay within the single currency if they were to reject the 
agreement.93  
Although there was a sense that the European Left were all keeping tabs on each 
other - from the Socialists in France to the ‘no’ campaign in Ireland, to the opposition 
in Germany and to the austerity-weary marchers in Greece, Spain and Italy – there 
was little doubt that the real leverage for change lay away from the high-profile 
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referendum in Ireland. The government in Ireland had insisted that the Eurozone 
would go on without them and that a ‘no’ vote would derail not the EU but simply 
the Republic itself.94 The same could not be said for France, where opponents of the 
agreement had more leverage than its detractors anywhere else on the Continent. 
Despite Francois Hollande’s animosity towards the agreement however, it became 
clear shortly before the first round of the presidential elections in April that the 
Socialist candidate would take a step back and put up little fight over the core 
contents of the treaty.95 His tune had changed significantly since the previous 
December when he had vowed to oppose the pact even if it meant alienating 
Germany and engaging in a time-consuming legal battle.96  
Hollande’s compromise solution – to add pro-growth mechanisms to the existing 
treaty - achieved mixed success. While there was no re-write to the Fiscal compact 
treaty, Eurozone leaders passed a €130 billion ‘growth pact’ in late June 2012, 
inspired by the new President’s plan to use mostly unspent EU funds for job creation 
and growth.97 However, backbench parliamentary Socialists in France refused to see 
the June pact as an adequate counterbalance to the Fiscal Compact and vowed to 
protest and vote against ratification. The Fiscal Compact was ratified comfortably in 
the French parliament but it was done so amid controversy and Hollande’s falling 
popularity.98   
The French President’s claim of a victory in passing the treaty through parliament 
alongside the addition of the growth pact appeared hollow considering his initial 
contempt for the agreement. His fear of losing influence in Europe, as his 
performance in domestic poll results continued to slide, acted as the primary 
motivator for the U-turn towards ratification. A week after his approval rating had 
reached a low of 43 per cent, Hollande announced the “sweeping majority” vote for 
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ratification would “give France a bigger voice (and) enable us to forge ahead with 
the rebuilding of Europe that I have committed to since my election.”99  
Countries that held reservations over the treaty on non-ideological grounds also fell 
in line due to the fear of losing influence. Poland led a small group of non-euro 
member states which had hoped to attend the bi-annual Eurozone summits set up as 
part of the agreement. The country with the largest EU population centre outside of 
the Eurozone was the only nation to threaten not to join the pact if excluded from the 
talks, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk deriding a fiscal agreement which 
threatened to cause “the division of Europe into two clubs”.100 However, the Fiscal 
Compact was finally passed through the Polish parliament in February 2013 after the 
new EU Budget had seen the country become the largest beneficiary, receiving €106 
billion.101 Poland had “won the financial battle for the next seven years like no other 
country in Europe,” claimed a satisfied Tusk.102  
2.4.iii A new treaty of few restrictions and few real changes 
Herman Van Rompuy had declared the Fiscal Compact an agreement of “more fiscal 
discipline; more automatic sanctions; stricter surveillance,” but there were mixed 
feelings within the Eurozone over the true significance of the reform with many 
believing the new ‘fiscal rule’ championed by Brussels and Berlin would not 
radically alter nations’ budgetary requirements as suggested. Austerity-weary 
member states signing up to the pact made two main assumptions to come to this 
conclusion.  
The first assumption was that the term ‘structural’ included in the provision for 
limited deficits would protect them against the kind of strict scrutiny over balancing 
the fiscal ledger that the debt-brake rule implied at first glance. The Irish 
government argued that the Fiscal Compact would not, in fact, prevent countries 
from running budget deficits during recessions and that the 0.5 per cent limit took 
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into account the normal up and down cycles in the economy. 103 This was partly a 
ploy by the government to refute claims made by several economists that the pact 
would completely rule out Keynesian counter-cyclical measures to address an 
economic downturn.104 However, there was validity to the government’s argument 
as they correctly noted that a structural deficit is “an estimate of what the deficit or 
surplus would have been if economic conditions were normal”.105  
The second factor pointing towards a more lenient-than-advertised agreement was 
in the confusion over the precise role of the European Court of Justice in punishing 
states for profligate fiscal management.  The treaty text states under Article 8 that if 
the European Committee or a “Contracting Party” (member state signatory to the 
pact) decide that a state has failed to comply with Article 3(2) it may bring the matter 
before the ECJ and the Court’s judgement on proceedings will subsequently be 
considered binding.106 Article 3(2) says that the fiscal rule must take effect in the 
national law of the Contracting Parties, “at the latest one year after the entry into 
force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character”.107 
The fact that Article 8 refers back to compliance with Article 3(2) as opposed to 
Article 3(1), under which point (a) states clearly “the budgetary position of the 
general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus” leaves 
member states struggling with fiscal deficits more than enough scope to argue that 
their only responsibility to the terms of the treaty itself is to pass the debt-break 
through national law, and not to actually adhere to it.  
Commentators responding to the treaty did not miss this contentious point. The 
Social Europe Journal claimed the Fiscal Compact was “Much ado about nothing”108, 
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Pat McArdale of the Institute of International and European Affairs argued the 
agreement barely deviated from the revised SGP109 and Sebastian Dullien of the 
European Council on Foreign Relations maintained that it was not completely clear 
“whether the Fiscal Compact will be de facto more binding than the Six-pack, should 
national governments later decide that they do not want to follow it”.110 
Additionally, while it was considered a coup for Merkel, Sarkozy et al. to have 
potential foes Spain and Italy fall in line with the concept at such an early stage, it 
was noted that it was unlikely either of these countries would approach a debt-break 
by the letter of the law.111After all, in 2011 Italy and Spain held budget deficits of 4.5 
per cent and 9.7 per cent respectively112 and they could take solace in the fact that 
under the limits of the SGP 23 of 27 states had been in the excessive deficit 
procedure, with very few of those actually punished.113 In the end, member states 
uncertain over the direction being advocated by the consolidation coalition could 
feel a reasonable sense of confidence that enforcement procedures would become 
tied up in either confrontation over definitions or a legal battle over the role of the 
ECJ.      
2.4.iv No safety in numbers 
The sturdiest nail in the coffin for the European Left’s campaign against the Fiscal 
Compact came in the brutal reality that both power and numbers in the EU were 
against the movement. The ‘Big Three’ were reduced to a big two after the UK veto 
but it was Germany and France that led the way for greater fiscal discipline in the 
union and the implementation of this through a revised or new treaty. Of the 
remaining member states, all large countries had centre-right governments and only 
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three – Austria, Belgium and Denmark – had Socialist ones.114 While a few noises of 
discontent were made in non-euro Denmark, little genuine resistance was put up by 
any of the three.115 This lack of material strength in the Council represented a major 
hurdle for Social Europeans.  
In Brussels, a commitment to consolidation supported the Franco-German approach 
to the crisis. While the Commission often advocated a slightly more even handed 
approach than Merkel, Sarkozy and Van Rompuy, Barrosso was completely on 
board with the immediate need for a ‘stability union.’ Even the often awkward 
European Parliament - essentially powerless to block the treaty under its terms - 
barely put up a fight against the Fiscal Compact. A motion to oppose treaty, citing its 
inability to “address the main elements that led to the crisis, namely the 
liberalisation, deregulation and over-reliance on financial markets” and 
admonishing the “imposition of neoliberal policies” only garnered the support of the 
vastly outnumbered left flank of the parliament.116 Meanwhile, the head of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, stuck to an inexorably ordoliberal line throughout the Fiscal 
Compact’s ratification process. He argued that despite severe budgets cuts 
deepening the recession in certain countries of the euro, the only way to maintain the 
integrity of the EMU was to persevere with fiscal adjustment.117  
Shriti Vadera, a former Labour Minister in the UK government led by Gordon 
Brown, reacted to the Fiscal Compact draft by claiming the EU had “produced a 
toolkit with only one tool in it, which is austerity.”118 The unfortunate reality for the 
Left was that there was just no significant force to lead the charge against such 
austerity and articulate this belief. With Francois Hollande’s accession to the head of 
French politics there came hope for change: an expectation that an austerity-only 
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response would was no longer a given. However, much like the IMF’s admission in 
January 2013 that they had got it wrong on consolidation - underestimating the effect 
of severe budget cuts on growth and economic development119- Hollande’s 
challenge proved to be too little and too late to truly impact the direction of the new 
Fiscal compact.  
2.5. Conclusion 
The pact has been ratified by 27 of 28 European countries, with the UK remaining 
the only holdout. While the British veto left Berlin and Brussels frustrated in their 
attempts to rubber stamp the stability treaty into EU law, it has been one of the most 
significant developments in economic governance reform since the collapse of the 
global economy in 2008 and the onset of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Just how 
significant it will be remains to be discovered, most likely through the courts, 
although signs point to a more lenient impact than what was intended. Whether or 
not the Fiscal Compact truly was a step on the road to fiscal union and what this 
union would look like were the more pertinent questions to come from the 
agreement.  
The European Left tried, and failed, to get in the way of the Fiscal compact. 
Ultimately, however, calls to renegotiate the treaty were not heeded as Social 
Europeans struggled against the weight of institutional power behind the 
ordoliberal orthodoxy, while feeling pressure from Brussels to act urgently. 
Furthermore, there were legitimate concerns within sceptical member state 
governments, that a failure to sign on would result in an effective excommunication 
from the head table in the Council. Though some believed the treaty did little more 
than reinforce the status quo, this would be a telling development in itself. The Fiscal 
Compact was the most controversial and meaningful economic agreement since the 
SGP and it delivered a defeat to the European Left’s vision for greater solidarity. The 
pact displayed the sheer strength behind the consolidation coalition during the early 
stages of crisis reform and the prospect of a future for Europe under an ‘austerity 
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union’ represented a chilling concern for opponents. However, as the following 
chapter shows, opponents of the status quo were about to regain a sense of initiative 
through its approach to the Two-Pack proposals in the coming months, with a 
remarkably timely shift in the political climate resetting the stage for debate.  
3. Caught in the Changing Winds: A Reprieve for Social Europe 
As the European economy dipped into a deeper crevasse and the outside world 
demanded leaders get their act together in the lead up to the December 8th 
showdown summit, José Barroso and his Commission could at least claim they had 
been busy laying some groundwork for reform. With the Six-Pack about to officially 
enter into force, a proposed legislative add-on - the ‘Two-Pack’ - was tabled, two 
weeks prior to the ‘summit to end all summits’. The proposal would not be at the 
forefront of the leaders’ minds heading into Brussels: the need to resolve the many 
awkward and significant political issues involved in the Fiscal Compact negotiations 
meant the Two-Pack would be very much consigned to legislators respective ‘deal 
with it later’ filing systems. Months later, when the whole European political 
establishment did come to deal with the Two-Pack in earnest, they were to discover 
that tension over the proposed reform brought with it the baggage of an increasingly 
divided Europe.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections: the first details the largely austerity-
based Commission Two-Pack proposal, before examining how the May 2012 shift in 
the political climate led to a drawn-out and fraught negotiation process between 
member states and the European Parliament. The second section discusses the 
development of the on-going debate around Eurobonds. Here it is argued that the 
ability of the European Parliament and other actors to keep the issue well and truly 
on the table has led to a victory for the European Left, and a renewed emphasis on 
the need for an alternative approach to economic reform. The momentum created by 
Left towards the adoption of Eurobonds and the concessions gained in the final 
Two-Pack agreement act as two factors in a swing back towards the Social European 
vision from the status-quo ordoliberal dominance.     
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3.1 The Two-Pack: more of the same? 
The original proposal for the Two-Pack was set down by the Commission on 
November the 23rd, 2011. While the Six-Pack was designed primarily to crack-down 
on fiscal profligacy in the Eurozone and achieve more macro-economic convergence 
within the Union, the Two-Pack was mostly about oversight. The Commission stated 
in their release of the proposal that there was “a need for euro area Member States to 
go beyond the Six-Pack” and thus unveiled “two new Regulations aimed at further 
strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro area.”1 Like the Six-Pack, the 
add-on reform targeted Europe’s misbehavers, and came during a period when the 
‘bailout states’ were struggling mightily to get their heads anywhere close to the 
surface. Greece, Ireland and Portugal were all about to set new record levels of 
public debt – Greece’s a staggering 170 per cent of GDP – and the remaining non-
bailout PIIGS nations, Spain and Italy, would suffer the same dubious distinction at 
the conclusion of 2011.2 Growth in the euro area as a whole had been negative in the 
second half of the year, leading observers to forget about the positive indicators from 
the same time 12 months prior to this.3  
Barroso and his Commission clearly felt as though the fiscal sustainability stick had 
not hit the toiling periphery states hard enough, and to address this some good old-
fashioned parenting was required from Brussels. The proposal introduced two 
separate regulatory reforms. The purpose of the first was to set “common provisions 
for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans”, while also ensuring member 
states’ correction of excessive deficits.4  
The monitoring requirements included the introduction of a common budgetary 
timeline, whereby euro area Member States would be required to present a draft 
budgetary plan with independent macroeconomic forecasting for the following year 
                                                             
1 European Commission (November,2011), MEMO/11/82, “Economic governance: Commission 
proposes two new Regulations to further strengthen budgetary surveillance in the euro area”, 
Brussels, available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-822_en.htm    
2 “Government Debt to GDP”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-
list/government-debt-to-gdp (Accessed: May 16th, 2014).  
3 “Euro Area GDP Growth Rate”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/gdp-
growth (Accessed: May 16th, 2014).  
4 Ibid.  
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to the Commission on October 15th.5 This was an initiative that did not radically alter 
the existing approach to fiscal governance in the Eurozone, especially considering 
the fact that co-ordination of budgetary reporting had already been set up in a 
similar form by the SGP and European Semester. The significant addition made by 
the ‘monitoring and assessing’ regulation was in the new power given to the 
Commission to require member states to revise their draft budgetary plans, should 
they show serious non-compliance with the SGP.6 The proposal essentially allowed 
the Commission to clamp down on any attempt by a member state government to 
renege on their deficit and debt requirements and turn their nose up until the unruly 
government decided to play ball. Moreover, the draft plans would also be assessed 
by other euro area member states in the Eurogroup before they could become law,7 
“increasing peer pressure” from other member states.8  
The second of the Two-Pack’s regulatory reforms was more explicitly directed at the 
PIIGS and other states either experiencing or threatening record levels of debt.9 
Brussels’ prescription for these member states was enhanced surveillance – more 
kindly described in the release as ‘graduated monitoring’10 – the sanctioning of 
which would be entirely at the discretion of the Commission. The surveillance – 
carried out with assistance from the ECB – would involve an obligation on member 
states to adopt measures to address sources of instability, as well as regular review 
missions, and the provision of more detailed financial sector data on request.11 
The means by which a country would “address the source of instability” would be 
decided through a European Council recommended macro-economic adjustment 
programme.12 If, then, the Council found that a nation had not complied with the 
requirements set out in this programme, financial assistance being received under 
                                                             
5 European Commission (March 14th, 2012), “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to 
the new EU fiscal governance”, available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm  
6 European Commission (March 14th, 2012), “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact?”  
7 European Commission (November, 2011), MEMO/11/82. 
8 European Commission (March 14th, 2012), “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? 
9 Ibid.  
10 European Commission (November, 2011), MEMO/11/82. 
11 European Commission (March 14th, 2012), “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? 
12 Ibid.  
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the EFSF (or later the ESM) could be threatened.13 While the carrot and stick 
approach to EU-mandated financial assistance was nothing new, the significance of 
the second regulation in the Two-Pack was to put Europe’s trouble-making 
economies on constant alert and subject to the strictest scrutiny. Once it became time 
to debate the initiatives, both supporters and detractors of the tabled reforms agreed 
that they were in large part about securing greater powers for the Commission. With 
EU finance ministers set to discuss the proposals in February 2012, an EU diplomat 
argued the Two-Pack constituted “an important power of appreciation” given to the 
Commission, which would put countries at risk of financial implosion “in front of 
their responsibilities.”14 MEPs sceptical about the level of Commission power 
emphasised the need to heavily involve the European Parliament - and member state 
in question - over the provision of adjustment programmes, due to concerns over a 
lack of “proper democratic oversight” included in the proposals.15 For its part, the 
Commission admitted that the surveillance process had already been “considerably 
improved with the Six-Pack” but argued the add-on reforms would give the 
Parliament’s executive body “the powers needed” to more closely monitor Europe’s 
fiscal and financial villains.16  
The Two-Pack proposal put forward by Barroso and the Commission – which, 
unlike the Fiscal Compact, was only designed for member states in the Eurozone - 
ostensibly appeared to be simply another chapter in the European handbook on 
fiscal discipline. If passed, the unprecedented powers handed to the Commission 
were to be used to more effectively to keep tabs on the struggling member states 
threatening the stability of the euro area, and to demand these countries change their 
ways by accepting structural reform. As such, the prevailing flavour of economic 
governance reform in the EU looked unlikely to be compromised by the proposals. 
                                                             
13 European Commission (March 14th, 2012), “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? 
 
14 “Ministers debate new EU powers over national budgets”, available: 
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/ministers-debate-new-eu-powers-n-news-511005 (Accessed: 
May 26th, 2014).   
15 Green economic affairs spokesperson Phillippe Lamberts (Belgium), source: EurActiv (June 14th, 
2012), “MEPs give green light to negotiate new fiscal discipline package”, available: 
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/meps-give-green-light-negotiate-news-513286  
16 European Commission (November, 2011), MEMO/11/82. 
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Critics of Europe’s ‘Austerity union’, cemented by the Fiscal Compact agreement, 
would not have felt appeased in the slightest by the core elements of the latest effort 
with Germany’s influence felt once more. However, the Commission’s decision to 
accompany the proposals with a ‘Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing 
Stability Bonds’ was to change the nature of the discussion altogether.  
Two months prior to the Two-Pack proposals, President Barroso announced that the 
Commission was to study and present possible options for a Eurobonds scheme.17 In 
an address in front of the European Parliament in the wake of further economic 
turmoil in Europe, Barroso had made it abundantly clear that deeper integration of 
euro area economic and budgetary policies was a vital part of the solution. In a clear 
break from his earlier consolidation-laden tone, he reiterated this belief two weeks 
later in his State of the Union Address by maintaining that “once the euro area is 
fully equipped with the instruments necessary to ensure both integration and 
discipline, the issuance of joint debt will be seen as a natural and advantageous step 
for all.”18  
The Commission presented three options for the adoption of “Stability Bonds” 
alongside the Two-Pack proposals on November 23rd. These varied based on 
different degrees of “substitution of national issuance” – in other words, the extent 
to which bonds would be delivered via a European body as opposed to by 
individual member states’ governments – and on “the nature of the underlying 
guarantee”(which and how many member states would be liable for funding this 
debt).19 The options ranged from ambitious to conservative and reflected an 
acknowledgement within the European community that Eurobonds were very much 
a risk versus reward prospect. While Option 1 – the most all-encompassing and 
ambitious approach – was to have “very strong potential effects on stability and 
                                                             
17 José Manuel Barroso (September 14th, 2011), “Speech by President Barroso to the European 
Parliament during the debate on the economic crises and the euro”, available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-572_en.htm  
18 José Manuel Barroso (September 28th, 2011), “European renewal – State of the Union Address 2011”, 
available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-607_en.htm  
19 European Commission (November 23rd, 2011), MEMO/11/820, “European Commission Green 
Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds”, Brussels, available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-820_en.htm  
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integration” yet “pose a relatively high risk of moral hazard”, Options 2 and 3 were 
set up to reduce moral hazard, either by limiting the substitution of issuance or 
lessening liability for the member states, thereby also reducing the positive effects on 
overall financial stability and integration.  
The Green paper also commented on concerns around the potential for change to the 
EU treaties, in the case of the adoption of “Stability Bonds”. The Commission noted 
that bonds issued “with joint liability and several guarantees would be incompatible 
with the current ‘no bailout’ provision”.20 This would have been the case for both the 
ambitious and moderate options, leaving the “relatively rapidly deployable”21 
conservative option as the easiest, but most incomplete, way forward. While the 
Green Paper also presented a list of pros and cons for the implementation of 
mutualised debt and provided a level of clarity for policymakers on the levels of 
risks and benefits involved in each of the options presented, the Commission 
decided against making any clear recommendation as to the way forward. Instead it 
decided to launch “a broad consultation” on the issue, stating that all “possible 
advantages, challenges, options and operational terms require careful 
consideration.”22  
There was undoubtedly merit in the Commission’s decision not to hedge its bets 
without the involvement of the member states and the European parliament but the 
move represented a back-down from Barroso’s lofty rhetoric only several weeks 
beforehand. In his State of the Union Address, the President had emphasised the 
need for immediate action: “we can do a lot within the existing Treaty of Lisbon” he 
said, “and there is no excuse for not doing it, and for not doing it now”.23 
Furthermore, the decision to label the options by the compromise term “Stability 
Bonds”, rather than Eurobonds, sent a clear message to observers that the 
Commission had somewhat buckled under institutional pressure in Brussels, or had 
at least experienced cold feet. Explicitly or otherwise, Barroso appeared to have felt 
                                                             
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 José Manual Barosso, “European renewal – State of the Union Address 2011” 
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the stern disapproving gaze from Berlin. Nevertheless, the Commission’s Green 
Paper had helped to create a renewed momentum for a debate on Eurobonds, 
particularly as it wasn’t the only proposal of its kind to be released to the world at 
the conclusion of 2011. Days prior to the presentation of the Green Paper, the 
German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) proposed a new twist on Eurobonds, 
named the European Redemption Pact, in its annual report.24 The GCEE – an 
academic body made up of five members designed to advise German policymakers 
on issues of economic policy25 - created “a novel solution to the crisis” by outlining a 
plan for the partial and temporary pooling of European debt.  
The economic advisors in the GCEE sought to emphasise the differentiation between 
their proposal and a fully-fledged plan for Eurobonds by positioning their initiative 
as an intermediate option between greater fiscal discipline and the expansion of a 
transfer union. Its aim, were the proposal be put in place, would be to “ease down 
the current unsustainable levels (of debt) while implementing credible fiscal reform 
policies in all Eurozone nations.”26 It would do this by using a “common 
consolidation pact and binding national debt caps” in order to bring national debt 
levels below the 60 per cent of GDP limit prescribed by the SGP, while also giving 
the participating states “the opportunity to finance themselves to a limited extent via 
a fund for which all are jointly liable.”27 This ‘limited extent’ referred to the 
provision that member states would only be able to refinance via the funding 
mechanism below the level of a 60 per cent national debt-to-GDP ratio. In other 
words, governments would have to ensure that the debt they had amassed on their 
own stayed strictly at or below the ‘brake’.  
                                                             
24 German Council of Economic Experts (18th November, 2011), “Third Chapter: Euro Area in Crisis” 
in Assume Responsibility for Europe: Annual Economic Report 2011/12, Economic Development Federal 
Statistics Office, Wiesbaden, available: http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/schuldentilgungspakt.html?L=1  
25 Objectives and tasks – German Council of Economic Experts, available: 
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/ziele.html?&L=1 (Accessed: May 26th, 2014).  
26 German Council of Economic Experts (November 9th, 2011), “A European Redemption Pact”, in 
Vox-EU online, available: http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Pressemitteilungen/A_european_redemption_pact.pdf  
27 GCEE (18th November, 2011), “Third Chapter: Euro Area in Crisis” 
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While the GCEE stated that the strings attached to the pact – including an 
approximate time limit for the scheme of 25 years - equated to a “decisive difference 
from the idea of Eurobonds”, the advisors were fully aware that a plan to save the 
Eurozone from imploding would not work without a convincing demonstration that 
solidarity would prevail.28 This could only be done “through strong countries 
lending their reputation… to member countries facing a liquidity crisis.” The 
experts’ plan to pool joint liability in the trillions of Euros was undoubtedly “a grand 
scheme (requiring) bold action and a long term commitment to the Eurozone.”29  
3.1.i The European Parliament’s power-play 
The Commission’s proposed regulations on enhanced surveillance and budgetary 
oversight had little trouble getting by European finance ministers in February 2012. 
The Council set out its common position for negotiation with the Parliament on 
February 21st,30 with its amendments making no noteworthy changes to Barroso’s 
proposals.31 Passing the Two-Pack through the European Parliament turned out to 
be an entirely different story.  
The Two-Pack first came before MEPs in the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee in mid-May 2012, almost six-months after the Commission had made its 
proposals. While this break in the process was not particularly out of the ordinary, it 
was a delay that the European Left seized upon with glee. The European 
Parliament’s left-wing could see three important developments in their favour as 
they prepared to negotiate the terms of the agreement: the renewed discussion over 
Eurobonds brought about by the Commission and the GCEE reports, the failure of 
austerity focused response to the crisis to turn around the European economy, and 
                                                             
28 GCEE (November 9th, 2011), “A European Redemption Pact” 
29 Ibid.  
30 Council of the European Union (February 21st, 2012), “Council agrees on second economic 
governance package”, Press release 6624/12, Brussels, available: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/128085.pdf  
31 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis, European Trade Union 
Institute, available: http://www.etui.org/Publications2/Background-analysis/The-two-pack-on-
economic-governance-an-initial-analysis  
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most significantly, a shift in the political climate, brought about by socialist triumphs 
in the French and Greek elections.32  
While it was difficult to criticise the lack of progress made under economic 
governance reforms to date – only the Six-Pack had come into force at this point – 
Social Europeans could point to a broader failure in the austerity-dominated 
response to the crisis, whether enforced through bailout conditions or within the 
members states themselves. By May 2012, Euro area unemployment had ticked 
above 11 per cent33 – a record high – and Europe’s periphery economies were mostly 
contracting34, fuelling fears that under the existing approach, any sort of meaningful 
recovery would be years away. At the same time, the Eurobonds Green Paper 
released by the Commission alongside the Two-pack proposals gave the Left a 
blueprint-of-sorts for an alternative approach, or at least options to re-ignite the 
debate over a more collective attitude towards reform. Of more significance was the 
GCEE’s report. The fact that these five academics tasked with advising Europe’s 
biggest roadblock to the mutualisation of debt – the German government – had 
declared the importance of collective responsibility with such vigour, meant that 
European socialists had an unlikely ally and a stronger base from which to debate.  
Despite these meaningful developments, it was more the results of the recent French 
and Greek national elections which had given the European Left momentum and 
presented the socialist-led parliamentary faction in Brussels with an opportunity to 
change the debate. Both the upsurge in support for the leftist coalition SYRIZA in 
Greece and victory for Socialist Francois Hollande in France had been inspired by 
fierce campaigns against domestic and European-wide austerity (see Chapter 2), and 
like-minded MEPs were more than ready to exploit this.  
The left-wing political groups in the Parliament, namely the Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D), Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) and the European 
                                                             
32 Ibid.  
33 “Euro Area Unemployment Rate”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/euro-
area/unemployment-rate, (Accessed: 31st May, 2014).  
34 “GDP Growth Rate”, available: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-growth-rate, 
(Accessed: 31st May, 2014).  
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United Left-Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL), saw the Commission’s proposals as 
“focusing only on the austerity and discipline side”.35 Claiming that “the world was 
a different place when the Commission made its proposals”36, the Socialists asked 
for the vote in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee to be postponed, on 
the very day it was due to take place.37 The opportunistic move was made only a 
week after the polls had closed in France and Greece, as the European Parliament’s 
largest left-wing group insisted that changes in the EU’s political landscape required 
the radical revision of certain Two-Pack provisions.38. Conversely, the leader of the 
European Peoples’ Party (EPP) and centre-right faction within the Committee, Jean-
Paul Gauzès, demanded that the vote on the Parliament’s amended Two-Pack 
proposals go ahead as scheduled. Gauzès cited the need for the legislation to enter 
into force as quickly as possible while brushing off the Left’s delaying tactics. 
“Changes in the political environment happen all the time”, he said39 Ultimately, the 
S&D group could not gain enough support in their bold attempt to capitalise on the 
change in the political winds and it was decided by a very narrow margin that the 
vote should go ahead on May 14th.40  
Despite their failure to block the vote, the Socialists received more support in their 
opposition to the overall nature of the Commission’s Two-Pack proposals. The 
Parliament’s third largest political group – the centrist Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) – crucially backed up the S&D MEPs in their 
criticisms of an ‘austerity-only’ approach.41 In the lead-up to the drafting of 
                                                             
35 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis.  
36 European Parliament (May 15th, 2012), “Fiscal Policy: Growth dimension and control of new 
Commission powers needed”, press release, available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/press-releases.html?action=10  
37 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis. 
38 Ibid.  
39 European Parliament (May 15th, 2012), “Fiscal Policy: Growth dimension and control of new 
Commission powers needed” 
4021 MEPs in the Committee decided in favour of the vote being held as scheduled, with 19 voting 
against and 3 abstaining.  
Source:  European Parliament (June 7th, 2012) “Economic governance “two pack” -  Q&A”, available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20120607BKG46436/html/Economic-governance-two-pack-QA 
41 European Parliament (March 7th, 2013), “Economic governance “two-pack” background note”, 
available: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20130304BKG62046/html/Economic-governance-two-pack-background-note 
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amended proposals, a rift between the left-bloc (including ALDE) and the right-bloc 
in Brussels compromised the passage of the Pact. The main issue was whether the 
legislation should be restricted only to fiscal rules preventing excessive deficits and 
enforcing reforms in ‘programme countries’ or whether it should include 
mechanisms for solidarity and further economic integration in the Eurozone.42 The 
configuration of coalitions between the parliamentary groups provided no clear 
majority on the matter either way, which initially made the impasse all the more 
difficult.   
In spite of the Socialists’ risky late-in-the-game tactics, amended texts for both of the 
Commission’s proposed regulations were passed by the Committee.43 A number of 
alterations were asked for by the two opposing Committee Rapporteurs in Gauzès 
and S&D MEP Elisa Ferreira and, unsurprisingly, it was Ferreira’s amended draft on 
“common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans” which 
demanded more.44  
The Socialists’ response had inserted a number of amendments under three themes. 
First of all, the text sought to place limits on the Commission’s power by 
emphasising a transparent and democratic budgetary oversight process through 
which other parties would be able to engage. Secondly, considerable protections for 
growth, key sectors such as health and education, and national institutions like wage 
formation practices were set down to prevent Commission and Council-mandated 
cuts having a negative effect. Finally, and most significantly, Ferreira’s draft 
ambitiously asked for the creation of a European Redemption Fund, a roadmap for 
the introduction of Eurobonds and a proposal for a European growth facility from 
the Commission (see Table One for more detail).45 The Portuguese MEP argued for 
                                                             
42 Ibid.   
43 European Parliament (June 7th, 2012) “Economic governance “two pack” -  Q&A” 
44 A rapporteur is an MEP elected by his or her colleagues within a parliamentary committee to draft 
a report based on a particular Commission proposal or other document, and subsequently report back 
to the committee or plenary regarding the findings/arguments of the report.  
For a further explanation of this role see: European Parliament (July 27th, 2006), “A ‘rapporteur’ – the 
person who presents reports to Parliament”, available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20060725STO09938&language=EN  
45 European Parliament (June 7th, 2012) “Economic governance “two pack” -  Q&A” 
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the amendments on the basis that there was “no evidence showing the effectiveness 
of rules-based fiscal frameworks in supporting sound and sustainable fiscal 
policies”, and that the current consolidation-based approach to economic 
governance by itself would “only lead to a prolonged recession within the Euro 
area.”46 
On the other hand, the amended text put forward by Jean-Paul Gauzès for the 
regulation on member states in severe financial difficulties largely maintained the 
spirit of the Commission’s proposal.47 This was expected in a sense, as Gauzès’ EPP 
(the largest group in Parliament) and the British Tory Party-dominated European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) had been outspoken in their support for the 
austerity-heavy response to the crisis.  In fact the centre-right’s proposals actually 
sought to further increase the Commission’s powers by implementing a reversed 
qualified majority voting (RQMV) rule for the Council. Thus when the Commission 
was to recommend correction measures or require debt reduction plans for member 
states, their decisions would be considered adopted unless they were explicitly 
opposed by a majority of the Council.48  
Due to the very difficult passage of the amended Two-Pack proposals through the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, MEPs decided that in order to gauge 
the level of support in the house, the texts would be put to a vote in the Plenary. 
While this action was not constitutionally necessary, there was a clear strategy on the 
part of European politicians to boost support and provide Parliament with a strong 
mandate going into negotiations with the Council.49 On the 13th of June, Parliament 
approved both texts by overwhelming majorities: Gauzès resolution received 471 
votes for, 97 against, with 78 abstentions while Ferreira’s text gained 501 affirmative 
votes, with 138 against and 3 abstentions.50 MEPs – particularly on the left – were 
                                                             
46 European Parliament – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (March 13th, 2012), 
“Amendments 47-287, Draft report Elisa Ferreira”, available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/econ/am/895/895611/895611en
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47 European Parliament (June 7th, 2012) “Economic governance “two pack” -  Q&A” 
48 Ibid.  
49 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis. 
50 EurActiv (June 14th, 2012), “MEPs give green light to negotiate new fiscal discipline package” 
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full of praise for their achievement. ALDE Group President Guy Verhofstadt said the 
proposal represented “the first time… a structural solution (is) on the table”51 while 
the Greens claimed the result to be a “milestone”52 that set out “a clear and 
constructive alternative to the failed one-sided austerity, which has characterised the 
response to the economic crisis so far.”53 Socialist leader Hannes Swoboda went as 
far to suggest the proposals put forward were “the core of a fiscal union”.54 MEPs in 
the EPP believed the Two-Pack provided the EU with the necessary tools to further 
scrutinise fiscal behaviour in the member states, but, like their centre-left 
counterparts, they also praised the agreement for its level of compromise. Clearly 
feeling as though the proposals included strong elements to allow the Commission 
and Council to keep profligate states in check, the EPP stressed that it would fully 
support the principle of a redemption fund, should it be backed up by analysis from 
the Commission.55As delegates prepared for negotiations with the Council, there 
was a feeling that the impressive result in the plenary had sent a strong signal of 
togetherness in the Parliament.  
3.1.ii Passing the pact: battle lines drawn 
There had been a degree of bullishness from MEPs over the chances of agreeing the 
bulk of their Two-Pack proposals with the Council. This was helped by a belief on 
the Left that some of the bigger, more powerful member states were altering their 
positions in regard to the original Commission proposal and the general direction of 
economic governance reform.56 Hannes Swoboda confidently asserted that the 
Council had been “shifting its position on how much austerity is needed.”57 There 
was an acceptance among those on both sides in the Parliament, and from outside 
                                                             
51 EUobserver (June 13th, 2012), “MEPs agree proposal towards ‘fiscal union’”, available: 
http://euobserver.com/economic/116608.   
52 Ibid. 
53 EurActiv (June 14th, 2012), “MEPs give green light to negotiate new fiscal discipline package” 
54 EUobserver (June 13th, 2012), “MEPs agree proposal towards ‘fiscal union’” 
55 European Parliament (May 15th, 2012), “Fiscal Policy: Growth dimension and control of new 
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wavering over the austerity-first approach to the crisis. Source: EurActiv (June 14th, 2012), “MEPs give 
green light to negotiate new fiscal discipline package” 
57 European Parliament (May 15th, 2012), “Fiscal Policy: Growth dimension and control of new 
Commission powers needed” 
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observers, that much would depend on the wider political context when it came to 
negotiations with the member states.58  
Passing the Two-Pack into law turned out to be far from plain sailing for Europe’s 
political players. When an agreement was finally reached nine months after the 
plenary vote, Parliament had failed to force through any major changes to Brussels 
ordoliberal approach (see Table One). The text largely reflected Europe’s existing 
line of attack: more scrutiny over national budgets and stricter fiscal rules for 
misbehaving members, with a twist in the greater level of power and influence given 
to the Commission. Moreover, none of the European Parliament’s truly controversial 
proposals had been accepted as member states successfully fought to avoid the 
inclusion of a European Redemption Fund, an expensive ‘growth facility’ and a 
promise to introduce Eurobonds. However, while the European Left could be 
forgiven for feeling unsatisfied with the final result, the process had highlighted the 
extent to which the nature of European economic reform negotiations were 
changing, against the backdrop of a more austerity-sceptical EU.  
The European Parliament negotiators had gone into discussions with EU finance 
ministers knowing their proposals for greater economic solidarity – and particularly 
for joint debt liability – were set to cause a stir. This was quickly confirmed by the 
reaction of some member states to Parliament’s draft texts. It became immediately 
apparent that the Council would largely stick to the position it had formed months 
earlier in February, as Germany and its allies in the Council remained unimpressed 
by the idea of introducing any sort of Euro area debt redemption scheme.59 
Furthermore, many held reservations over the use of the Two-Pack to promote 
growth and investment, rather than simply shore up fiscal rules and oversight 
mechanisms in the Eurozone.60 With MEPs holding their corner, negotiations 
throughout 2012 proved to be mostly fruitless. Only 10 days after the Presidency of 
the Council had informed ministers that it was very close to reaching an agreement 
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59 European Parliament (March 7th, 2013), “Economic governance “two-pack” background note” 
60 Ibid.  
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on the Two-Pack61, talks were suspended in mid-December, primarily at the 
insistence of Socialist, Green and Liberal MEPs who continued to demand provisions 
for a redemption fund to balance out the austerity-centric regulations agreed to by 
the Council, which they believed simply served to reinforce the status quo.62 After 
talks had resumed in early 2013, MEPs expressed their frustration by what some 
believed to be member state arrogance in the negotiation process. Sven Griegold, of 
the Greens, said the hold-up was due to the Council’s belief that it could simply 
show up with its decision and force Parliament into submission.63 However, 
Parliament continued to demand concessions.  
When a deal was agreed in February, despite remaining true to the spirit of the 
Commission’s original proposals, the legislation did include a number of 
noteworthy concessions offered to Parliament and the European Left. MEPs had 
managed to temper the advancement of austerity-focused national budgetary 
surveillance by ensuring that Commission-mandated reform for struggling 
economies would not hurt national healthcare and education, and that national 
institutions such as wage practices would be protected. Furthermore, deficit 
reduction timetables would be applied with more flexibility in exceptional 
circumstances thanks to the Parliament’s efforts in negotiations (see Table One).64 
The most significant of the concessions for the future of Europe however, was the 
commitment by the Commission to study the “feasibility” of introducing Eurobonds 
and a debt redemption fund and report back to the Parliament on its findings by 
                                                             
61 Cyprus Presidency of the European Union (December 4th, 2012), “Press release – ‘Two-Pack’ and 
Single Supervisory Mechanism closer to a final agreement”, available: 
http://www.cy2012.eu/index.php/en/news/press-release-two-pack-and-single-supervisory-
mechanism-closer-to-a-final-agreement  
62 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis 
63 Ian Wishart (January 30th, 2013), “MEPs and member states clash over financial rules – concern over 
Council’s approach to negotiations”, available: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/meps-and-
member-states-clash-over-financial-rules/  
64 As indicated in Table One, one of the two main Parliament proposals under the regulation 
regarding enhanced surveillance for member states in serious financial difficulty – Reversed qualified 
majority voting in the Council on national budgetary reform – was approved in the process and 
became part of the Two-Pack legislation. The other major amendment in the Gauzès text – bankruptcy 
protection for member states facing default – was not approved amidst fears it would cause alarm in 
financial markets. 
Source: EUobserver (June 13th, 2012), “MEPs agree proposal towards ‘fiscal union’”.  
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early 2014.65 While this was derided by some observers as a back-down from MEPs66 
and merely appeared to kick the proverbial can down the road, it would serve to 
keep the issue of Eurobonds on the debating table, and slowly but surely up the 
pressure on Brussels to find a legitimate alternative to the consolidation’s existing 
approach to European economic reform.  
The amendments successfully inserted into the text by Parliament showed MEPs had 
been able to exert a far-greater level of influence over the Two-Pack legislation than 
in any of the previous economic governance reforms combined. They had been 
aware of their superior position of strength prior to the talks. Following the landslide 
plenary vote in June 2012, a Parliament official expressed his belief that debt 
mutualisation could legitimately be on the table for the first time: “before Hollande’s 
vote, I would have said the redemption fund was just a negotiating chip they would 
let drop. But now the political winds have changed.”67 Despite this, there was no 
redemption fund, nor a 100 billion growth provision carved into the final Two-Pack 
text, both of which had been so vociferously fought for by the Left. The non-
inclusion of the most controversial proposals set down by Parliament could be put 
down to three main factors: the need for efficient reform, material power in the 
Council and a less accommodating than expected political climate at the time.  
With the Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact already agreed prior to the adoption of 
this particular piece of legislation, efficiency was seen in this case by some as a 
secondary concern: an attitude which undoubtedly contributed to the lengthy delay 
in producing an agreement on the Two-Pack. Despite this, with the Eurozone 
economy still failing to gain ground during the summer and spring of 2012, the call 
for further action from member state governments and the international community 
unsurprisingly led to a feeling of urgency in Brussels. In October – with 
                                                             
65 European Parliament (January 16th, 2013), “Texts adopted – feasibility of introducing Eurobonds”, 
available: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2013-0018+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
66 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis 
67 EUobserver (June 13th, 2012), “MEPs agree proposal towards ‘fiscal union’” 
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unemployment at a record 11.6% high and rising68 - the European Council 
demanded legislators find an agreement before the end of the year.  
The problem for the European Left, led by Elisa Ferreira and the Socialists insisting 
upon more economic solidarity, was that urgency of any sort over the Two-pack 
seriously compromised the likelihood of their success. It had been well understood 
on both sides of the political fence for some time that the introduction of a joint debt 
liability scheme would never be an overnight phenomenon in Europe. Thus it 
followed: should a genuine proposal be put on the table, the terms involved in 
adopting such a long-term solution would require stringent and detailed debate. 
While the main aspects of the Two-Pack set down by the Commission were 
consistent with the existing reforms to economic governance, the creation of a 
redemption fund would represent a considerable break from this pattern and the 
Left needed as much time as it could get to rally support for such a fundamental 
shift.  
Both the redemption fund proposal put forward by the GCEE and the Commission’s 
Green Paper on Eurobonds noted that these options were unlikely to be set in stone 
in the short-term. Crucially, during tripartite negotiations with Parliament and the 
member states, the Commission said it would not be able to put a legitimate 
proposal for Eurobonds in place by the end of 2013.69 This was a curious admission 
by the Commission, especially since they had produced their Green Paper on the 
issue around a year prior to the impasse in negotiations. Perhaps the greater 
‘efficiency concern’ for the Left was in another idea highlighted by the Green Paper: 
that the introduction of a comprehensive debt mutualisation scheme would very 
likely have to involve treaty change at the EU level. Most parties were, again, in 
agreement over this inconvenient fact. As was the case with the Fiscal Compact (see 
Chapter 2), the need to make changes to the EU treaties was bound to scare off some 
and not concern others. However such a move would necessarily involve significant 
                                                             
68 Julia Kollewe and Phillip Inman (October 31st, 2012), “Eurozone unemployment hits new high”, 
available: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/oct/31/eurozone-unemployment-record-
high-eurostat  
69 European Parliament (March 7th, 2013), “Economic governance “two-pack” background note” 
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political wrangling and add a - mostly unwanted - extra layer alongside further 
delays to the debate.                 
While José Manuel Barroso and his Economic Affairs Commissioner Oli Rehn may 
have felt unable to produce a passable proposal for a mutual debt issuance scheme 
within the timeframe for agreeing the Two-Pack, much of their decision not to push 
for its inclusion was down to insufficient support for Eurobonds in the powerful 
Council.70 The Commission quite simply did not want to lose face at this stage when 
they knew there was a strong antagonism towards the issue in some of the member 
states. This was most especially the case for Germany, which led a group of 
countries fervently opposed to any form of mutualised debt.71 The same could be 
said of the Socialists attempts to have a €100 billion ‘growth fund’ inserted into the 
Two-Pack agreement. The priorities of centre-right finance ministers in Northern 
Europe were still centred around tightening the fiscal straightjacket on misbehaving 
members. It was clear that the shift in the political climate was more ably exploited 
in the European Parliament than in the Council: the massive majority of the plenary 
voting for a more fundamental shift in economic governance reform could not 
translate to a group where a qualified majority is needed and decisions of such 
importance are rarely ever taken if not through unanimity.72 
Finally, over the latter months of 2012, the political climate had become somewhat 
less advantageous for the bold reform asked for by the Left. Francois Hollande had 
made big waves at his first European Summit in late May, following his momentous 
election win two weeks earlier.73 
 
                                                             
70 De la Parra, S. (2013) The two-pack on economic governance: an initial analysis. 
71 Germany’s opposition to Eurobonds, and the dwindling coalition against debt mutualisation, will 
be examined in detail in the following section.  
Source: Benjamin Fox (12th February, 2013), “Deal near on Eurozone economic governance laws, says 
Rehn”, available: http://euobserver.com/news/119023  
72 “The Union’s decision making procedures – Extension of qualified majority voting” (accessed: June 
9th, 2013), available: http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/majority_en.htm  
73Carsten Volkery (May 24th, 2012), “France Dominates EU Summit: Hollande Steals the Show from 
Merkel”, available: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/euro-bond-discussion-dominates-
european-union-summit-a-834865.html  
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Table One: The Two-Pack – what made it in 
Parliament’s draft74 Final version75 
Proposals from Elisa Ferreira – S&P76 
Common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans 
Limit Commission power through ‘delegated 
acts’ 
Rejected 
Protect national practices and institutions 
such as wage formation 
Approved – “the need to respect national 
practices and institutions” (Art. 1, Para 3) 
More veto checks for MEP on Commission Rejected 
Opportunities for parties to engage in 
economic dialogues on points of contention 
Approved – provides scope for discussion 
between Council, Commission, Parliament, 
IMF, ECB and member states over enhanced 
surveillance (Art. 3) 
Encourage the involvement of national social 
partners and civil society organisations 
Partially Approved – “Recognising the role of 
social partners at EU level” (Articles 1 and 6) 
Commission’s expanded powers should not 
be used to hinder economic growth 
Partially approved – “Economic partnership 
programmes must identify priorities for 
enhancing competitiveness and long-term 
growth” (Art. 7) 
Requested significant cuts for ‘programme 
countries’ should not hurt education and 
healthcare 
Approved – “Taking account of the financial 
requirements to continue undertaking 
‘fundamental policies’, such as education and 
healthcare” (Art. 6, Para 5) 
Deficit reduction timetables applied more 
flexibly in exceptional circumstances 
Approved 
Creation of a European Redemption Fund Rejected 
Introduction of Eurobonds 
Rejected – Commission to study “feasibility 
of introducing Eurobills” and debt 
redemption fund. 
Creation of a €100 billion European Growth 
facility 
Rejected 
Proposals from Jean-Paul Gauzès – EPP 
Provisions for enhanced surveillance on member states in severe financial difficulty 
Mechanism to allow for a national default 
and US Chapter 11-style bankruptcy 
protection 
Rejected 
Increased Commission powers by 
introducing Reversed Qualified Majority 
Voting for the Council on debt reduction 
plans 
Approved 
                                                             
74 European Parliament (June 7th, 2012) “Economic governance “two pack” -  Q&A” 
75 European Parliament (March 7th, 2013), “Economic governance “two-pack” background note” 
76 While the amendments made by Parliament to the original Commission proposal totalled more 
than the proposals included in Table One, many can be included under one umbrella. For example, 
there were several amendments built-in to the Ferreira text that focussed on further opportunities for 
parties to engage in economic dialogue in regard to Commission decisions and points of contention.    
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However, the French President’s standing in Europe appeared to be on a slow but 
steady decline throughout the remainder of the year as he pulled back from initial 
plans to re-negotiate the Fiscal Compact treaty while experiencing falling domestic 
popularity (see Chapter 2). The Two-Pack legislation in itself had also inspired less 
protest and fervour amongst Europe’s disenfranchised than preceding chapters of 
economic governance reform. While the European Left had managed to rally 
together a number of demonstrations against the Fiscal Compact in early 201277, the 
reforms enhancing fiscal surveillance and increasing budgetary oversight failed to 
gain much publicity. This was perhaps a result of the Two-Pack legislation being 
sold as an ‘add-on’ to the already agreed Six-Pack. There were also fewer public 
recriminations offered by the various parties during the negotiation period in this 
case, as the Parliament and Council jostled predominantly behind closed-doors in 
order to concede as little as possible in the final text, which undoubtedly contributed 
to a much less vitriolic response from opponents to austerity. This combination of 
factors did Social Europeans no favours in their efforts to forcefully place their mark 
on another significant piece of economic governance reform.  
3.2 Edging towards Eurobonds: does ‘no’ mean ‘no’ for the Right? 
The passing of the Two-Pack had seen the European Parliament become more 
involved in economic governance reform than at any point during the debt crisis. 
Despite this, it could scarcely be argued that the concessions gained in the final text 
had truly represented a turning point in the EU’s political economy. The view of the 
author of this thesis is that it was not the outcome of the Two-Pack negotiations, but 
the ability to maintain and elevate the debate surrounding Eurobonds that became 
the primary achievement of the European Left. This allowed Social Europeans to 
gain a foothold in the discussion surrounding further economic reform and push the 
debate away from a heavily austerity-centric approach.  
The idea of mutualising European debt had been slated as a potential recovery 
mechanism, and future anti-crisis protection tool, at a very early stage in the reform 
                                                             
77EurActiv.com (26th January, 2012), “Trade unions plan pan-EU action against fiscal compact”, 
available: http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/trade-unions-plan-pan-eu-action-news-510386  
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process. A number of proposals were put forward as full-scale panic was setting in 
over the European economy during 2009 and the early months of 2010. The first idea 
to receive considerable coverage was the ‘Blue Bonds’ proposal issued through the 
Brussels-based economic think tank Bruegel. The paper, authored by Jacques Delpha 
and Jakob von Weizsäcker, distinguished itself from earlier versions by partially 
pooling European liabilities while ring-fencing higher levels of debt to remain in the 
hands of individual member states.78 The proposal acted as a precursor to the 
GCEE’s call for a European Redemption Fund, as it introduced the notion of 
incentivising sustainable national economic policies by collectivising debt below 60 
per cent of GDP, while punishing countries on “reckless borrowing path(s)” above 
this level through the unavoidably higher interest rates on remaining debt.79 The 
Blue Bonds proposal would join the GCEE report and the Commission’s Green 
Paper as oft-cited reference points for supporters of Eurobonds during an on-going 
debate which was to intensify as the economic governance reform process moved 
along.  
3.2.i Why Eurobonds? The anti-austerity balancing tool 
The Eurobonds issue has come to epitomise the two sides of the European economic 
debate and the battle between the two competing visions for an ever closer union. 
The Left’s on-going frustration at the austerity-first approach to reform was well 
expressed by Green MEP Marijie Cornelissen in the lead up to Parliament’s battle 
with the Council over Eurobonds in 2012. Cornelissen noted that the existing 
approach to economic legislation belied the divergence in viewpoints within the 
political machinery in Brussels and beyond, and called for Europe to reconcile its 
two faces by basing reform not only on reducing costs “but also (on) enhancing 
welfare.”80 The Dutch MEP claimed the tension between ministers within the EU 
institutions was not being addressed by the European Council, which had “mainly 
                                                             
78 Delpha, J. and von Weizsäcker, J. (2010), The Blue Bond Proposal, Bruegel policy brief issue 2010/03, 
Brussels, page 4. Paper, available: http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/403-the-blue-bond-proposal/  
79 Ibid, page 2.  
80 Marijie Cornelissen (28th February, 2012), “Europe needs to reconcile its two faces”, available: 
http://euobserver.com/opinion/115391  
A Reprieve for the Left 84 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
ignored most of the messages coming from those dealing with employment and 
social affairs, and only endorsed the ones proclaiming fiscal stability.”81 Moreover, 
she correctly pointed out that proposals within the governance structure for 
launching a “social recovery” had been vague and “merely repeated former 
commitments”.82 This was in sharp contrast to the binding commitments made to 
tougher rules on budgetary discipline across the EU.83 
Throughout the reform process, the introduction of Eurobonds had been seen by 
many as a potential method of balancing out new austerity-centric economic 
legislation. The basic effect of such a scheme would be to lessen the debt burden on 
the peripheral European economies battling to stay afloat, by allowing them to 
participate in a collectivised system where at least a good proportion of their 
liabilities would be guaranteed by all of the Eurozone countries. Whether the scheme 
was to be applied presently or only for future debt, the hope is it would pave the 
way towards recovery for struggling member states, while lessening the economic 
imbalances within the EU. Supporters of debt mutualisation argue it would prove 
effective in a number of ways:  
a) Lowering the cost of borrowing for indebted states:  
The creation of a Eurobond would significantly lower interest rates for highly 
indebted member states thereby lowering the cost of borrowing. The bond yield 
resulting from a total or partial pooling of European debt would likely even be lower 
than the weighted average of national yields.84 Currently, high yields are preventing 
southern member states from accessing capital and from investing public funds to 
stimulate their ailing economies.85 Eurobonds would give struggling countries the 
                                                             
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Delpha, J. and von Weizsäcker, J. (2010), The Blue Bond Proposal, page 2. 
85 Collignon, S. (2011), Eurobonds: the financial equivalent of the single currency – briefing note, European 
Parliament, Brussels, page 22, available: 
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ability to ease down current levels of unsustainable debt and provide easier and 
cheaper access to the financing of budgetary stimulus programmes.86  
b) Increasing liquidity in the Euro area 
A Eurobond would be a highly liquid asset with a large volume of available debt. 
Countries like Greece have become at risk of being insolvent, as a lack of liquidity in 
national bonds (alongside the high rates of risk) has led investors to pull out of 
periphery bond markets.87 However, a Eurobonds scheme would allow struggling 
countries to issue bonds in a highly liquid and safe market in which investors’ 
confidence would be restored, due to the reassurance that the stronger economies 
would be forced to foot the bill should the issuing country default.88 Moreover, the 
amount of debt available would help the Euro’s rise as a “second global reserve 
currency”, rivalling the US Treasury bond.89  
c) Providing incentives for fiscal discipline  
The introduction of Eurobonds would provide countries with high debt levels the 
incentives to become more fiscally disciplined, in order to be eligible for the scheme. 
As most of the serious proposals being discussed come with conditions attached 
based around adherence to existing or new fiscal rules, this would also help to re-
establish the credibility of the SGP, as well as fiscal rules set down in the other 
strands of European economic governance laws.90 Additionally, the incentives for 
fiscal stability could be reoriented “away from the dubious ‘stick’-based system of 
fines and sanctions and towards a ‘carrot’-based system of benefits for those states 
that can prove themselves to be fiscally sound.”91  
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87 Collignon, S. (2011), Eurobonds: the financial equivalent of the single currency 
88 EUCE North Carolina (2012), “Policy Area: Eurobonds”, EU Briefings May 2012, University of 
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90 Delpha, J. and von Weizsäcker, J. (2010), The Blue Bond Proposal 
91 EUCE North Carolina (2012), “Policy Area: Eurobonds”, EU Briefings May 2012, page 6. 
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d) Mitigating the ‘flight to safety’ syndrome  
As well as easing investors’ concerns by providing additional liquidity, Eurobonds 
would also mitigate against the ‘flight to safety syndrome’ that currently disrupts 
the European bond markets.92 The likes of Greece and Ireland are often shut out of 
the financial markets as their debt is viewed as too risky.93 As a result buyers seek 
out safer bonds in Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. If the divided debt or 
Blue and Red bond proposals were put in place, markets would define the boundary 
between safe and risky assets in terms of debt level as opposed to nationality. 
Investors would thus be able to move their money into higher quality debt in the 
same country rather than needing to look towards a different country altogether.94     
e) Aiding the banking system and the private sector.  
A joint liability scheme would improve financial market stability and as a result 
allow the ECB to focus on the overall functioning of monetary policy operations.95 
Eurobonds would also provide a source of more robust collateral for all banks in the 
Euro area, reducing their vulnerability to deteriorating credit ratings in poorly 
performing member states.96 Without the fear of ‘liquidity bottlenecks’97, banks 
would be more able to fund private investment, which would in turn help to create 
economic growth.98 The private sector could benefit further from the introduction of 
Eurobonds, especially if their design was along the lines of the EU ‘project bonds’ 
proposed by José Barroso, which would be used to create public-private 
partnerships to increase the number of growth-spurring investments.99  
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Other important advantages to creating a debt mutualisation scheme have been 
occasionally put forward by advocates. These include the prevention of disruptive 
speculative attacks on financially struggling countries100, increasing the integrity of a 
monetary union which arguably does not currently meet the criteria for an optimum 
currency area (as noted in Chapter 1) and the restoration of trust in the EU between 
member states, within financial markets and between citizens.101 
3.2.ii The German-led opposition: a risk too great 
The debate over Eurobonds has been at times at the fringes during economic 
governance reform, and at other times placed front-and-centre by opponents to the 
existing ordoliberal orthodoxy. Throughout the entire process however, the 
introduction of any debt mutualisation scheme has been met by resolute opposition 
from one key source: Angela Merkel and the German Government. While Germany 
under Merkel has been rhetorically supportive of more integration in the EU and the 
idea of an altogether closer union,  this sense of collective spirit has never threatened 
to extend to compromise in the realm of economic policy, particularly in regard to 
Eurobonds. 102 The dichotomist approach that characterises the consolidation 
coalition’s vision for integration was captured in 2012 with Wolfgang Schäuble’s 
pleas for “bigger steps in the direction of a fiscal union”103 complemented by 
Merkel’s refutation of the merits of debt mutualisation, stating that Eurobonds were 
“exactly the wrong answer to the current crisis” and would turn Europe into “a debt 
union and not a stability union.”104 
A proposal for Eurobonds put forward by then-Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Junker and Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti received a frosty 
reception from Germany and its allies in the European Council at the summit in 
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December 2010.105 Opponents claimed, and continue to claim, that any joint liability 
scheme would result in punishing the fiscally sound ‘non-crisis countries’ while 
rewarding less responsible governments by allowing them to continue profligate 
spending patterns.106 In more detail, the primary arguments used to counter the 
issuance of Eurobonds are as follows: 
a) Creating moral hazard  
A pooling of sovereign debt would create moral hazard and lead to a free-riding 
problem.107 Increasing the availability of bonds and lowering interest rates would 
not encourage struggling member states to become more fiscally disciplined, rather 
it would provide the likes of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy with fewer 
incentives to conduct sustainable fiscal policies, thus resulting in greater levels of 
spending and higher amounts of debt in ‘crisis countries’.108 Even some advocates 
for Eurobonds admit that the conversion of national debt into joint debt poses 
enormous moral hazard concerns. These concerns may not be simply allayed by 
creative construction of a mutualisation scheme that divides debt into European and 
national tranches, as the interest rate on the guaranteed component of the debt 
would be largely insensitive to an individual debt increase.109 This would therefore 
fail to create an incentive for countries to stop borrowing at unsustainable levels, 
something which most proposals are trying to achieve. 
b) Anti-re-distribution: hurting fiscally responsible governments 
A debt redemption or Eurobonds plan would re-distribute resources away from 
countries with sound public finances towards countries which have failed to keep 
their books balanced or their debt levels in check. This would result in the taxpayers 
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of countries such as Germany becoming liable for other countries’ debt.110 
Furthermore, Germany would not benefit from the low Eurobond interest rate as 
Bund yields have been comparatively low to what is likely to be offered under a joint 
liability scheme.111 The German Finance Ministry has estimated that the country 
would pay an extra 80 basis point premium over present rates, at a cost of €20-25 
billion over the next 10 years.112 
c) Eurobonds place within the economic governance structure 
A joint debt structure would not fit well into the existing European economic 
governance framework. A consensus exists among Eurobond detractors, particularly 
in northern Europe, that the imposition of fiscal discipline is the way to solve the 
crisis (as has been outlined in this thesis).113Any sensible preconditions for the 
issuance of Eurobonds have not been met and a sustainable fiscal framework must 
first be put in place to avoid the issues of moral hazard and free-riding.114  
d) Constitutional concerns and the ‘no bailout’ clause 
The idea of Eurobonds raises concerns over democratic accountability and 
constitutional legitimacy.115 Many, if not most, versions of joint liability schemes that 
have been put forward would likely require a change to EU treaties (some 
supporters of mutualisation agree). A Eurobonds scheme would necessarily involve 
the removal or adaptation of the ‘no bailout’ clause – preventing fiscal transfers 
between sovereign nations – under which so much European economic reform has 
been based.116 The German constitution, and likely some other national 
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constitutions, would also have to change in order to reverse limits on competence 
transfers and shared liability laws.117  
3.2.iii The tide had changed: just a matter of time  
The German resistance to Eurobonds has been equal parts about power, ideology 
and self-interest, as it has been about Angela Merkel’s government’s concerns for the 
future of the Eurozone. Germany has led a stern and uncompromising opposition to 
Eurozone debt mutualisation throughout the Sovereign Debt Crisis, but it looks 
unlikely to be enough: it seems that at some point over the next few years, Germany 
will have to compromise to an extent they have not yet experienced during the 
reform process and take the plunge on some form of debt pooling scheme. At the 
time of the European Parliamentary elections in 2014, the move towards Eurobonds 
was looking increasingly inevitable, whether their introduction would be two, five 
or 10 years away. In order to explain why this is the case, the rest of this section will 
examine how Eurobonds shifted from being an unpopular proposal in 2010, to a 
means of alternative reform firmly supported in many quarters today. Subsequently, 
Chapter Four will discuss how Eurobonds and other priorities for the Left continue 
to play a crucial role in Germany’s struggle between its commitment to an austerity-
based European economy and its desire to hold the union together.  
Germany’s dismissal of debt mutualisation had been long known prior to the wave 
of proposals for implementing Eurobonds were released and increasingly put under 
the microscope as the crisis wore on. The well-understood “fact of life”118 for 
austerity antagonists was that the German commitment to sound money, price 
stability and fiscal conservatism is deeply rooted and certainly not a historical 
anomaly (see Chapter 1).119 Many of the proposals took the German position into 
account, seeking to find a compromise that would not necessarily place the bill for 
Europe’s economic recovery firmly at the feet of Merkel’s government. Early in the 
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reform process, Merkel was not short of allies in her position on Eurobonds. In fact 
during 2010 and throughout most of 2011, there seemed little appetite for the idea: 
the presidents of the Council and ECB, as well as the leaders of Europe’s two biggest 
nations after Germany – France and Italy -  all publicly refuted suggestions that a 
collectivised debt issuance scheme should be part of the package to save Europe. In 
late 2011, Herman Van Rompuy stated his belief that the time was not right for such 
a move and that further budgetary convergence and more rigorous stability 
mechanisms were the way to solve the crisis.120 Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti 
claimed that levelling interest rates through joint bond issuance gave “the wrong 
signal”121 to struggling member states while Nicholas Sarkozy balked at the idea, 
arguing that “countries should be given responsibilities, not have them taken 
away.”122 
The views of Europe’s most powerful policy-makers were unsurprising, given the 
faith most of the political elite had placed in increasing fiscal oversight and 
enhancing consolidation as the key components to solving the crisis. In producing 
their proposal for a redemption fund, the GCEE noted in late 2011 that the respective 
positions on the issue appeared to be “almost impossible to reconcile” with 
“proponents of solidarity stunned that their Eurozone peers let them stand in the 
rain even at the risk of their own peril”.123 Other supporters lamented prior to the 
French presidential election that the German opposition to collective liability 
appeared “insurmountable”.124 
The real turning point for Eurobonds came, again, with Francois Hollande’s electoral 
victory, and it was clear the mood had changed when the French President departed 
from his first EU summit in late May 2012. While the issue had been reignited by the 
Commission’s Green Paper – Barroso had come to the party on Eurobonds following 
                                                             
120 Terrance Roth (August 22nd, 2011), “Van Rompuy cautions against Euro Bonds”, available: 
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his earlier timidity125 – and the GCEE report in the latter months of 2011, the 
European Left needed a champion for change. Hollande had given the anti-austerity 
movement in Europe a powerful voice, and his activism on economic reform 
extended into the realm of debt mutualisation. 
Despite German insistence that Eurobonds would not be on the table for discussion 
prior to the Summit126, Hollande ensured the EU leaders’ meeting on May 23rd was 
dominated by the issue. The French president’s vision for growth in the Eurozone 
very much included the creation of a joint debt mechanism and with supporters for 
Hollande’s demands greatly increasing in number and boldness, officials said the 
inescapable feeling from the meeting was one of a shift in power towards the French 
and away from the austerity-focus that had shaped discussions over the past two 
years.127 In fact, it was the first EU summit in years that had not been dominated by 
Merkel, and the schism between France and Germany was plain for all to see, with 
the leaders of the two countries declining to meet ahead of the event to agree a 
common position.128 This marked a complete departure from the strategy 
undertaken by the Eurozone’s two biggest powers during the Merkozy pact.129       
Hollande’s domination of the EU summit in May, where Eurobonds were discussed 
by EU leaders seriously for the first time, helped to transform a mere molehill for 
Germany into a moderate, but irritating mountain.130 Merkel stood firm on the issue 
and was, at times, particularly explicit in her defiance. 
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She ramped up the rhetoric when confronted by members of her government on the 
issue a month later, stating that “there will be no shared total debt liability for as 
long as I live.”131 This angry response had been influenced by Herman Van 
Rompuy’s decision to set down Eurobonds as a discussion topic for the next leaders’ 
summit on June 28th, having himself joined the ever-growing pool of influential 
European politicians to endorse some form of debt pooling (see Table Two).132 The 
fact was that Germany’s allies on the issue were rapidly retreating and taking an 
                                                             
131 Open Europe (26th June, 2012), “Merkel comes out swinging against debt pooling”, available: 
http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.nz/2012/06/merkel-comes-out-swinging-against-debt.html  
132 Van Rompuy, H. (26th June, 2012), Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union – Report by 
President of the European Council, Press release, Brussels, page 4, available: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf  
Table Two: The shifting climate’s effect on Eurobonds 
         2011       2014 
  
    
Pro-Eurobonds
Jose Manuel Barroso
Jose Zapatero (SPA)
Yves Leterme (BEL)
George Papandreou 
(GRE)
Enda Kenny (IRE)
Anti-Eurobonds
Angela Merkel 
Nicholas Sarkozy 
Herman Van Rompuy
Mario Draghi
Oli Rehn
IMF
OECD
Mario Monti (ITA)
Mark Rutte (NET)
Passos Coelho (POR)
Jyrki Katainen (FIN)
Werner Faymann 
(AUS)
Iveta Radicova (SVA)
Pro-Eurobonds
Francois Hollande
Herman Van Rompuy
Jose Manuel Barosso
Mario Draghi
Oli Rehn
IMF
OECD
Mateo Renzi (ITA)
Mariano Rajoy (SPA)
Elio Di Rupo (BEL)
Antonis Samaras (GRE)
Werner Faymann
Robert Fico (SVA)
Enda Kenny
Anti-Eurobonds
Angela Merkel
Mark Rutte
Passos Coelho
Jyrki Katainen
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alternative view: a trend which would only continue as Europe edged towards the 
all-important elections in 2014.  
Before being subjected to the rigours of an election campaign, the Seventh European 
Parliament played a crucial part in the slow but sure drift towards Eurobonds. 
Seizing upon the shift in the political climate after Hollande’s victory, the left faction 
managed to keep Eurobonds firmly on the agenda throughout 2012 and into 2013. 
While the promise of an expert study on the ‘feasibility’ of introducing Eurobonds 
and a redemption fund was hardly a ground-breaking concession from the member 
states, the publicity surrounding its release served to increase the pressure on 
European leaders against the backdrop of a lifeless Eurozone economy in early 2014.  
Though MEPs are often accused of being ‘out of touch’133, their effectiveness in 
coming together on the issue of Eurobonds was typical of a compromise mentality 
that has set the European Parliament apart from an increasingly divided Council. 
MEPs from the four largest party groups in the plenary voted handsomely in favour 
of introducing Eurobonds by adopting Sylvie Goulard’s Own-Initiative Report in 
2013.134 This included 80 per cent of the centre right EPP voting for debt 
mutualisation and, intriguingly, nearly half of the MEPs from Merkel’s CDU party in 
favour of the proposal in a bold break from the domestic party’s position.135 The 
ideological compromises undertaken by political groups from the left and right 
factions of the European Parliament led to a much more balanced approach towards 
economic reform. While helping secure the Socialists’ sign-off on increased 
budgetary surveillance and tighter fiscal rules, this approach has also led the 
Parliament towards taking a stance against Europe-wide austerity, with various 
reports from parliamentary committees warning that the existing approach presents 
the risk of a recessionary spiral with serious social consequences.136  
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The growing consensus in favour of debt mutualisation is not one encapsulating 
only policy-makers in Europe. The issue has become the standard bearer for the 
European Left and anti-austerity movement, but the dire economic state of the union 
has undoubtedly served to keep interested parties not directly responsible for reform 
– such as academics, commentators and stakeholders outside of the EU - invested in 
the idea of collectivised debt redemption in Europe. As voters went to the polls to 
have their say in the European elections in late May 2014, Eurozone unemployment 
stood at 11.7 per cent, only 0.3 per cent below the record high in 2013.137 While 
developed countries around the world were experiencing slow but steady recoveries 
from a global economic crisis five years removed from its low-point, growth in the 
Eurozone was an anaemic 0.2 per cent.138 With much of the positive activity coming 
in Germany, the economies of southern and eastern European countries – as well as 
struggling France – were not close to creating the revenue required to address 
spiralling debt levels in any serious way. The confirmation that Greece had finally 
reached a primary surplus in April was met with relief, but belittled by the fact that 
the country’s debt had reached a staggering 175 per cent of GDP.139  
While other proposals for growth facilities, public investment funds and, more 
prominently, relaxed budgetary rules have featured heavily in the debate, the 
Eurobonds issue has simply refused to go away. As well as it being seen as both a 
short and long term solution for the Eurozone’s inequities, much of the reason for 
this can be put down to the number of issues the proposed schemes seek to address 
and the amount of compromise already inserted into the plans for joint debt 
issuance, making it more likely such a scheme would eventually find consensus 
within the many layers of policy-making in the EU.140 
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Those now calling for the adoption of Eurobonds include Christine Lagarde at the 
IMF,141 as well as the OECD.142 More and more of the commentariat has jumped on 
board the Eurobonds bandwagon, with leading think-tanks Bruegel and CEPS 
among the organisations providing their own proposals while many others continue 
to endorse debt mutualisation. Meanwhile, both Barack Obama and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, David Cameron have been open to the idea while suggesting that the 
Eurozone collectivise more economic responsibility if it is to recover. The American 
president’s insistence to Angela Merkel that she ‘ease up’ on austerity measures in 
Europe at the G8 meeting in May 2012 further isolated the German Chancellor 
against a wave of popular opinion. This wave continued to swell in the two years 
following the May 2012 turning point before elections completely took over the EU 
agenda. By this stage it seemed the Merkel government was fighting a war, almost 
on its own, which threatened to seriously alienate Germany from its major 
neighbours, and outside allies such as the US.143 
Despite the great momentum behind debt mutualisation in Europe, Eurobonds are 
not yet a done deal. At the time of writing, there have been no proposals agreed 
upon by each of the Parliament, Commission, Council and member states to create a 
joint debt issuance mechanism. It would likewise be misleading to state that the 
forces behind the implementation of such a scheme were now ‘insurmountable’ for 
opponents, as some Eurobonds protagonists had feared was the case on the other 
side of the ledger prior to May 2012. In fact there are some convincing arguments to 
suggest that supporters will continue to be frustrated in their efforts to create 
collectivised debt redemption in Europe. The best of these arguments centres on the 
ever present power of Germany and a conviction that joint bonds cannot and will 
not be adopted without its approval. Francois Hollande has made it clear he is 
reluctant to go forward with designing concrete proposals for Eurobonds without 
Merkel and is aware that a change to EU treaties – therefore unanimity amongst EU 
                                                             
141 EUbusiness.com (January 23rd, 2012), “IMF head wants ‘larger firewall’, ‘eurobonds’ against crisis”, 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2012-1-en 
143 Reuters (June 19th, 2013), “Obama tells Merkel policies must improve lives”, available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-obama-berlin-jobs-idUSBRE95I0Y620130619  
A Reprieve for the Left 97 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
leaders - would most likely be necessary to see them through.144Additionally, there 
is no denying Germany continues to ‘hold the purse strings’ in Europe. Already the 
largest contributor to the bailouts, Germany would in many Eurobonds schemes 
again be the economic force behind debt guarantees. This idea has been exaggerated 
in some circles: while Open Europe and other anti-federalists have repeatedly 
suggested collectivised issuance would require German taxpayers to underwrite 
“the whole party”145, the GCEE redemption fund proposal, for example, would 
actually expect Italy to contribute the greatest amount to the €2.3 billion fund.146 
Some believe Germany will never cease to hold their position against Eurobonds and 
the adoption of more lenient budgetary measures due to a historically-consistent 
ideological edifice that separates the country from the rest of Europe.147 Moreover 
Angela Merkel has for the most part reacted to her unpopularity across the 
Continent with little anxiety.148 Opponents of debt mutualisation have also argued 
that the impact of the pro-Eurobonds movement has been felt mainly in political 
circles in Brussels and has made little impact on the outside world. As such, they 
claim this concentrated fuss is never remotely likely to overcome the principle 
concerns of opposing member states.149 
The arguments against the inevitability of change are legitimate. There is no doubt 
that the German opposition to Eurobonds provides the ultimate obstacle to their 
introduction. However, it must be noted that there are some who believe Merkel has 
played her cards in a certain way as to leave the door slightly ajar for the adoption of 
such a scheme in the future. While many of her public statements have been 
forthright about the dangers of debt mutualisation, she has certainly given slightly 
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different messages to different audiences on the issue. Merkel’s ‘over my dead 
body’-esque refusal in mid-2012 was delivered in front of her Government’s junior 
coalition partner at the time, the right-wing FDP.150 The claim she made actually 
denounced the possibility of “shared total debt liability”, which alongside her 
spokesman’s insistence that Germany was “not there yet”151 on the issue, left open 
the possibility that a more balanced option – such as the Blue bonds proposal or 
GCEE plan – could be a possibility down the track. Two days later before the EU 
summit Merkel stated that “joint liability can only happen when sufficient controls 
are in place”152, suggesting further that there may be light at the end of the tunnel for 
Social Europeans, at least when Germany is happy with the state of fiscal rules in the 
Eurozone. Moreover, it should be noted that complementing the German economic 
ideology demanding stability above all else, is a convincing logic that joint debt 
issuance should become much easier with firm rules in place. As mentioned in many 
of the more balanced proposals, economically strong member states underwriting 
debt will be much more comfortable in a scenario where their contributions are only 
financing more moderate levels of liability.   
Furthermore, claims that a strong anti-Eurobonds coalition still remains in force 
outside of Germany are starting to diminish the credibility of opponents. For 
example, Daniela Schwarzer’s claim of “an outright rejection of Eurobonds in a 
number of member states” falls wide of the mark. While the Prime Minister of 
Portugal, Pedro Passos Coelho, continues to stand by the German position – against 
heavy domestic opposition153  - come June 2014, Finland and Holland were the only 
other remaining Eurozone countries not in support of some form of Eurobonds 
scheme.154  
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3.3) Conclusion 
The Two-Pack process did not yield the concrete outcomes desired by the European 
Left and supporters of the Social European vision. It did, however, eventuate into a 
15-month battle where the European Parliament forced its hand to mitigate the 
effects of more central control over struggling economies, and reinvigorate the 
debate surrounding Eurobonds. The corresponding shift in the political climate in 
Europe away from the Merkozy-enforced austerity-fixation led more and more 
European policy-makers to question the consolidation coalition’s approach towards 
reform. While this shift barely made its mark on the Fiscal Compact, it has 
undoubtedly influenced the prospective move towards Eurobonds and a renewed 
concentration on greater economic integration in the Eurozone. These factors 
allowed Social Europeans to feel as though they had earned a victory in the year 
following the French election. Germany’s vision for Europe appeared less sacred and 
less secure.  
This chapter has discussed the developing debate over Eurobonds and legislative 
reform in Europe by examining the shifting political tide against consolidation and 
the changing positions of major players in Europe. The next chapter however, will 
turn away from a focus on economic governance to look at the effect of the crisis on 
another major political event on the Continent. The 2014 European elections 
represented what many believed would be a defining process in the history of the 
EU. The success of Eurosceptic parties in the election and the public disenchantment 
with the status quo has undoubtedly thrown a spanner into the works in European 
politics. The thesis will now examine the extent to which the rise of anti-European 
sentiment has positively affected the standing of the Eurosceptic vision, and ask 
whether an unlikely federalist alliance could provide the Left with another chance to 
shift economic reform away from its austerity-first focus.  
4. European Elections 2014: An Unlikely Alliance Emerges 
“The Eurozone crisis is a dialogue of the deaf between two rival schools of thought”1 
- Hugo Brady 
They probably couldn’t, and be shouldn’t be called the ‘comfortable crisis years’ as 
they were anything but comfortable. But the period between late 2011 when the Six-
Pack passed into law, and February 2013 when the troublesome Two-Pack became 
the latest piece of legislation, at least saw a European political landscape fully 
engaged in the notion of positive institutional change. As seen in the previous two 
chapters, this was a time of reforming the EU, not casting it aside; of more Europe, 
not less. However, the efforts to reform economic governance, which acted as the 
central tenants in the EU’s response to the Continent’s woes, were very much 
characterised by fierce debates over stability versus solidarity; of austerity versus 
growth. Compromises were never easily found, while both sides argued over the 
impacts of shifts in the political climate. Hugo Brady’s description of the crisis was 
thus perfectly apt. Austerity advocates and Social Europeans certainly had trouble 
hearing each other as they fought tooth and nail for the advancement of their own 
visions for the Union. It seemed somewhat strange then, that upon approaching the 
European elections in May 2014, the main topic of conversation was not the success 
or failure of recent EU reforms. Nor was the agenda set solely for another chapter in 
the argument over austerity. Instead, the narrative in Europe in the long lead-up to 
election-time was about the undeniable rise in Euroscepticism across the continent.  
This chapter will chart the rise of anti-European sentiment and explain how the 
vision for less Europe managed to gain such prominence. The explanations for 
Euroscepticism touched on in chapter 1 will be explored further in the context of the 
rise in anti-EU fervour since the crisis began. Accounts based on identity, economic 
loss and institutional distrust will all be considered. However, the second section of 
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the chapter will argue that instead of pushing Europe towards the brink of breakup, 
the recent wave of Euroscepticism could actually serve to be somewhat 
counterproductive towards its central vision, as the Union threatens to be pulled 
ever closer together by an unlikely alliance of federalist forces on the left and the 
right.  
4.1 Rise of the Eurosceptics 
On May 25th, 2014, it was revealed that voters across the continent had elected the 
most Eurosceptic assembly in the history of the European Community.2 The 
proportion of anti-federalist MEPs rose from 16.1 per cent before the vote to 22.6 per 
cent in the newly elected European Parliament.3 As the plenary sat for the first time 
on July 1st, notable gains had been made by the British Tory party-led ECR (plus 13 
seats), the anti-EU right-wing EFDD (plus 17 seats), while the number of non-
attached Eurosceptic MEPs had risen by 19, close to a 60 per cent increase from the 
previous Parliament.4 The Eurosceptic gains had come at the expense of the 
‘establishment’ parties, particularly the centre-right EPP which still retained the 
highest share of MEPs with 221, but had conceded a spectacular 53 seats. The centre-
left S&D did not fare quite as poorly, dropping five seats, while the pro-integration 
Liberals and Greens lost 17 and seven MEPs respectively.  
Perhaps the most alarming feature of the Eurosceptic rise was the extent to which 
anti-EU sentiment dominated the election campaigns within the member states. Far-
right nationalists impacted voting in the UK, France, Denmark and Hungary in a 
manner few could have imagined half-way through the Parliament’s previous term.5 
Nigel Farage’s UKIP and Marine Le Pen’s Front National topped the polls for the 
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first time in British and French history.6 The Danish People’s party also surged to top 
spot in the Scandinavian country.7 Meanwhile, encouraging gains were made by 
Eurosceptic parties in Finland, Sweden, Greece and Germany.8  
4.1.i Against the establishment: Vision for a European overhaul 
The European media began to take notice of the rise in Euroscepticism in mid-20119, 
yet the focus on the crisis, bailouts and economic reform meant it remained mostly 
in the background for the following 12 months. However European surveys showed 
the upward trend began well before this point, with a steady increase in anti-EU 
sentiment from the beginning of the economic downturn in 2007 to a record high of 
over 19% in 2011.10 This trend was seized upon with glee by Eurosceptic parties in 
the UK, France, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, and even Italy and 
Germany.11 Throughout 2011 and 2012, these parties made significant inroads in 
political polls and in some cases stormed their way into national parliament.  
In December 2012, Euroscepticism in Britain reached unprecedented levels with a 
poll finding 51 per cent of respondents would vote to leave the EU.12 David 
Cameron’s promise of an ‘in-out’ referendum on Europe just four weeks later 
created a stir on the continent, and forced European leaders to come to terms with 
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anti-European momentum in the UK.13 The Prime Minister had made his pledge for 
a referendum on EU membership – to be held in 2017 in the case of a second term 
being secured by his party – against the backdrop of increasing tension between the 
leadership and Eurosceptic Tory backbenchers.14 While many felt the ‘soft-
Eurosceptic’ Cameron had simply fallen prey to the internal pressures of his party, 
European leaders acted mostly with disdain towards the Prime Minister. The 
German and Austrian Foreign ministers criticised Cameron for his “cherry picking” 
approach towards the EU.15 Their Swedish counterpart was more damning claiming 
Britain wished to open up “a 28-speed Europe”, which would lead to “no Europe at 
all. Just a mess.” The French foreign minister mocked Cameron’s “a la Carte” 
attitude by comparing his approach to joining a football club and asking to play 
rugby upon arrival.16  
The planned in-out referendum in the UK represented the most consequential 
expression of the Eurosceptic vision in some time. Cameron’s pledge included a 
promise to negotiate new terms for Britain’s membership within the EU, which the 
voters would then choose to accept or reject at referendum.17 Essentially, it was a 
threat that amounted to “give us what we want or we are out” from the 
Conservatives. Despite this, there were few serious attempts made to brush off the 
popular surge in anti-European sentiment as simply a ‘British disease’. The UK was 
by no means a Eurosceptic outlier: by May 2013 trust in the EU had fallen from +10 
to -22 per cent in France, from +20 to -29 per cent in Germany, from +30 to -22 in 
Italy and, staggeringly, from +42 to -52 in Spain since the beginning of the crisis.18 
The following year saw the tide building steadily in size and momentum as the 
                                                             
13 Nicholas Watt (January 23rd, 2013), “EU referendum: In-out choice by end of 2017, Cameron 
promises”, available: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/22/eu-referendum-2017-
david-cameron  
14 the Guardian Editorial (January 23rd, 2013), “In-out referendum: Cameron’s hokey-cokey”, available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/23/eu-referendum-david-cameron-
editorial  
15 BBC (January 23rd, 2013), “Cameron referendum speech: EU reaction”, available: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21159365  
16 Ibid.  
17 Nicholas Watt (23rd January, 2013), “EU referendum: In-out choice by end of 2017, Cameron 
promises” 
18 Torreblanca, J. and Leonard, M. (2013), “The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism”, page 1.  
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elections of May 2014 approached. Eurozone leaders and federalist MEPs dispelled 
the virtues of integration on the campaign trail before bracing for the inevitable. 
When the tsunami hit, it caused a “political earthquake”19 that rocked the Union 
from Brussels to Bratislava. 
4.1.ii Fed up with federalism or anti-austerity? 
Chapter 1.2 briefly discussed commonly held explanations for Euroscepticism. While 
it is not the purview of this thesis to wade too far into this historical debate, this 
section will examine the competing arguments over the cause of the Eurosceptic rise 
in the midst of the crisis. Key issues often cited include identity concerns, the 
‘democratic deficit’, institutional distrust, economic loss and elitism. However, while 
there is agreement over many of the reasons for the rise, the contested part of the 
analysis lies in the debate over the extent to which it has been caused by anti-
federalist or anti-austerity attitudes.  
The anti-federalist explanation relies heavily on the role that identity concerns have 
played in the most recent Eurosceptic wave. Extremist, mostly far-right parties are 
credited for encouraging, or reacting to, a surge in nationalist sentiment based on 
fears over the loss of sovereignty to the nation state. The strong performance of Front 
National in France appears to be testament to this view. Marine Le Pen’s emphasis 
on French sovereignty and statehood has been at the centre of her party’s appeal to 
the electorate. She has labelled the EU a “Trojan horse of ultraliberal globalisation… 
holding us back and condemning us to isolation.”20 Proponents of the anti-federalist 
justification have downplayed the role of economics in the Eurosceptic rise during 
the crisis.  
Serrichio et al. argue in their analysis that during the turbulent GFC crisis years of 
2007-2010, economic indicators were not directly involved in fostering 
Euroscepticism, but instead the period reinforced the role of national identity and 
                                                             
19 BBC (May 26th, 2014),“Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ rocks EU elections”, available: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714  
20 Euractiv.com (January 25th, 2013), “Euroscepticism: More than a British phenomenon”, available: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/euroscepticism-more-british-phenomenon-
286609  
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political institutions as the primary explanations.21 Their examination of 
Eurobarometer survey results in 2011 led them to claim that Euroscepticism was 
only strongly related to a negative evaluation of the economy in four countries: 
Greece, Portugal, the UK and the Czech Republic.22 Leconte adds to this line of 
analysis, by arguing that the perceived threats to the nation state by the promise of 
more Europe play a major role in anti-European sentiment.23 She contends that the 
“Communitization” of certain policy areas, particularly those with potential 
implications on redistribution and on deeply held societal preferences, may loosen 
or disrupt ties between member states and citizens.24 
There is broad agreement that the declining trust in the EU and its institutions has 
played a significant part in the reinvigoration of Euroscepticism. As Leconte argues, 
public perception of the perceived responsiveness, transparency and trustworthiness 
of EU institutions has significantly influenced turnout and voting behaviour in EU 
elections and referenda.25 Thus, the hugely negative swing against the EU on its 
trustworthiness rating prior to the election no doubt played a major role. Advocates 
of the anti-austerity explanation argue that this is not the result of general 
‘integration-fatigue’ or an inherent lack of belief in the EU as a political union; rather 
it is an expression of dismay in European institutions’ inabilities to effectively tackle 
the crisis.26 This take on the crisis seeks to explain the Eurosceptic rise as primarily 
an outcome of economic disarray and resulting public disillusion. John Palmer has 
claimed that the “growth in support for far-right… has been fed by the worst world 
recession since at least the 1930s – mass unemployment and falling living standards, 
made worse by the self-defeating austerity obsession of European leaders.”27 The 
EU-level reform of economic governance aimed at alleviating the crisis has, after all, 
                                                             
21 Serrichio, F. et al (2013), “Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis”, page 61.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Leconte, C. (2010), Understanding Euroscepticism, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, page 179. 
24 Ibid, page 162.  
25 Ibid, page 249. 
26 Cecile Leconte (November 15th, 2011), “Debunking Myths about Euroscepticism”, available: 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/11/debunking-myths-about-euroscepticism/  
27 Shaun Harkin (June 19th, 2014), “The message of the European elections”, available: 
http://socialistworker.org/2014/06/19/message-of-the-european-elections  
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been based largely on fiscal consolidation and greater oversight over government 
expenditure (as explained in Chapters 2 and 3).   
Moreover, the anti-austerity argument appears to be the only legitimate explanation 
for the rise of leftist parties in certain member states during the European elections. 
In Greece and Spain, left-wing political movements SYRIZA and Podemos 
respectively, made large gains against the backdrop of vitriolic opposition to 
austerity measures imposed by both the EU and national governments.28 Other 
economic explanations for the rise have emphasised both the ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ 
frustrations with the economic state of the union, noting that the likes of Germany, 
Finland and the Netherlands have experienced increased Euroscepticism due to 
opposition to the bailouts.29 
The anti-austerity explanation is convincing for the most part but ultimately over-
simplified. It doesn’t account for the embedded nature of Euroscepticism prior to the 
crisis and, in particular, the surge in anti-European sentiment following failed treaty 
referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.30 One-size-fits-all justifications 
for Euroscepticism appear in general to be misleading. As Torreblanca and Leonard 
point out, anger over austerity may provide the best explanation in the PIIGS 
countries, while identity concerns dominate in the UK, Denmark and Sweden.31 
More pragmatic, non-ideological cost-benefit approaches towards the EU leave 
countries like Finland, Poland and arguably the Czech Republic outside of these 
classifications.32  
However, as noted in Chapter 1, explanations that remove economic concerns as a 
primary motivator for Euroscepticism remain unconvincing. The analysis provided 
by Serrichio et al. fails on two fronts. First of all, it does not effectively clarify the 
reasons for the upwards trend in Euroscepticism from 2007. While it notes the crisis 
                                                             
28 Ibid.  
29 Torreblanca, J. and Leonard, M. (2013), “The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism”, page 1. 
30 Startin, N and Krouwell, A. (2013), “Euroscepticism Re-galvanised: The Consequences of the 2005 
French and Dutch Rejections of the EU Constitution”, in: Cini, M. et al (ed) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Volume 51, issue 1, Blackwell Publishing, pages 72-73.  
31 Torreblanca, J. and Leonard, M. (2013), “The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism”, pages 2-5. 
32 Ibid. 
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“exacerbated” existing sources of anti-EU sentiment, it does not convincingly 
portray this as a non-economic effect or provide a justification for the lack of a 
similar spike in the more economically stable period of 2000-2007.33 Secondly, based 
on the data provided, the claim of a weak correlation between economic factors and 
Euroscepticism is sketchy, at best. Of the 11 countries found to be more Eurosceptic 
than the EU average, only two do not suffer from large dissatisfaction over national 
economic performance.34 Moreover, the large increases in Euroscepticism recorded 
between 2007 and 2011 were almost exclusively in the member states with poor 
perceptions of national economies such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Slovenia.35 
Crucially, a fault with the anti-federal explanation for the Eurosceptic surge is found 
in the latest Eurobarometer survey, which notes the hugely declining levels in trust 
for the EU, but also shows that 45 per cent of Europeans support the development of 
a ‘federation of nation states’ as compared to the 35 per cent who oppose it.36  
4.2 Europe’s true believers: A series of grand coalitions 
The reaction to the European election results was one of alarm in many quarters. 
While pre-election polling had suggested such a result was well on the cards, several 
morning-after reports sought to claim the end of the EU in its current form. The New 
York Times suggested the “angry eruption of populist insurgency” was set to call into 
question “the very institutions and assumptions at the heart of Europe’s post-World 
War II order”. The French were clearly left reeling from the result, as the sheer 
weight of votes afforded to the nationalists came as a surprise. Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls’ claim of a “political earthquake” acted as headline fodder for 
European and global press.  
The election results were meaningful and captured an undeniable feeling of 
disillusionment across the continent. The Eurosceptic vision had been given a huge 
boost: UKIP leader Nigel Farage basked in his party’s success, claiming an end to the 
                                                             
33 Serrichio, F. et al (2013), “Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis”, page 58. 
34 Ibid, page 59. 
35 Ibid, page 58. 
36 European Commission (2013), “Public Opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 
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‘inevitability’ of European integration.37 Farage’s sentiments were understandable 
and certainly defensible, as it appeared in the immediate aftermath that the 2014 
election may have provided a watershed moment for the move away from an ever 
closer union. However the Eurosceptic excitement ignored the underlying strength 
of the status quo, with federalist parties holding onto a dominant majority in the 
European Parliament despite the results. More importantly, the governments of all 
the major Eurozone nations, led by Merkel, Hollande and Italian newcomer Matteo 
Renzi, remained unapologetically committed to European integration.38 There was a 
sense among all following May 25th that the elections were a wakeup call, and that 
Europe must change. But the question remained: what kind of change? This section 
will argue that the rise of Euroscepticism is set to unite federalist factions, and in 
doing so create the kind of change nationalist advocates fear the most by pushing 
Europe further towards an ever closer union. Further to this, it will be argued that 
the evolving political landscape is perhaps set to benefit the Social European vision 
more than its competitors.     
4.2.i German politics: Merkel and the SDP  
Despite a resounding triumph for Angela Merkel’s CDU at the German Federal 
elections in September 2013, the embarrassing failure of outgoing coalition partner 
FDP to gain over the 5 per cent threshold39 left the CDU starring down the barrel of a 
tricky coalition negotiation process. It became quickly clear that the only option for 
Merkel was to enter into a second ‘grand coalition’ with the rival centre-left SDP. 
When the coalition agreement was signed in December, the Social Democrats 
managed to win a strong range of concessions. Germany for the first time would 
adopt a federal minimum wage while labour laws would provide more income 
protection across sectors. Additionally, a modest public investment programme and 
                                                             
37 The Economist (May 30th, 2014), “The Euosceptic Union”, available: 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21603034-impact-rise-anti-establishment-parties-europe-
and-abroad-eurosceptic-union  
38 Martin Banks (June 22nd, 2014), “Italy to push for ‘United States of Europe’ when it holds the EU 
presidency”, available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10918134/Italy-
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39 Euractiv (September 23rd, 2013), “Merkel triumphs as German liberals fall”, available: 
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progressive pension reform would be implemented and, with the strength of the 
domestic economy, there were no plans for an austerity approach at home.40 While 
given credit for their domestic triumph, the SDP was criticised by many across 
Europe for failing to influence a more progressively-minded approach towards the 
Eurozone. Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble ensured the policy on Europe would 
remain largely the same: the coalition agreement pointed the finger at other member 
states while demanding “structural reforms for more competitiveness and strict 
sustainable fiscal consolidation”.41 While the SDP’s fingerprints were evident in a 
section calling for the strengthening of Europe’s social dimension, Social Europeans 
would have been frustrated by the lack of clear cut caveats to the existing ordoliberal 
strategy: where the language was promising, policy commitments to a new direction 
in Europe were completely lacking. Notably, Merkel and Schäuble had refused to 
yield on their rejection of Eurobonds and debt redemption.42 
Following the agreement, many on the Left bemoaned what they felt would be a 
German status quo approach towards Europe. However, this sentiment 
underestimated the effect the shifting landscape in German politics could have on 
Europe. The Social Democrats had been heavily criticised during the previous Grand 
coalition for their lack of opposition to Merkel’s austerity measures on the domestic 
front. This in turn significantly damaged their vote at the following election.43 A 
determination to not to suffer the same ignominy on this occasion has led SDP 
leaders to pursue an ambitious leftist agenda as a part of the coalition agreement. 
This has already spilled over into the language used on European policy and will 
continue to do so.  
                                                             
40 Wolfgang Munchau (December 1st, 2013), “Germany’s coalition will have to break promises”, 
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41 Andrew Watt (November 29th, 2013), “Unintended Consequences: The Implications of The German 
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43 Geir Moulson (September 22, 2013), “Germany’s Merkel faces difficult coalition talks after 2 
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The Left in Germany has been lambasted over the years for choosing to side with the 
Christian Democrats ordoliberal orthodoxy over visions for European solidarity.44 In 
the few months since the coalition government took office, the SDP has already 
signalled that this will change. Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs 
Sigmar Gabriel called for more flexibility over the tight rules surrounding budget 
deficit and debts in the Eurozone in June, while stressing the need for a greater focus 
on growth and jobs.45 Less than a week after his comments, Gabriel was in Paris to 
meet with centre-left European Prime Ministers to discuss European Parliament and 
Commission posts, as well as the Left’s on-going strategy in Europe.46 His 
attendance was a clear sign that he stood with proponents of European solidarity 
and would not act as a lackey for Merkel.  
When the Chancellor proclaimed in 2012 that there would be no Eurobonds “as long 
as I live”, she did so in front of the most receptive audience possible in the form of 
the FDP, many of whom reportedly responded by saying, “we wish you a long 
life.”47 The fact is that should the debate in Europe shift further towards debt sharing 
and growth alternatives, pro-Eurobond Social Europeans now present in the 
coalition are likely to echo the pressure from the continent, and certainly unlikely to 
provide Merkel with a happy home for her austerity-centric strategy. While Gabriel’s 
approach certainly risks drawing the ire of his ‘bosses’ Merkel and Schäuble, it will 
be lauded by the European Left and quite possibly come as welcome relief to the 
German electorate, which has for years been unable to tell the difference between 
CDU and SDP European policy.48 This will, at the very least, help to present a few 
forks in the road for the German debate on Europe in the coming years. 
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 Euractiv (June 24th, 2014), “Socialists back Juncker, want other jobs”, available: 
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4.2.ii Blocking the fringe: The establishment unites 
After the dust settled from the European elections, federalists of all colours were 
quick to ask for perspective and eager to provide context. In The New York Times – 
only days after the same publication had reacted with alarm - an international 
business writer prudently reflected: “When can a vote of 25 per cent be described as 
a ‘stunning victory’ or even a ‘political earthquake’?”49Almost immediately 
following the vote the dominant factions in European politics began plotting ways to 
alienate the growing fringe. This is not likely to be a particularly difficult task in the 
European Parliament with law-making only marginally affected, if at all, by the 
increase in Eurosceptic MEPs.50 The lack of threat to the federalist, compromise-
happy Parliament has been outlined by French think-tank Notre Europe, which 
noted that “70 per cent of decisions are done via deals between the three main 
groups”, with the EPP, S&D and ALDE all refusing to work with Eurosceptic 
MEPs.51  
The Eurosceptic vision has been dealt a further blow by the confirmation of Jean-
Claude Juncker as Commission President six weeks following the elections. This is a 
particularly damaging outcome for David Cameron who had fought to block his 
selection, citing an undemocratic nomination process and a rejection of the 
Luxembourgian’s plans for Europe. The Prime Minister and Eurosceptic Tories had 
latched onto labels of Juncker as an “arch-federalist” political fixer52 and “Brussels 
insider” whom they claimed was exactly the wrong type of figure to reform the 
EU.53 However, Cameron failed to convince fellow EU leaders – including centre-
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right Eurosceptic allies in Sweden and the Netherlands -  to look elsewhere and 
could not enforce a ‘blocking minority’ in the Council against Juncker.54  
A European grand coalition has very much been forming in Brussels and most of the 
talk regarding deals in the Parliament and the Commission have been from the left 
and right of centre, while disjointed Eurosceptic parties struggle to come together. 
Juncker received a comfortable majority of votes in the EP to become Commission 
President, while the Socialists managed to secure the posts of Economics 
Commissioner and President of the Parliament as part of the cross-party 
agreement.55 Meanwhile, anti-EU parties have had a harder time finding common 
ground, an unsurprising development due to the vast array of ideological 
underpinnings at play between anti-federalist groups. Nigel Farage led the 
negotiations to form a 48-MEP strong EFDD group, not without its share of 
idiosyncrasies. Aside from its 24 UKIP members, the group consists of 17 MEPs 
representing the Italian Five Star Movement, led by comedian Beppe Grillo, 
alongside two Swedish Democrats (a party with a racist history linked to Nazi 
groups); an MEP seeking more EU subsidies for Latvian farmers; an aerobatic 
champion former mayor from Lithuania with alleged links to Russian crime; and a 
64-year-old Front National MEP who defected from the French party due to its racist 
policies.56  
While Farage is expected to have difficulty with the veritable motley crew that make 
up the delegations of the EFDD, the UKIP leader managed to achieve more than 
Marine le Pen. In a bizarre round-robin of accusations between a number of pots and 
kettles, the Eurosceptic blame game designed to publically out ‘the most extreme’ 
took centre-stage. UKIP refused to join up with Front National - which it labelled too 
right-wing - while in turn the French nationalists were unable to meet the 
requirements to form a Parliamentary group, after anti-immigrant Dutch MEP Geert 
Wilders refused to form a coalition with Polish Eurosceptics who supported the 
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abolition of women’s voting rights.57 The failure of Eurosceptics to unite over 
anything resembling a single cause while airing their pronounced disagreements in 
public has put a dent in the side of the movement. While supporters of the vision for 
less Europe in the predominantly soft Eurosceptic ECR have formed much more of a 
united front against the ‘overreach of Brussels’, they will struggle to remain 
unblemished by their louder and far more dysfunctional ‘allies’ to the right.  
While it is too early for academic analysis, a number of commentators have come to 
the conclusion that the Eurosceptic wave could well work as a blessing in disguise 
for the federalist establishment. British PR firm MHP said, “It would be a mistake to 
paint the 2014 elections as a devastating blow for the European project.”58 Instead, it 
believed the results would lead to “’more Europe’ and eye-catching initiatives to 
show tangible benefits to European citizens.”59 The Eurosceptic think-tank Open 
Europe reluctantly agreed. Director Mats Persson said that while European politics 
may become more unpredictable, the anti-European surge would “paradoxically… 
strengthen the resolve of the three mainstream groups to continue to vote for more 
Europe in the European Parliament, in order to freeze out the anti-EU 
contingent.”  Iain Begg of the London School of Economics felt that Eurosceptics 
would likely be frustrated by most of the recent and prospective initiatives for 
reform such as debt mutualisation and macroeconomic stability based on further 
integration.60 He also argued that the results could well spur federalists on, forcing 
the realisation “that the procrastination and squabbling over second-order concerns 
cannot continue and that all the institutions need to look for more comprehensive 
and coherent solutions”.61  
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4.2.iii Where lies the soul of Europe? 
Two months on from the European elections, cooler heads generally prevail in the 
analysis of the event. However, depending on who one listens to, the result is still 
being classified as a wake-up call, a turning-point in European politics or a 
cataclysmic eruption of public unrest. Chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis analysed 
European policy-makers’ reactions to the crisis through the reform of economic 
governance. This chapter has examined an election which acted as a report card on 
their efforts. The markers were not kind: David Cameron was correct in surmising 
that tens of millions of voters had decided to “give their governments a kicking”.62So 
what for the future of Europe and the political visions that will influence its 
direction?  
a) Separate nations, separate souls 
Eurosceptics will argue that this is only likely to be the beginning. They may be 
right. The voters’ response to being afforded their European scorecards at first 
glance appeared to mark a big red cross against ‘more Europe’. This chapter has 
pointed out flaws in the pro-nationalist/anti-federalist explanations for the rise in 
Euroscepticism. It has also placed a level of perspective on its real political 
implications.  However, Farage and his friends have certainly put a brighter 
spotlight onto the European project and there is a chance to make the inevitable 
become not so inevitable.  
Supporters of the vision for less Europe will hope the cluster of ideologues is able to 
make enough noise in the European Parliament not to render Euroscepticism 
obsolete in Brussels. However, the crucial battle grounds will lie in the member 
states. Local and national elections will provide the opportunity not only to spread 
the message at a more grass-roots level with greater voter turnout, but also afford 
Eurosceptics the chance to put pressure on mainstream parties to adapt to their 
populist policy positions. In many cases, small influence may be enough: where 
UKIP and Tory Eurosceptics have forced the British Conservative Party leadership to 
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wrestle with the idea of withdrawal from the EU, they have come close with 
opposition leader Ed Miliband. The Labour candidate for Prime Minister in 2015 has 
come under pressure from a number of his caucus to match David Cameron’s 
promise of a referendum following the UKIP’s election boil over.63  
Other areas of focus for Eurosceptics on the continent include Denmark following 
the strong election showing, Sweden and Spain where there are upcoming national 
elections, and especially France, where nationalists will be desperate to take 
advantage of their extremely successful campaign and indeed appear in a strong 
position to influence European policy in France. With France’s position as one of the 
two central drivers of integration throughout history, the influence of the Front 
National genuinely threatens to affect the course of Europe’s future.  
A repatriation of powers from Brussels is unlikely should the EU suddenly find its 
feet, and regain its long-lost respect from the public. While this chapter has argued 
that a grand coalition between the established parties in the European Parliament 
could act as a positive, this convergence could also potentially work for 
Eurosceptics. Should EU policy-makers resort to a series of lowest-common-
denominator compromises on major issues of reform, they will most likely continue 
to appear out of touch and will set themselves up to be punished by the voters.64 The 
danger of coming together lies in the perception to the electorate that there is no 
major difference between the major players, an assessment which will not act as an 
advantage should the European economy continue to flounder and other issues 
remain unresolved.   
Despite the best efforts of hard Eurosceptics, a breakup of the union is not on the 
cards. The biggest potential shakeup to the EU membership on the horizon is in the 
chance of UK exit in 2017. However, while certainly a possibility, it would at present 
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appear unlikely, with the Conservatives slightly behind in the polls to Labour65, and 
the near certainty that David Cameron will put considerable effort into the ‘yes’ 
campaign should he win another five years as Prime Minister.66 In terms of the 
broader Eurosceptic vision which wishes to retain the EU but opposes moves 
towards an ever closer union, the jury is still out on the new Commission, but 
support is weak in the Parliament and Council. Cameron may gain some concessions 
in renegotiation that he can sell to his domestic audience, but the governments of 
Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands will be relatively powerless to stop further 
integration. Meanwhile, the Swedish Prime Minister will first have to cling onto his 
position, which looks under threat from his Europhile Social Democratic opponent 
ahead of the national election in September 2014.  
b) How Social Europe will prosper 
Patience must be the virtue for the European Left, as the future looks brighter than at 
first glance. A number of developments would represent a victory for Social 
Europeans in the coming years: The adoption of Eurobonds, the creation of a 
substantial growth fund, a revision of the SGP, the creation of a Eurozone budget, a 
fiscal and transfer union, a re-focus on the social dimension. While all of these will 
not be achieved, and a full re-distributive United States of Europe remains beyond 
the wildest dreams of European socialists, some of these measures are distinct 
possibilities in the short-medium term. The most important facet of reform for the 
Left must be the removal of austerity as the weapon of choice for Europe’s economic 
woes, and this is certainly on the cards in the EU in 2014.  
Three factors have set the Social European vision up as the most distinct benefactor 
of recent political shifts in the EU. First of all, Brussels finds itself in the greatest 
‘must act’ situation since the near default of Greece in the heart of the crisis. Not only 
are EU institutions being forced to fight a still faltering economy, but also a 
                                                             
65 Jim Pickard (July 7th, 2014), “UK’s Labour leads Conservatives in latest opinion polls”, available: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1db41af8-05f8-11e4-89a5-00144feab7de.html#axzz37tHjilut 
66 Benjamin Russel (November 4th, 2013), “David Cameron: I can secure yes vote in EU referendum”, 
available: http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/441084/David-Cameron-I-can-secure-yes-vote-in-
EU-referendum  
Elections 2014: An Unlikely Alliance Emerges 117 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
disillusioned voter base and a Parliamentary fringe that wishes to pull it apart from 
within. The Eurozone must find an alternate vehicle to austerity to mend its woes: 
while the German economy has prospered in recent times, most others in the single 
currency are still struggling. The tiny economy of Luxembourg is the only other in 
surplus in the Eurozone, while only five of eighteen are currently adhering to both 
the debt and deficit requirements of the SGP.67 Moreover, calls for Germany to 
address its huge current account surplus, by pulling some of its exports from the 
periphery are increasing in volume and sincerity.68 The existing reforms to economic 
governance, while significant, have been based on a one-track tactic of consolidation 
and – regardless of arguments over economic ideology – it is an approach which has 
simply failed to deliver the desired results while becoming ever more unpopular 
among the public.69 
Secondly, the Left finally finds itself in a favourable position to pull together its 
influence and act. Chapter 3 explored the shift in the political tide following Francois 
Hollande’s election in 2012 and the slowly eroding support base for the German-led 
consolidation model. The scene following the elections, while somewhat complicated 
by the Eurosceptic rise, shows little to dissuade the Left. Whereas in 2009, a new 
European Parliament came to power met by Council laden with centre-right 
strength, the same cannot be said in 2014. Eight of the 18 Eurozone heads of state 
currently sit on the left, while an emphasis on greater solidarity is also supported by 
the leaders of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus inside the Euro Area and the 
leaders of Malta, the Czech Republic and Denmark70 outside of the single 
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currency.71A good deal of hope is being placed on Italian newcomer Matteo Renzi. 
The 39-year-old centre-left Prime Minister has stormed into Rome with a pledge to 
rid the political establishment of corruption and restore the Italian economy.72 With 
Italy taking over the Council presidency for the second half of 2014, Renzi will be 
hoping to exploit his strong standing to push the EU towards adopting less 
austerity-focused budget rules and a more collective approach to reform centred on 
the social model.73Renzi’s rise has been a particularly timely one for Social 
Europeans in search of an idol, as Francois Hollande’s domestic popularity and his 
influence on Europe as a result has continued to decline to unprecedented levels.74  
The other figure of great importance for Social Europeans is Jean-Claude Juncker. 
While hailing from the EPP, the experienced Luxembourgian politician has become 
known for his slightly more centre-left view on European integration and economic 
reform.75 Never having set out his own doctrine of integration during his time in 
Brussels, Juncker sent a message in his opening address as President by demanding 
a more political Commission and praising the “patient, courageous and determined” 
work of the founding fathers of European federalism in Jacques Delors, Francois 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.76 Juncker further disassociated himself from the 
outgoing commission – often accused of bowing to German demands over austerity 
-  by placing a heavy emphasis on social issues pledging to “revive the community 
method” and arguing that “you can’t achieve competitiveness by getting rid of social 
security… the internal market is not more important than social affairs.”77 Known as 
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supporter of debt mutualisation, having himself presented a plan for Eurobonds in 
2010, Juncker will be expected, at the very least, not to sit through three years of 
economic hardship before realising the need for a different economic direction in the 
Eurozone. Moreover, he arrives at a time where the European Parliament essentially 
managed to select its own the Commission President which, while under 
controversial circumstances, displayed the greatest shift in the balance of power 
away from the Council in European history. With a full backing from the vast 
majority of EU leaders, 78 Juncker has a strong mandate to act and will feel the 
necessity to make bold moves, so as to alleviate the pressure from the fringes and 
disaffected public.  
Optimistic advocates for reform on the European Left will no doubt also argue that 
they have already benefitted from closer cooperation with pro-austerity forces in the 
Council, Commission and Parliament. In recent months, European policy-makers 
have completed a landmark agreement on the formation of a banking union79, have 
worked towards the implementation of a financial transactions tax80 and have found 
common ground on the potential creation of a Eurozone parliament.81 This pattern of 
federalist reform not only underscores the commitment to ‘more Europe’ but also 
leaves the impression that moves towards increased economic solidarity may not be 
too far away.  
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c) Protecting the stability union 
The argument for a status quo austerity-centric approach to EU integration lies in the 
age-old belief that - regardless of the surrounding circumstances - Europe’s future 
comes down to Germany. While simplistic and somewhat overstated, like many 
clichés it has a strong element of truth to it. If Merkel and Germany continue to 
insist, it may be able to withstand the pressure for reform to keep the ordoliberal 
orthodoxy in place. However, while the loss of friends in Europe will not bother the 
German government to a great degree at the moment, an angry tide of anti-
European fervour will. Responding to an increase in support for anti-euro AFD prior 
to the German election, government ministers said giving up the euro would be 
“economically insane” and would mean “risking the collapse of Europe”.82 The only 
steady way forward for the vision of Europe under the consolidation coalition, is via 
a vast improvement for the Eurozone economy in the coming months and years. If 
there are few signs of the economy soon springing into life, imbalances being 
redressed and public disorder being tamed, Merkel – the pragmatist who happily 
accepted the bulk of the SDP’s leftist agenda to revert to stability in Germany83 - will 
likely be forced to seek a compromise that alters the political and economic nature of 
the union in favour of the European Left. The likelihood of a steadfast refusal to this 
end depends on perhaps the most crucial question of them all. Faced with the 
dilemma of protecting only one of its two post-war national orders, which way will 
it go?  
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the recent rise of Euroscepticism and its impact on the 
2014 elections. It has found that while there are a number of explanations for the 
spike in anti-European sentiment, including concerns over loss of national identity 
and feelings of a ‘democratic deficit’, the surge in frustration with the EU is 
primarily linked to economic dissatisfaction and an increasing lack of trust in EU 
institutions as they failed to substantially mitigate the effects of the crisis. Here this 
thesis has sought to look past the alarmist assumptions made by commentators 
immediately following the electoral results, and restored a sense of perspective to 
the analysis. While European leaders are aware of the mood for change, the 
Eurosceptic rise will most likely have the paradoxical effect of forcing the two 
dominant visions into compromise and setting the scene for more Europe, and not 
less. This is unlikely to work via the status quo approach advocated by Germany 
and its allies, with the consolidation coalition faced with a tough choice over 
embracing further solidarity if it is to restore public faith in the European project. 
The ordoliberal commitment to sound public finances, fiscal consolidation and state-
minded markets has worked for the German economy. Moreover, it has proved 
domestically popular to the extent where it is almost embedded within the nation’s 
culture. Meanwhile, the pursuit of peace and solidarity within the “fundamental 
rightness” of the European project has played at least an equal part in its recent 
history. Eurosceptics and many outside observers believe the crisis has exposed an 
impossible relationship between nations fraught with the problems caused by 
competing cultures. The Germans do not agree, nor have they ever. Angela Merkel 
rose to prominence in German politics as a protégé of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The 
great statesman, who referred to Merkel as “my girl”, was chief among the designers 
of the euro, a man who dreamed of the United States of Europe and believed the 
Union was a matter of heart and soul.84 Lewis saw Germany’s adoption of the euro 
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in the 1990s as “a device for flushing away the past”, but this obscures the true 
meaning of the move towards the single currency. The Deutsch mark was supremely 
popular85, and its abolition contributed significantly to the end of Kohl’s 
chancellorship in 1998.86 The creation of the single currency represented a sacrifice 
for Kohl and Germany in the name of European unity. “Germany is our fatherland; 
Europe is our future”, said Kohl. At a time when the European project has come 
under its strictest scrutiny since the Maastricht Treaty and austerity has failed to 
deliver, it is easy to imagine Merkel’s mentor’s words ringing in her ears, and she 
may yet make her own sacrifice. Germany’s future is Europe. A future for Europe 
must mean change.   
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Conclusion 
This thesis has traced the changing appeal of three visions for Europe during the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis period of 2010-2014. It has done so by looking at three separate 
rounds of debate: the economic governance reform process encompassing both the 
creation of the Fiscal compact and the Two-pack, as well as the European elections of 
May 2014. The vision of Germany and its allies promoting a more deeply integrated 
stability union has for the most part dominated the Eurozone crisis period. Through 
nearly all the major and minor reforms to economic governance in the EU, the 
emphasis on controlling deficits and debt institutionalised by the Stability and 
Growth Pact has been not only preserved, but enhanced. However, a shift in the 
political climate in 2012 and the effects of a rise in anti-European sentiment on the 
2014 elections have called into question the federalist ordoliberal status-quo. This 
thesis has argued that it is not the Eurosceptic, but the Social European vision which 
has gained the most momentum from the changing political tide in the Union over 
the past two years, and is best set to prosper as the continent emerges from the crisis.  
The success of the consolidation coalition in embedding its vision for Europe over 
the reform period had much to do with institutional control. While there was 
undoubtedly friction over the austerity-first approach to solving the Eurozone’s 
economic woes in the early months of the crisis, the fact that this vision was so 
strongly held by the most influential political actors remained the difference. The 
consolidation bias was heavily swayed by the Merkozy pact and robust initial 
support in Brussels. The philosophical familiarity between Angela Merkel and 
Nicholas Sarkozy allowed the pair to set a common strategy prior to crucial 
negotiations over governance reform in the EU. Moreover, the collective position 
held by European political heavyweights Mario Draghi, José Manuel Barroso and 
Herman Van Rompuy was one that stressed the need for a firming of fiscal rules and 
budgetary discipline as the most essential elements towards restoring the integrity of 
the EMU. Despite the pain caused by enforced austerity measures on the people of 
the PIIGS nations, it had become difficult for austerity opponents to argue against 
the edict handed down from Berlin and Brussels. The consolidation coalition was, to 
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a large extent, able to successfully circulate the view that the Eurozone’s imbalances 
had been caused by profligate spending and poor fiscal management on the part of 
the crisis countries.  
Prior to Francois Hollande’s victory in May 2012, the crisis period represented a 
turbulent time for the European Left. Outnumbered by centre-right governments in 
the Council and hamstrung by the sheer power of pro-austerity voices, Social 
Europeans struggled to promote their vision for full economic and political 
integration in the EU. The passing of the Fiscal compact derided by many as the 
foundations of an ‘austerity union’ represented a clear loss for the Left. As argued in 
Chapter 2, those seeking an alternative to the status quo response to the crisis did 
not have time on their side. The failure to renegotiate not only showed up the 
European Left’s material weakness but also revealed the fear held by many member 
states of alienation from Europe’s central brokers in Brussels and Berlin and 
marginalisation from the decision-making process.  
This fear began to quickly subside with the end of the Merkozy pact. The ever-
increasing support for the implementation of a Eurobonds scheme was indicative of 
the shifting political climate in Europe. Since this time, leaders have been looking 
more and more for alternative measures to tackle the crisis and have become critical 
of responses that focus wholly on fiscal rectitude. The increased scrutiny over the 
ordoliberal status quo however has not simply been a story about France and 
Germany. A shift in attention from stability to solidarity was put in play by 
Hollande’s ascension to the head of French politics, but was more than helped by a 
change in tune across European institutions in Brussels. Where Draghi, Barroso and 
Van Rompuy had all strongly endorsed austerity, they were now looking to 
reconcile fiscal discipline with provisions for growth and plans for public 
investment. To Germany’s chagrin the consolidation coalition has dwindled in size 
since the crisis reform period’s turning point. Equally instrumental in the revival of 
the Social European vision has been a realisation of the failure of austerity measures 
to spark anything close to the economic recovery so desperately needed in the 
Eurozone, as discussed in Chapter 4. The crisis period has provided four years of 
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pain for disenfranchised Europeans and has thus served to act as a learning episode 
for the failings of the consolidation-centric approach to recovery.     
The most telling outcome of this period in Europe’s history has been the 
reinforcement of an unwavering commitment towards further European integration. 
This development has hurt the Eurosceptic vision with more Europe appearing 
increasingly inevitable. Some will argue against this position and point to 
uncertainty over the lasting effects of the Eurosceptic rise in the 2014 elections. Why 
should advocates of ‘less Europe’ not be able to latch onto uncertainty over the 
European project in the same way opponents to austerity have been able to push the 
conversation on economic reform away from an obsession over balanced budgets 
and fiscal sanctions? The greatest chance for Eurosceptics will initially be at national, 
and not the European level. Forthcoming elections in The UK, Sweden and Spain 
will provide the opportunity for anti-EU parties to exploit public antipathy towards 
Brussels and perhaps more importantly, upset the status quo by forcing mainstream 
parties to court the Eurosceptic vote. It would be foolish to brand the success of 
nationalist parties at the elections as a flash in the pan, as these movements certainly 
unearthed a deeper-lying concern over a declining trust in EU institutions. However, 
the inability of Eurosceptic parties to form any sort of coherent coalition of ideas 
across the continent – as indicated by the idiosyncratic groupings in the European 
Parliament – showed just how weak the anti-establishment movement remains 
relative to the political actors representing the two federalist visions.  
The explanations offered in this thesis for the changing political landscape in Europe 
throw up a number of interesting questions about how politics is made in the EU. 
The primary purpose of this work has been to uncover the political soul of Europe 
by analysing the contrasting fortunes of the three competing visions over the crisis 
period, and while it is beyond the scope of this thesis to wade into the contested 
debate over the location of power in EU policy-making, it is a discussion which 
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could help to illuminate some of the conclusions found here. This debate has been 
best captured in more recent years by the likes of Moravcsik, Hix1 and Richardson.2   
This thesis does not take a position on which is the more accurate theoretical 
understanding of the political process in Europe. However, the author broadly 
agrees with the evaluation offered by Hix, which holds sympathy Moravcsik’s 
analysis of Germany and France as the traditional drivers of integration and the two 
key players in the series of grand bargains, but notes the inability of 
intergovernmental theory to explain “the more complex environment of day-to-day 
legislative politics in the EU”.3 The period in European politics covered by this thesis 
provides an interesting case study for this existing debate and is certainly worthy of 
further examination. This is especially the case due to the crisis-response nature of 
economic policy-making in Europe over the past four years. The processes by which 
policy is made in the EU during normal economic cycles have almost undoubtedly 
been altered in the crisis period and it would be interesting to discover how 
traditional explanations of EU politics can attest to these changes.  
This thesis has concluded that the overarching commitment to more Europe held by 
the political establishment in the EU has proved to be too big of a barrier for 
supporters of the Eurosceptic vision to overcome. This is likely to continue to be the 
case. In fact, moves towards a more complete federalism are more on the cards than 
they were before the global economy took a disastrous turn for the sores in 2008. 
Furthermore, it has been argued here that the unlikely alliance of pro-EU forces 
created to oppose the Eurosceptic rise should more heavily benefit the Social 
European vision than those who make up the consolidation coalition. So what does 
this mean for Europe’s future? The momentum gained by the Left prior to the May 
2014 elections will not have been significantly disrupted by the outcome. Rather, 
calls for alternatives to the existing austerity-centric approach to reform have gained 
more credence, with the integrity of the European project in its current guise under 
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threat. Onlookers should not expect a denouncement of the rules which make up the 
consolidation-based EMU, nor should they dream of Berlin and Brussels embracing 
anything resembling a truly socialist Union. There is enough support within the 
Union to maintain the ordoliberal orthodoxy’s commitment to sound money and 
strong public finances to a considerable degree. However, in order to protect the 
whole, Germany and its allies will most likely call for a compromise which repairs 
the social dimension and re-establishes European solidarity as the Union moves ever 
closer towards a more complete federation of nation states. 
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